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PREFACE
The McDonnell Douglas Astronautics Company has been engaged in a Space
Station Data System Analysls/Archltecture Study for the National Aeronautics
and Space Administration, Goddard Space Flight Center. This study, which
emphasized a system engineering design for a complete, end-to-end data system,
was divided into six tasks:
Task l.
Task 2.
Task 3.
Task 4.
Task 5.
Task 6.
Functional Requirements Definition
Options Development
Trade Studies
System Definitions
Program Plan
Study Maintenance
McDonnell Douglas was assisted by the Ford Aerospace and Communications
Corporation, IBM Federal Systems Division and RCA in these Tasks. The Task
inter-relatlonshlp and documentation flow are shown in Figure l.
This report was prepared for the National Aeronautics and Space
Administration Goddard Space Flight Center under Contract No. NAS5-28082
Questions regarding this report should be directed to:
Glen P. Love
Study Manager
McDonnell Douglas Astronautics Company
Huntington Beach, CA 92647
(714) 896-2292
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Volume II
TASK 2 - OPTIONS DEVELOPMENT
2.0 DESIGN OPTIONS
SUMMARY
Thls volume contains the options development for the Design Options Category.
The speclflc deslgn options and their respective volume II section numbers are
as follows:
2.1
2.2
2.2.1
2.2.2
2.2.3
*2.2.4
2.2.5
2.2.5.1
*2.2.5.2
2.2.5.3
*2.2.5.4
Software
2.l.1 Data Base Management
2.1.2 Resource Management
2.1.3 Distributed Operating System
System Architecture
Fault Tolerance
Autonomy/Automatlon
System Growth
Deleted
System Interfaces
SSDS/Payload
Deleted
Man/Machlne (workstations)
Deleted
2.3 System Securlty/Prlvacy
2.4 Time Management
2.5 Communicatlons
2.5.1 Space Communications
2.5.2 Wide Area Communications
2.5.3 Local Area Networking
2.6 Network Performance Assessment
For the options development general approach and methodology the reader is
referred to the introductory sections of Task 2, Options Development, Volume I.
* These items have been deleted or incorporated into other sections.
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DATA BASE MANAGEMENT (OPTIONS 2.1.1)
2.1.1,1.0 INTRODUCTION AND APPROACH
The Data Base Management Systems (DBMS's) that will be used in the Space
Station Program (SSP) will probably not be designed from basic data base
principles but rather will be vendor products (possibly modified for a
specific application). This is necessary to realize cost effectiveness.
lhere has also been a great deal of investment in this area in the commercial
world. However, it is still necessary to understand the principles of DBMS's
to select the commercial products which are best suited for the "user driven"
data manipulation requirements in the SSP. The characterization of user data
manipulation requirements and the characterization of the data collection
method and location(s) are the primary drivers in determining the desired DaMs
characteristics such as:
data structure
distribution/partitioning
replication/recovery
interface
presentations and reports
The details of various vendor options can be traded to establish the best
match to the requirements. The problem boils down to understanding the
features of various vendor options and understanding the diverse requirements
of various SSP SSIS data handling entities. These SSIS entities are
distinquishable because of unique data views and locations. Some segment(s)
of the SSP DB exist(s) at each SSIS entity. The list of entities identified
on the SSP is given in section 5.1. At each of these entities there will be
individuals(or teams of individuals) called data base administrators (DBA's)
with the responsibility to make the data base design decisions. These DBA's
will have to understand the requirements of DB users and available vendor
options to make decisions. This paper is written to aid the DBA's in these
decisions.
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The approach taken in this SSDS A/A study is to consider all SSIS DB entities
and then to concentrate on the characteristics of the SSD$ DB embedded within
the SSIS. For the data base problem this approach translates into the
following study stages:
I , Define all the SSIS DB entities using the TASK i functions list and
the basic premise that there will be partitioning and geographic
distribution of TASK 1 levelO functions.
Determine which of these DB's are within the SSDS (exclude TMIS
segments) while still considering required connectivity and
interfaces of all segments.
, Characterize the SSD$ DB entities by:
i) data type and source
ii) functional manipulation requirements
iii) connectivity
using the supporting material in Appendix B.
, Define options for commercial products applicable to the ground
segments.
. Define options (commercial, modified commercial or "roll your own")
for space segments.
The data base design process will then continue into the $SDS A/A TASK 3 and
'TASK 4 where trades will be performed and a design will be recommended. TASK
3 and TASK 4 will have the following stages:
6. Partition the SSD$ DB's by space/ground segments
. Partition the SSDS DB ground segments to as low a level as required
to separate by utilization (development, operational, scientific/PL)
I
and also by interest domains, data types and DBMS functional
requirements (see section 1,5)
, Trade options and define recommended SSD$ DB architecture.
B
2.1.1.1.1 PROGRAMREQUIREMENTSFORDBMS's
1.1.1 TRACEABILITYTO FUNCTIONLIST
As part of the SSDS A/A Study Task No.l a list of functions has been
developed. In Appendix A the functions requiring DBMS support are listed. An
assumption has been made that data being processed in a transport service such
as a telemetry stream or communication network where short term buffering is
required is not a part of the DBMS.
1.1,2 CUSTOMER REQUIREMENTS FOR STANDARD SERVICES FROM THE SSIS
Appendix B contains extracts from the SSIS/SCS document prepared at GSFC.
This material defines the DB segments to support the "short and long term"
storage requirements of customer data.
1.1,2 SPACE STATION REFERENCE CONFIGURATION
The Space Station Reference Configuration document suggests some
characteristics for the onboard data base, The sections of this document
describing the data base characteristics are included in Appendix B.
1.1.4 SS DEFINITION & PRELIMINARY DESIGN RFP
The Phase B RFP describes functional attributes of the DBMS and these sections
are included in Appendix B.
1.1.5 SSIS DATABASE MANAGEMENT SERVICE
The SSIS final report (JPL D-1737) contains recommended characteristics of the
DBMS services and these are included in Appendix B.
1.2 TMIS
The TMIS can be mapped to functions defined to be within the SSIS. The data
base maintained by the TMIS corresponds to section 7.5 of the functions list,
that is "Configuration Management". The TMIS is considered to contain the
following data segments:
TMIS DATACONTENT
LEVEL B SE&I MASTER DATA BASE(MDB)
- LEVEL A SPEC
- SSIS CONFIG(CONNECTIVITY,ICD's)
- REF CONFIG(DRAWINGS,TEXT)
- WP ICD's
LEVEL B SE&I ENGINEERING MASTER SCHEDULE(EMS)
- SE&I SCHEDULES
- S/W SCHEDULES
- HARDWARE SCHEDULES
LEVEL C SE&I DATA BASE
- HARDWARE SPEC's
- SUBSYSTEM ICD's
- S/W REQUIREMENTS
- SSE REQUIREMENTS
The functional description of TMIS provided in the Phase B RFP is included in
Appendix B. The TMIS Functions equate closely to the "development" portion of
the major partitioning described in Table 5.1.3. The TMIS DBMS is not
considered to be a part of SSDS but there there may be some data exchange
required From the SSDS DB segments to support TMIS. It is not known at this
time what that data might be.
1.3 SCOPE OF DATA BASE MANAGEMENT
A basic issue that needs to be addressed concerning data created as a part of
the SSP is " should this data be included under a DBMS that allows the data to
be shared or should it remain under control of the owner in some simple file
handler"?. A lot of data will be created which is of no interest to anyone
but the originator. There may also be data only of interest to a small
group. Should that data be managed by this group or a central authority? An
example might be a special analytical tool developed by a contractor. These
issues must be addressed to establish the scope of each DB segment and the
partitioning of authority For administration of each segment. To establish
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reachability of data the need for remote access must be demonstated. In
section 1.2 the segmentsof TMISwhere described along with the contents of
each segment. This list gives the characteristics of data that will be shared
and should reside in a DB. In this section the DB's other than TMISare
characterized and the data described is considered shared data which should
reside in the data base.
The need for data bases other than TMIS is clear from the Task 1 requirements
(Appendix A). The following preliminary partitioning along functional lines
is proposed:
DATA BASES OTHER THAN TMIS
SSE DB
- SOFTWARE
- MODELS
- TEST SCRIPTS
- RESOURCE SCHEDULING
TRAINING DB
- PROCEDURES
- SCHEDULES
INTEGRATION SITE
- SOFTWARE
- INTEGRATION SCHEDULES
- PROCEDURES
- TEST SCRIPTS
SSCC
- SPACE STATION STATUS
- MISSION SEQUENCING
- COMMAND PROCEDURES
POCC DB
- PLATFORM/PL ENGINEERING DATA
- EXPERIMENT DATA
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REGIONALDATACENTERS/DISCIPLINEDATACENTERS
- SPACESTATIONANCILLARYDATAARCHIVE
- PLATFORMANCILLARYDATAARCHIVE
- FF ANCILLARYDATAARCHIVE
SPACESTATIONO/B DATA BASE
- DOCUMENT MANAGEMENT
- MANUALS(PROCEDURES)
- DAILY SCHEDULES
- DIAGNOSTIC SUPPORT(SCHEMATICS)
- SOFTWARE
- CHECKPOINTS
- SUBSYSTEM TREND DATA
- REAL-TIME DATA
- BUFFERED DATA(RECORDERS)
CO-ORBITING/POLAR-ORBITING PLATFORM O/B DATA BASE
- ENGINEERING DATA
- SCIENTIFIC DATA
DATA HANDLING FACILITY
- LEVELO DATA
- SHORT TERM ARCHIVE
- LONG TERM ARCHIVE
1.4 DATA BASE ADMINISTRATION
There will be some one identifiable person (or team of people) who has the
central responsibility for the "operational data" (i.e. the released d(_ta
viewed by DB users). This person is the data base administrator (DBA). The
centralized control of the operational data performed by the DBA provides the
capability to:
Reduce redundancy
Avoid inconsistency
Share data with new applications
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EnForce standards
Apply security restrictions
Maintain integrity
Structure For performance For most used applications
The role of the DBAis important and a high degree of technical expertise is
required. The DBAresponsibilities include:
Deciding information content of DB
Deciding storage structure and access strategy
Coordinate with users
Define authorization checks and validation procedures
Define strategy for backup and recovery
Monitor performance and respond to requirements changes
The DBA must have the techical expertise to understand the applications of the
data being stored and manipulated and also be a DB expert. The DBA is
supported by a number of utility programs which are an essential part of a
practical DBMS. One of the most important DBA utilities is the "data
dictionary" which is effectively a DB containing descriptions of the DB
content.
For the SSP there will be many DBA's, each with responsibility For one of the
DB's described in sections 1.2 and 1.3 or some segment of a DB. The
assignment of these individuals or teams should be done in parallel with major
DB partitioning and should be done early in the program before DB's start
emerging with no visible control mechanism (i.e. DBA). This mainly concerns
TMIS where system requirements are emerging during phase B.
1.5 DATA CHARACTERISTICS
The characterization of data within a data base will aid in determining the
data base system features required to manipulate this data. The table below
contains the three basic data types, their attributes and the Functions needed
from the DBMS. Each DB entity contains segments. Each segment contains just
one of these data types.
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TABLE1.5.1 DATACHARACTERIZATION
TYPE I ATTRIBUTES I DBMS FUNCTIONS
I I RE@UIRED
I I
SAMPLED DATA
"TEXT
ASSOCIABLE
o NUMERICAL DATA
RECORDS FROM EXP OR
OPERATIONAL SENSORS
o ANCILLARY DATA
RECORDS
o ALPHA NUMERIC
CHARACTERS ENTERED
AND STORED BY LINE
AND PAGE AND
DOCUMENT
I
o TABLES OF DATA
IN WHICH LOGICAL
INFERENCES CAN BE
o STORE
o RETRIEVE
o COPY
o ARCHIVE
o CREATE FILE
o KEEP DIRECTORY
o WORD PROCESSING
o STORE
o RETRIEVE
Io COPY
o PRESENTATION
o CREATE FILE
o KEEP DIRECTORY
o AD HOC QUERY
o MANIPULATE
- JOIN
MADE FROM CORRELATIONI - PROJECT
I - RESTRICT
Io PRESENTATION
I
I
I
Data can also be broadly categorized by major phase or area of the program:
i) Development (dev schedules, dev status, analysis, specs, ICD's)
ii) Operational (activity sch, vehicle status)
iii) Scientific (experiment data)
Table 5.1.3 illustrates a partitioning along these lines. This subdivision
will aid in determining the range of visibility needed within each data base
and thus network connectivity. Some data can logically fall into multiple
categories in which case this categorization may not help partitioning so
much. As an example, operational data contains the ancillary data and will be
of interest to the scientific community. The ancillary data will also be used
for vehicle monitoring. There is also a good deal of overlap within the
development and operational areas. This grouping can still be used as a high
level segmentation to minimize constaints on DB selection caused by coupling
diverse requirements.
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2,1.1.2. TECHNICAL ATTRIBUTES OF OPTIONS
2.1 DATA MODEL (STRUCTURE) (reference iB)
The data model is the logical method used to organize and retrieve data. It
has two aspects:
i) How the data is organized and structured
ii) How the data is accessed
There are four options:
i) Relational
ii) Hierarchical
iii) Network
iv) Inverted
lhe selection of a data model depends on the nature of the application. 3eff
Stamen of Management Decision Systems suggests the following generic selection
criteria:
Planning and analysis Decision Support Systems
(graphics,word processing,
electronic mail,etc.)
Management Control I Relational
Operational I Structured (hierarchical, network,
inverted)
2.1.1 RELATIONAL
The relational model introduced by E.F. Codd (reference 17) in 1970 has
demonstrated many features desireable in a DBMS: flexibility for growth with
minimal impact, ad-hoc query. Q tutorial on the distributed relational DB has
been prepared and included as Appendix C. This material is from reference I.
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2.1.2 HIERARCHICAL
This model is the original model for data and is widely used. It presents the
fastest access of any model along the primary path (i.e., a direct search to a
piece of data from the root). It responds best to data searchs desribed as
"many to one" but doesn't handle "many to many" well. It can use a lot of
redundant data storage. It is relatively inflexible requiring much
preplanning for performance. The strengths of this model are for large data
bases with many users queries being serviced. For DB's where the data is
either "sampled data" or "text" (as described in section 1.5) this model
presents the best performance. Much of the "operational" and "scientific"
data will fall in these categories.
2.1.3 NETWORK
The network solution for general usage is better than the hierarchical
although not as fast on the primary path. It is much better for multiple
search strategies. The network model can represent the hierarchical "many to
one" search as a subset. It can represent any relationship easily and
efficiently. However, it is difficult to add, change or delete
relationships. It is also difficult to add, change or delete files.
2.1.4 INVERTED
An inverted file is one in which access to record occurrences can be gained by
presentation of one or more data item values (keys). For example, a
bibliographic file might be inverted on three keys: title, author, and
subject. A file is "totally inverted" if access can be gained through any
data item value. Otherwise, it is "partially inverted". The inverted model
is as flexible for growth as the relational model. Some implementations are
more mature than the relational model(i.e., in the areas of: on-line DB,
query, large DB's. The inverted model is applied especially well to multi-key
retrieval. If the DB is highly dynamic the inverted model can result in high
overhead.
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2.2 DISTRIBUTION QND PQRTITIONING
Data bases may be "fully partitioned" or "fully replicated" or something
inbetween. In the fully partitioned case each database segment is stored in
exactly one place. In the fully replicated case each database segment is
stored in all locations. Replication is not desirable if updates are common
because of several problems: difficulty in keeping copies identical and
network delays. However, replication is used to improve performance and as a
recovery technique. These conflicting issues must be traded in DB design.
Distributed data base systems are an important application of computer
networking, Distributed data base systems infers that there is some
geographical distribution of the data base. This distribution can present the
DB designer with several advantages:
i) increased reliability because redundancy is build in to tolerate
hardware failures
ii) improved transaction response because we are dealing with
multiple machines
iii) incremental growth options on a collection of smaller systems
2.2.1 CONCURRENCY CONTROL
There are three basic strategies for ensuring the consistency of a DB.
i) The first strategy is based on two-phase locking and requires that a
transaction acquire an exclusive lock on each data object that it
wishs to read before releasing any lock. The locks are usually
acquired on demand during run time. In order to facilitate easy
recovery the locks are usually held by the transaction until commit.
ii) The second strategy assigns each transaction a time-stamp, which is
unique throughout the system. Transactions are required to execute
in the order of their time-stamps.
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iii) The third stategy, which is usually called optimistic, allows each
transaction to execute freely and during the transaction execution
and/or at the end of it the objects read and updated by the
transaction are reviewed to ensure that the transaction viewed the
data base in a consistent state. If so, the transaction commits.
not, the transaction is aborted and restarted.
If
In reference 22 there is a discussion of these concurrency techniques. This
paper addresses the problem of maintaining consistency in distributed data
bases. An algorithm is proposed which operates as an optimistic concurrency
control until the rate of transaction contentions reaches a specified degree.
The algorithm then switches to a pessimistic mode similar to a two-phase
locking. The main arguments in favor of the optimistic concurrency control
are:
i)" it provides higher degree of concurrency and therefore smaller
delays
ii) the overhead associated with non-conflicting transaction
synchronization is low although the overhead for conflicting
transactions can be high
The optimistic algorithm is reported to perform better than the other control
mechanisms for the following reasons:
i) It produces minimum synchronization overhead for non-conflicting
transactions.
ii) The proposed algorithm achieves some increase in concurrency
over two-phase commit by allowing a transaction to access
results generated by other transactions which are not yet
committed.
iii) The proposed algorithm adapts timewise and spacewise and thus it
can switch between pessimistic (which uses long term locks) and
optimistic (which uses short term locks) modes at any time and
over any data object.
IB
Concurrency control in distributed databases is also discussed in Appendix C
where several references are sited. Much research and many new products are
being announced in the area o? distributed relational data bases and these
need to be evaluated by the DB designer. Reference Ig suggests that there are
still some technological hurdles to overcome before general application is
achieved.
2.3 PERFORMANCE
To a data base user the main metrics which can be applied to any DB are (in
order of importance):
i) availability
ii) ease of use
- change
- ad hoc query
iii) response time
- query
- update
These are all reasonable measures for evaluating a DBMS and can be used by the
designer to evaluate options after setting up a set of "bench mark"
applications typical of the DB users. To insure good performance for the user
within cost the DB designer must also be provided with measures on such
characteristics as:
i) reliability
ii) throughput
iii) storage efficiency
iv) flexibility for growth
v) cost
The best way to compare products is to present the same "problems" to to them
and measure the metrics described above. Some of the measures must be
provided by the vendor (i.e., reliability, cost).
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2.4 SECURITY
The Data Base Administrator (DBA) ensures that the only means of access to the
DB is through proper channels. The DBA defines the authorization checks to be
carried out whenever access to sensitive data is attempted. Different checks
can be established for each type of access (retrieve, modify, delete, etc.)
and access authorization can be to some DB segment level. Security is also
augmented by the Operating System (0$) and the network manager. Communication
with the DB can be checked and validated at the network level if remote access
is allowed.
2.5 NETNORK COMMUNICATION
The distributed DB must communicate with geographically separated segments
which is usually accomplished by a "wide area network" (NAN). Reference l
discusses this communication in the light of the ISOJOSI reference model. The
distributed data base can be considered to be in the "application layer" of
this model. In reference l page 440 Tanenbaum states, "Furthermore, there are
almost no national or international standard protocols for layer 7". Figure
2.5.1 shows that a distributed data base is coupled to the features of the
communication software supporting a network interface. Although this should
be transparent to the user, it is not transparent to the system design and
communication between distributed data bases with different partitions managed
by heterogeneous DBMS's requires communication gateways and DB translation
before data can be exchanged.
There are many vendors who provide the communication software to interface
with their own products (remote terminals and remote computers). These
products are all claimed to meet the ISO/OSI reference model but these
products will not communicate at the layer 7 level.
Homogeneous distributed DBMS's must be considered as a option for some of the
major segments of the SSP DB (i.e., development, operational, scientific/PL)
to minimize complexity of data exchange.
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Using a WAN to exchange data between DB's requires that the addresses of these
DB's be known to the network and that these addresses be unique. Reference 23
treats this topic and suggests an algorithm for dynamic address assignment.
The treatment is for network stations but this could be extented to DBMS's.
The delivery of data to remote sites on a public network is an option that
must be considered. Currently, point-to-point arrangements are made through a
service called NASCOM. This usually entails communication on leased carriers
(physical layer) and the protocol at higher ISO OSI must be negotiated by the
two communicating applications. Another option is to allow addressing data in
a generalized end-to-end protocol which allows delivery of customer data
generated in space to the customer DB using standard formats (as suggested in
reference 5). The development of the Program Support Communications Network
(PSCN) is a possible physical layer to start developing this generalized
delivery service.
There are currently supported networks which allow remote terminal access to
networks (i.e., ARPANET TELNET). These higher level protocols should be
considered for remote file access. (see references 24, 25, 26).
2.6 DATA ACCESS AND USER INTERFACE LANGUAGES
A single high-level language should be considered as a query language. This
language would have the capability for: definition, manipulation, and
control. The features that should be looked for in a interface language are
as follows:
i) Simplicity
- ease and conciseness
- elimination of lower language features
ii) Completeness
- for queries, user never has to use loops or branchs
iii) Non-procedural
- specify "what" is wanted, not procedure to get data
- high level statements of intent
- capture intent and apply search optimization
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iv) Ease of extension
- provision of built in functions
- permit user defined built in functions
v) Support Higher-level Languages
- casual user natural language
In reference 26 a unified language supporting interface to all three of the
commonly used data structures (i.e. relational, hierarchical, network) is
proposed. This is an option to consider. In addition, programming language
support must be considered. The options here are as numerous as programming
languages themselves but for sure the following options need special
consideration:
i) FORTRAN (for scientific and operational DB's)
ii) COBOL (for management control DB's)
iii) Assembler (?or developing efficient frequently used routines)
There is a possibility to use a natural language such as English as a query
language. An IBM product is available called INTELLECT. This is a natural
English language query program with the following attributes: analyzes
grammar, uses application-specific dictionaries, interfaces to SQL/DS data
bases (see vendor products for description of SQL/DS). In reference 20 the
product INTELLECT and its capabilities are briefly described. The author is
with Artifical Intelligence Corporation the developer of INTELLECT. In this
paper the author describes some interesting problems encountered when
installing INTELLECT and has some recommendations for future research.
2.6.1 AUTOMATIC COLLECTION OF OPERATIONAL DATA
The acquisition of onboard operational data using a DMS service available to
the core subsystems and users is described in reference 15. This DMS service
acquires data on a periodic or aperiodic basis and also controls the interface
between the operational DB and the telemetry service. This generalized
service should be considered as an option for data collection into DB files
since the management and location of these files must be known to the DMS
Function supporting the data acquisition for telemetry.
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2.6.2 REPORTSANDPRESENTATIONS
The software programs to generate reports and format presentations are
supplied as built-in functions to the interface language. The user should not
have to resort to building special formats.
2.7 MIGRATION TO ARCHIVE
Data collected on a periodic basis will require rapid access for some
applications and therefore will have to be accessible by the host computer in
an "on-line" memory. Following retention for some period this data will then
migrate to an archive (i.e., massive data storage with relatively slow
accessibility). This migration may be done automatically by a DBMS function.
The need for archive management appears in the requirements of reference 21.
The process of archive management is described in reference 11. In this paper
archiving strategies are discussed including such factors as:
i) archiving files that have been idle for longest time
ii) large files archived before small files
iii) periodic archiving for reliability of system
iv) archiving during low usage times
This is a general treatment but the features to look for in DB products are
clearly defined along with a suggested system design. A review of this paper
will aid in evaluating vendor options.
2.B RECOVERY AND AVAILABILITY
Availability refers to the probability that the DBMS will be operating at any
given time and therefore available for use. This concept is of course very
closely tied to the reliability and fault tolerance of the DBMS. Recovery is
the technique built into the system to recover and continue operation
following failures.
There are two types of failures that the DBMS must recover from:
i) system failures
ii) media failures
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lhe usual option offered for system failures is to provide automatic system
recovery. This is done with back-up computers (redundancy) and supported by
operating system functions. High reliability computers still do not preclude
•the need for redundancy. System crash recovery is closely coupled with
concurrency control since multiple hosts must coordinate the recovery. An
example of an integrated concurrency and recovery algorithm is given in
reference 27 and summarized in reference 1. Many algorithms for maintaining
integrity of a DB require certain actions to be "atomic", (i.e., either
carried out to completion or not carried out at a11). Since an atomic action
may have to perform several disk accesses, there is a possibility that the
system may crash part way through the atomic action, leaving the DB in an
inconsistent state. In reference 2B Lampson has studied this problem and
suggested an algorithm that maintains two copies of critical disk blocks in
such a manner as to ensure consistency at all times. Reference 7 also
discusses distributed system crash resistance and proposes a structuring to
ensure consistency. The ARCHONS project at Carnegie-Mellon University is
another example of research in the area of distributed system consistency (see
reference B). Reference 16 is a good survey of the concurrency control
problem.
Media failures refer to the crashing of on-line memory. The option for media
failures is to provide archive back-up. This is an option usually offered
with vendor products.
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2.1.1.2. MAYOROPTIONS DECISIONS
3.I DISTRIBUTION/CONNECTIVITY
One major decision will be to define to what extent each data base is
reachable from various geographic and space locations. This aspect of data
sharing will drive network design and universal naming conventions for the
data structures (data sets or relations). The complexity of DB interfaces
will also be driven by whether we have homogeneous DB's or heterogeneous
DB's. Once data has been categorized as private (that is to say it is only of
interest to a local individual or small group) then this data will be managed
locally and the selected manager may not support communication with other
managers making this data unreachable by remote interests. This presents a
problem in defining early in the program all data which has a potential of
being shared by decentralized users to insure the network and distributed
DBMS's accommodate any future change in interest domains while still not
dictating that all data be reachable from anywhere(potentially a cost driver
in the communications design and constraint on using heterogeneous DB's).
3.2 ADMINISTRATION
The issue here is to insure that the authority for data base management is
established early in the program and this authority is not distributed so
widely that DB state becomes difficult to control, The assignment of
administrators needs to be done as DB entities are defined and c!ear
partitions are established,
There is a continuum of options here ranging over the spectrum of possible
granularities given to the DB segments. Some common sense must be applied to
assigning administrative authority over DB segments.
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3.3 REPLICATION/RECOVERY
There is a possibility to implement a recovery schemeby augmenting a
commercial product. This option can be considered if the survey of products
establishes that inadequate recovery is provided or if a vendor option is
selected because of superior capabilities other than recovery and augmentation
is appropriate. Additional back-up by replication of the DB is an option.
This maybe accomplished by replication in the archive.
3.4 PARTITIONING
3.4.1 SPACE/GROUND
Partitioning of data between space and ground is a major design decision.
Data storage and large DBMS software packages in space could present a higher
cost for computational and storage devices because they must be space
qualified. This must be traded against the bandwidth needed for space to
ground transfers and queries. The response time for space queries will have
to be analyzed to determine if acceptable times are realizable. For the most
part this seems possible since the majority of data exchange will be
non-interactive (i.e., mainly large text block transfers). The possibility of
having the capability to put large DBMS in in space in the lggo's is also real
(i.e., space rated memory may become less expensive) which would change the
trade criteria to maintainability and demonstrating the need for space
autonomous data manipulation (which may be difficult to demonstrate
considering the limited crew time resource). It appears that the Space
Station and other orbital elements should be treated as a place where
scientific and operational data are generated but the need for manipulation
(other than management for remote delivery) must be demonstrated (i.e, need
for "quick look analysis"). Transformation of scientific data (from time
domain to Frequency domain) should be considered to be outside DBMS services.
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3.4,2 GROUND SEGMENTS
The major partitioning of DB segments to ground entities (DHC, SSCC, POCC .... )
presents a high level design decision that must be made early in the program
to maintain stability in DB development. In section 1.3 the content of the
SSP major DB segments is suggested but furthur detail of data content and
exchange mechanisms must be established.
3.4.3 ANCILLARY DATA GROUPING
The performance of an O/B system which allows users an option to acquire
ancillary data an append that data to experiment data will be highly dependent
on the nature of the ancillary data blocks. This presents the O/B DB designer
with decisions concerning ancillary file structures and granularity of
ancillary data access. A common block required by most users is the vehicle
state (attitude, position vector, time). Other groupings need to be
established after user requirements are understood. These groupings should be
such that the O/B data network is not loaded down with data transfers
containing a majority of data that will be discarded. Reference 21 suggests
the typical ancillary data required by customers.
3.5 ARCHIVE RESPONSIBILITY
A major DB design decision that has impact at the program level is to
determine where the functional responsibility for archiving data resides.
options are some reasonable assignment of the following data groups to the
major data handling centers.
The
DATA CENTERS
Engineering
Ancillary
Customer
Data Handling
Space Station Control
PL Control
Regional/Discipline
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3.6 RECORDER MANAGEMENT
]he option to provide bulk recording in the space segments of the OB to aid in
managing the telemetry link is an area for consideration and couples tightly
with the O/B DB design. The management of these recorders is another area
needing consideration (DMS or C&T).
3.7 O/B DB OF SUBSYSTEM HISTORY DATA
Another decision facing the O/B DB design is to establish how much and what
subsystem history data will be held O/B for O/B status support. This design
decision couples with the need for O/B autonomy and the communication system
capability to support interactive communication with the ground segments of
the DB.
3,B COMPATIBILITY OF DB's
The use of heterogeneous institutional facilities is a major decision.
Existing data base management systems are to be provided to the Space Station
Program by the Level C centers. This means dealing with heterogeneous DBMS's
and the operating systems that they run under. 'This complicates the problem
but is probably unavoidable since a variety of vendors are established at the
centers and any further expansion of center capability could contain multiple
vendor equipment. Compatibility with the JSC TMIS DBMS is a key
driver since this DB will contain the Level B SE&I Program Master Data
Base(MDB) and the Engineering Master Schedule (EMS). NASA has specified that
the TMIS be IBM compatible (reference Phase B RFP C-6 3.0a). Some work is
proceeding in the area of virtual terminal protocols and protocols for File
transfer in heterogeneous networks (references 25, 26). Establishment of
higher level protocols for resource sharing in heterogeneous systems is a
possibility to ease the complexity of heterogeneous system data exchange (as
suggested in reference 26).
29
3.9 STRUCTURE
The selection of a DB structure for each of the SSP DB's will be an important
decision and require a complete understanding of the data characteristics and
user intentions for data manipulation. R selection criteria suggested in
reference 18 is depicted in Figure 3.9.1. Rny data structure selected can be
abused an result in poor performance if other factors are not considered. The
organization of data within the constraints of the DBMS features can be called
the DB architecture. It may turn out that this architecture is more important
to performance than the DBMS data structure. The big decision that will be
encountered designing the various DB'sfor the SSP (besides the selection of a
DBMS) will be the characterization and desired organization (i.e.,
architecture) of the data within each DB segment. Data can be broadly
categorized into three groups:
i) Sampled data (sequential numerical; sensor data)
ii) Text (alpha numeric; s/w prgms, presentations)
iii) Associable (tables with correlatable data; mission data)
This characterization will aid in determining the DBMS functions needed to
manipulate each category of data. For category 1 a flat file server may be an
adequate DB manager option Category 2 requires more DB manager services mainly
related to word processing. Category 3 represents data which must be
organized into records or tables so additional information can be extracted by
queries which result in presentations (reports) to the user. For category 3
we must decide on the data storage structure (i.e., relational, hierarchical
or network). This decision and the organization of data within that structure
(i.e., architecture of DB) will determine the DB performance (throughput and
response).
3O
Number of
Terminals
Accessing
Data Base
S
Relational
Access
Figure 3.9.1
Size of
Data Base
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3.10 GRONI'H ACCOMMODATION
Predicting growth in data storage is another design aspect which is critical.
Large structures may become unmanageable requiring Further partitioning and
the data base managers must be Flexible to absorb restructuring without
impacting application software. Vertical growth (i.e., built-in margin) is an
option and horizontal growth (i,e,, expansion by adding capacity without
impact to existing structures) is another option. The DB designer should
Factor growth into design decisions.
3.11 ARCHIVE STANDARD FORMAT (SFDU's)
The SFDU recommendations made by the CCSDS may be built into the DB archive
capability. 'This is especially pertinent to the archiving of ancillary and
scientific data. It is not clear at this time if the SFDU "labels" are
related to catalogue names used by the DBMS to retrieve data blocks. Further
study and decisions are required to integrate the standard Formats into the DB
management.
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2,1.1.4. SOLUTION OPTIONS
There are three major options for data structures:
i) Relational
ii) Hierarchical
iii) Network
The benefits of relational structures are well known:
i) Easy to understand
- tables
- SQL language
ii) Easy to change
- dynamic flexibility
- continuous operation
iii) Automatic navigation
- path selection
- optimization
iv) Set processing
In addition, the reference configuration (see Appendix B) suggests a
relational DB For the Space Station Onboard DBMS (i.e., operational data
base). It seems like a good idea to use the relational model where ever
possible because of the demonstrated advantages. Exceptions may include DB's
only requiring file management services. The user of such services may be
satisfied with and desire a hierarchical structure.
4.1 USE OF EXISTING INSTI"FUTIONAL RESOURCES
In any solution option the existence of planned NASA resources must be
factored in. The Phase B RFP states on page C-6-5, "NASA will implement an
information system for the purpose of providing the necessary collection and
dissemination of data to manage the SSP". Also on page C-6-5, "Each
contractor will transmit all required data to the MCDS and will receive data
from the MCDS. NASA intends to utilize the MCDS throughout the SSP and to
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design it as the primary mechanism for routine data transfer between the
contractors, NASA Level A, Level B, and Level C centers." And on page C-6-B,
"NASA plans to make a data base management system and a management information
system availabled on an IBM-compatible mainframe computer at JSC to support
the Level B processing of management data". It is clear that the interface to
and use of the MCDS(now called TMI$) must be considered in the design of all
data bases defined in section 1.3.
4.2 COMMERCIAL PRODUCTS SURVEY
4.2.1 LARGE RELATIONAL PRODUCTS
Each commercial product has unique characteristics which can be used to
evaluate applicability to the various data base segments. The list below
contains relational products surveyed in reference 14. The complete set of
characteristics is not included for all products because of the volume of
material in reference 14. A table of each of the sets of characteristics
which can be used in the trades are included along with an example ?or one
system. These seem to be a comprehensive set of criteria for DBMS evaluation.
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VENDOR PRODUCT CHARACTERISTICS
GENERAL INFORMATION
I I I I
SYSTEM I VENDOR I CPU/OS' s I COST I DEV HISTORY
SQLIDS
ORACLE
INGRES
IDM
iDBP
RAPPORT
NOMAD
ENCOMPASS
i ,,
IBM
CORP
ORACLE
CORP
RELATIONAL
TECHNOLOGY
INC
BRIT'I_N-LEE
INC
INTEL
CORP
LOGICA
LIMITED
D&B
COMPUTER
SERVICES
TANDEM
COMPUTERS
INC
w 370/DOS/VSE
with CICS
* VM/CMS
DG/Eclipse
VAX/VMS,UNIX
370-compatable
/VM-CMS
M68000/UNIX
DEC PDP/RSTS,
UNIX
others
VAX/VMS,UNIX
M6BOOO/UNIX
others
VAX/VMS
ZBO/CPM
Univac 1100
Oatapoint I00
DG Eclipse
PDP ll/UNIX
None announced'
25 mini's
and mainframes
370-compatable/l
VM/CMS
MVS/TSO
TANDEM NONSTOP
NONSTOP II
Commercial version
of SYSTEM R
Developed as a
OB manager for
SEQUEL (now SQL)
Based on the system
developed at the
Univ. Calif/
Berkeley
Developed as a
back-end database
processor using
a QUEL interface
Developed for micro
and office
automation a_._l. ....
Originally a
reporting system
for the national
CSS timesharing
network
DBMS for a trans-
action processing
system
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SYSTEM COMPONENTS
I I I INTERACTIVE I I ADDITIONAL
I SYSTEM I ARCHITECTURE I INTERFACE I UTILITIES I FACILITIES
I I I I I
I I I I
SQL/DS ITwo major compsl Interactive ILoad/unloadlCompile S@L
I RDS,DBSS I S@L(IS@L) I linto machine
I I is a CICS appll llanguage
ORACLE
I I I I
I User Friendly I Interactive IReport I
I Interface I Application lwriter I
I (UFI) I Facility(IAF) I I
NOMAD Query,report
writing etc.
integrated
I
I DBCHK to
I indicate
DB needs
I to be re-
I organized
I
Bulk load
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DATASTORAGEANDACCESSTECHNIQUES
SYSTEM DATA STORAGE INDEX SUPPORT
SgL/DS VSAM datasets
One or more tables
in VSAM dataset
B-tree indexes (no hashing)
Multiple column keys
Ascending or descending keys
Unique keys optional
Two types:clustered/non-cluster
ORACLE Direct access files
One or more tables
can be stored in a
file
Related data from
multiple tables can
be stored on the same
page
B-tree indexing (no hashing)
Multiple column keys
Ascending/descending keys
Unique keys are optional
NOMAD Data stored in direct
access files
B-tree indexing (hashing)
Multiple column keys
Ascending/descending keys
Non-unique keys optional
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DATA DEFINITION
SYSTEM
I I I
I TABLES I INDEXES I
I I I
DATA TYPES
SgLIDS
I I I
ITables createdl Indexes created I Character,FP,packed
l& destroyed I & destroyed
Idynamically I dynamically
I I
I I
I I
I decimal,integer, long
I character
I Rows<4000 bytes long
I (excluding long
I character fields)
ORACLE Tables can
be created
and destroyed
dynamically
Indexes can be
created and
destroyed
dynamically
Character,numeric,
date,money
NOMAD Tables can
be dynamic-
ally created
or destroyed
Indexes can be
created and
destroyed
dynamically
Data types are;
character, integer,
FP,packed decimal,
name,date
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DATA MANIPULATION
SYSTEM
I
I RELATIONAL
I OPERATORS
I I
I AGGREGATE I
I FUNCTIONS I
DATA INSERTION,
UPDATE,DELETION
SQLIDS Supports all
(limitations
on union)
Supports grouping
and single
level aggregation
Two optimization
strategies
User-specified
ordering
Single rows or sets
I
I
I
I
I
I
ORACLE
I
Uses SQL ]Supports grouping
Supports all land aggregation
relational ]User specified
operators Iordering
INo optimization
]strategy
I
I
INSERT, UPDATE,DELETE, I
can be single rows or I
sets I
SQL statements for I
parts explosion and
outer JOIN (partial)
NOMAD Supports all
relational
operators
Supports group-
ing and aggreg-
ation
User specified
ordering
No optimization
strategy
INSERT,UPDATE,DELETE
can be single rows
or sets
Full outer JOIN I
supported I
Statistical operators I
supported I
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DATA CONTROL
SYSTEM
I I
I AUTHORIZATIONI
I I
VIEWS SECURITY
SgLIDS
I
Specific I Dynamic
authorization
for-
administration
access,
data def'n,
data maniplt'n
programs
Password optional
ORACLE Specific
authorization
ifor:
DB administra-
tion,access,
data def'n,
data maniplt'nl
programs(pre- I
processor chk)l
Decentralized I
authorization I
Dynamic (no
restrictions)
NOMAD Specific
authorization
for:
access,data
manipulation
Centralized
authorizationl
Dynamic view
mechanism
(using schemata
and subschemata)
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CONCURRENCY CONTROL AND RECOVERY
I I I
I SYSTEM I TRANSACTIONSI
I I I
I
LOCKING
I BACK-UP I ARCHIVAL
I AND I SUPPORT
I RECOVERY I
I
I SgL/DS
I
I User defined
I
I
I
I I I
I Multiple levell Automatic I Recovery for
I (row,page, I for I media
I table,DBSPACE)I system I failures
I I failures I optional
ORACLE User defined
I
IMultiple levels
lof locking
Igranularity
l(row, table)
I
Automatic Recovery for
media
failures
optional
NOMAD User defined I Single state-
in single userl ment trans-
mode I actions in
I multiple user
I mode
I
Automatic None
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PROGRAMMING LANGUAGE INTERFACE
SYSTEM
I
I LANGUAGES
I SUPPORTED
I I
I TYPE OF I
I INTERFACE I
RESTRICTIONS
SgLIDS
I
I PLI1
I COBOL
I FORTRAN
I Assembler
I
I
I
I All SQL
I statements
I supported
I
I Limitations on host
I data types
I Program variable
I Multiple cursorsl binding at
I I precompilation when
I I possible
ORACLE COBOL
FORTRAN
PL/1
C
Preprocessor for
COBOL
Call interface
for FORTRAN,
PL/1 and C
A11 SQL
statements
supported
Allows for
multiple cursors
NOMAD I COBOL, I All NOMAD
I FORTRAN,PL/I I commands are
I I supported
I I
I I
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DOMAIN AND INTEGRITY SUPPORT
I
I SYSTEM
I
DOMAINS
I I
I PRIMARYAND I
I FOREIGNKEYS I
ASSERTIONS/TRIGGERS
SQLIDS
I I I
I No support I Limited support I None
I I for primary I
I I keys I
I I I
ORACLE Limited Limited
No support of
foreign keys
Assertions handled
through IAF
NOMAD I Limited
I (primarily
I for report
I writing)
I
I Support for I None
I primary keys I
I No foreign keys I
I supported I
I I
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4.2.2 IBM PC DATA BASE PRODUCTS
The use of PC based local data base segments which are downloaded and then
uploaded after updates seems to be one possible architecture for offloading
the mainframe DBMS. 'There are over 66 database products available for the IBM
PC. The PC magazine surveyed these products and reported the results in the
June, July, August and September issues. The products were separated into 4
categories:
Category 1 : simple file handlers operate on whole records manipulate one
file at a time
Category 2: genuine data base structure (relational, network, hierarchical)
manipulate two files at time query language
Category 3: capabilities of i and 2 procedural language
Category 4: capabilities of 3 outstanding in some way
All products within a category were given the same problem and then assessed
on performance and capability. 'This is a fair evaluation criteria.
In category 1 the following products were recommended:
PRODUCT NAME COMPANY DATA MODEL PRICE
PC-FILE Ill Buttonware Flat file $45
Data Base Manager II Alpha Software File Manager $295
ResQ Key Software Flat File $295
VersaForm Applied Software Technology Flat File $345
UltraFile Continental Software Flat File $195
PFS:FILE Software Publishing Indexed File $140
PFS:REPORT Software Publishing Indexed File $125
RANK AND FILE I RAF Software Flat File $160
NUTSHELL Leading Edge Products Flat File $395
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In category 2 the following products were recommended:
PRODUCT NAME COMPANY DATA MODEL PRICE
TIM IV
R:BASE SERIES 4000
PC-FILE'N REPORT
i0 BASE
Innovative Software
Microrim
JASPIR International
Fox Research
Flat File $395
Relational $495
Relational $195
Relational $495
In category 3 the following products were recommended:
PRODUCT NAME COMPANY DATA MODEL PRICE
MANAGER VERSION 4 Manager Software
THE SENSIBLE SOLUTION O'Hanlon Computer Systems
Condor 3 Condor Computer
dBASE II VERSION2.4 Ashton-Tate
Relational $195
Linked/indexed $695
Relational $650
Relational $495
In category 4 the following products were recommended:
PRODUCT NAME COMPANY DATA MODEL PRICE
SAVVY PC
Revelation
DataFlex VERSION2
PC/FOCUS
informix version3,11
KnowledgeMan
dBRSE III
Excalibur Technologies
Cosmos
Data Access
Information Builders
Relational Database Systems
Micro Data Base Systems
Ashton-Tate
Relational $395
Relational $950
Relational $995
Hierarchical $1595
Relational $795
Relational $500
Relational $695
4.2.3 DB2
The DB2 product is the equivalent of SQL/DS but it is for the IBM MVS
environment. /he vendor products survey in section 4.2.1 describes SQL/DS.
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4,2.4 LOCUSor DOMAIN
The LOCUSsystem is a UNIX based distributed system. It is described in
references 3 and 4. LOCUS is a distributed operating system supporting UNIX
data management facilities. Another distributed system is the Apollo Computer
Inc. DOMAIN system which is also designed on an "integrated model of
distributed systems". DOMAIN is described in reference 29. Both of these
options are possibilities for the onboard DBMS.
4.2.5 Distributed Data Base Management Systems (DDBMS)
Distributed data base management systems are still considered to be an
immature technology (see reference 19). There are many projects studying this
problem. Reference 13 contains a list of projects. This appears to be a
technology with potential application, This will depend on the distribution
architecture of the DB segments.
REFERENCE 13: pp,62-74"Distributed Database Concepts"
Current DDBMS Projects
o Heterogeneous
COSYS
CSIN
Sirius-Delta
Univ. of Grenoble
Computer Corp. of America
INRIA.- France
Sirius.-POLYPHEME Univ. of Grenoble/CII-HB
Dist. DPLS Univ. of Tsukuba
XNDM NBS
Multibase Computer Corp. of America
o Homogeneous
SDD-I
System R_
Dist. INGRES
Honeywell-DDTS
XDFS
PRIME.-OTS
TANDEM-ENCOMPASS
Computer Corp, of America
IBM
RTI
Honeywell
Xerox
Prime Computer
Tandem Computer
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4.30NBOARDOPERATIONALDATABASE
An option that must be considered for the onboard operational DB segment is to
use a commercial product. Some modification may be required if the product is
not available for the processor being considered as the interface to the
onboard mass storage.
Some form of a UNIX based file service may be adequate for onboard storage.
The LOCUS system is a possibility (see references 2,2,4). Another
possibility, which is also a distributed system, is the DOMAIN system
described in reference 2g. The assessment of options for the onboard DB must
consider many factors:
o communication with the ground DBMS (homogeneous/heterogeneousg)
o performance (response .... )
o the inherent program requirement to minimize onboard storage
o technical issues related to autonomy and automation such as
(onboard diagnostics,training,operations manuals .... )
The content of the onboard DB will be a prime driver in selecting an
appropriate onboard DBMS. The TASK 1 function list suggests that the
following are potential segments for residence onboard:
ONBOARD DATA BASE CONTENT
DOCUMENT MANAGEMENT
- MANUALS(PROCEDURES)
- DAILY SCHEDULES
- DIAGNOSTIC SUPPORT(SCHEMATICS)
SOFTWARE
CHECKPOINTS
SUBSYSTEM TREND DATA
REAL-TIME DATA
BUFFERED DATA(RECORDERS)
DIRECTORIES
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2,1.I.5.0 OPTIONS FOR SSDS DATA BASE ARCHITECTURE
5.1 DATA BASE DISTRIBUTION AND CONNECTIVITY
The entities identified and associated connectivity are listed in the
following table and shown in Figure 5.1.1.
TABLE 5,1.1 :
DATA BASE ENTITIES AND CONNECTIVITY
NASA HDqTRS
LEVEL B ]SC
LVL C ]SC
LVL C GSFC
LVL C MSFC
LVL C LEWIS
CONTRACTOR 1
CONTRACTOR 2
CONTRACTOR 3
CONTRACTOR 4
SSE
SSCC
POCC
RDC
DDC
INTEG SrFE
'TRAINING
SPACE STN
COP
POP
DHC
IHILI LVL
IDIVl C
IQILI
ITI IJ G M L
IRIBIS S S E
ISl IC F F W
III CCI
CON Isis
TRACTORI SIS
IEIC
1 2 3 41 IC
II
II
II
PIRID
OIOlD
ClClC
Cll
II
II
II
IITIS
NIRIS
TINI
EIII
IGINI
IGI
II
IXl I
Xl XlX
Xl
Xl
Xl
Xl
Xl
IXl
X
X
I I
II
xll
Ixl
Ixx
x
x
xlx
X
X
X
X
X
X X
X
X
X
xl
ixl
Ixx
I
I x
Ixlxlx
IxIx
xxl
Ixl
xl
X
X
CIPID
OIOIH
PIPIC
II
II
II
II
Xl
XlXl
IXl
IXl
IXl
IX l
X IXl
IXl
IXl
XlXll
48
SCHs
SSIS Config
WP ICDs
NASt
Headquarters
s/w
Models SDE
Level B
MDB
Level A Spe(
Ref Config
SSIS Config
WP ICDs
Bulk
Recorder MSF
LeRI
Connectivit,
way
LAN
[_On-Line'
Storage
Computer
O,
Major
Archive
EMS
SE&I SCH
S/W SCH
H rdwre SCH
Processors
SCHs
S/W Training
Models
S/W
SCHs
ICDs
s/w
Models
SCHs
Hrdwre Spec
Subsys ICDs
S/W Reqmt
SSE Reqmt
Hardware
Specifications
S/W Requirements
ICDs
SSE
Requirement
SS Eng Data
Mission Seq
Command
Processors
Development
Contractors
Operational
Figure 5.1.1. SSlS Data BaseDistribution Option
DHC
Level O Data I
Short-term Archive
Long-term Archive I
PL Eng Data
SS Ancillary Data Exp Data
SSCC
PLAT/PL Eng Data
Exp Data
PLAT/P
Ancillary
Data
SS Ancillary Data
Scientific/PL
Public
Network
Pop
RDC/
DDC
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The requirements for data base services at each entity is shown in the
followin9 table. The characterization of requirements was extracted fr'om
reference material in Appendix B and a review of features offered by various
vendor products.
TABLE 5.1.2:
DATA BASE MGMT SERVICE REQUIREMENTS
NASA HDql"RS
LEVEL B ESC
I_VL C 3SC
LVL C GSFC
LVL C MSFC
LVL C LEWIS
CON'TRACTOR I
CONTRACTOR 2
CONTRACTOR 3
CONTRACTOR 4
SSE
SSCC
POCC
RDC
DDC
IN-I"EG SI'TE
TRAINING
SPACE STN
COP
POP
OHC
ClSlR
RITIE
EIOIT
AIRIR
IIEII
E E
V
E
FILE SERVER ITIREPORTS
IEI
ClMIDIUIXIClUIPIG
OIEIEIPITIAISlLIR
PIRILIDI INIEIOIA
YIGIEIAIPINIRIrIP
IEITITIRIEI IS H
IEIE0 DlSl I
c IPl c
IEI s
Icl
I I
I I
I I
II
INTERFACE
LANGUAGE
AIIIR PI
DINIE RI
ITIn OI
HIEIL CI T
OIRIT El Y
ClAII DI
IClM Ul R
QITIE RI E
UlII AI 19
EIVI LI lO
RIEI II
Yll II
Ixlx x
Ixlxlx
Ixlx x
Ixlxlx
Ixlx x
xlxlx
xlx x
xlxlx
xlxlx
xlxlx
xlxlx
xlxlx
xlxlx
xlxlx
xlxlx
xlxlx
xlxlx
xlxlx
XlXlX
xlxlx
xlxlx
XlXlXlxlxlxlxlxlx
xlxlxlxlxlxlxlxlx
xlxlxlxlxlxlxlxlx
xlxlxlxlxlxlxlxlx
xlxlxlxlxlxlxlxlx
xlxlxlx
XlXlxlx
xlxlxlx
XlXlXlx
xlxlxlx
xlxlx x
xlxlxlxlx
xlxlxlxlx
xlxlxlxlx
xlxlxlxlx
xlxlxlxlx
xlxlxlxlx
Ixlx
Ixlx
X X
xlxlx
xlxlx
xlxlx
xlxlx
xlxlx
xlxlx
xlxlx
xlxlx
xlxlx
XlXlX
xlxlx
xlxl
xlxl
X X
xl
xl
xl
xl
xl
X
X
X
X
X
X
s AlSl
E RITI
c clal
u HITI
R IlII
z vlsI
EITI
TI
ICl
AI
LI
I
FI
Cl
INI
Ixl
xlxl
Ixl
Ixl
Ixl
Ixl
Ixl
Ixl
Ixl
Ixl
Ixl
xl
xlxl
X
X
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lhe data stored in various data bases within the SSPwill be distributed both
geographically and by interest. For example, scientific data collected from a
specific experiment or PL will not be in the domain of interest of say a
subsystem S/Wdeveloper who would be interested in someother part of t:he I]B.
The table below partitions the "domains of interest" into three major
subdivisions. These major functional partitions and their associated "range
of interest" was used in defining connectivity needed between DB's.
'FABLE 5.1.3:
PARTI'I"IONING BY MAJOR F'UNCI"IONAL PHASE/AREA
"JMAgOR PHASE/AREA 'jDATA APPLICA'rIONI RANGE OF I
I I -. I IN"I"EREST I
I I........... I I
DEVELOPMENT
OPERATIONAL
SCIENTIFIC/PL
PROGRAM PLANNING
SOFTWARE DEV
TEST/SIMULATION
TRAINING
SYS INTEGRATION
LOGISTICS PLAN
MISSION PLANNING
S/W RECONFIG
VEHICLE MONITOR
TRAINING
ANCILLARY DATA
RESEARCH
ARCHIVE
CONTRACTORS
NASA SE&I
PRGM MGMNT
GND CREW
OB CREW
REMOTE DISTR TO
CUSTOMERS
SCIENTISTS
REMO'T'E DISTR "10
CUSTOMERS
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The typical data base entity will consist of the following components:
Hardware: processor(s)
storage
terminals
network interface
Software: operating system(OS)
network communication S/W
data base mgmtsystem(DBMS)
terminal interface S/W
A typical configuration of these componentsis shown in figure 5,1,2. In
figure 5.1.3 and figure 5.1,4 typical configurations for commercial products
are shown. These illustrate the fact that a full set of components (software
and host environment) are needed to define the DBMSconfiguration.
5.2 APPLICABLEVENDORPRODUCTS
Ali of the relational products discussed in section 4.2 are candidates for
handling the large segments of the ground DB's.
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Processor
Operating System
Comm
S/W DBMS
Terminal
Interface
Terminals
Network
Base
Figure 5.1.2. Typical Data Base Components
Segment
No. 1
Segment
No. 2
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Figure 5.1.3
OPERATIONAL ENVIRONMENT
/
DOS/VSE
BATCH I
I tiSQL
SOL/DS
I
I
,
/
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/ /
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C_[S
L.=.,,_.q ._.=_
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r_
/
/
/
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I
I
/
DB2
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2.1.I.6.0 SUPPORTING MATERIAL
APPENDIX A
SSDS FUNCTIONS REQUIRING DBMS SUPPORT
(TRACEABILITY TO FUNCTION LIST)
PRECEDING PAGE BLAN_K_JOT FILMEb
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SSDS FUNCTIONS REQUIRING DBMS SUPPORT
1,0 Manage Customer/Operator Delivered Data
i.I Manage Real Time Data Return
11.1.1Capturel
I I
1.2 Manage Delayable Data Return
11.2. I Capturel
I. a Distribution
11.3.2 Capturel
I I
1.4 Manage Deliverable Customer Data
11.4.2 Customer Data Capture I
11.4.4 Core Rncillary Data Acquistion )
I i
1.5 Manage Deliverable Core Data
11,5.2 Core Data Capture i
I I
2.0 Manage Customer/Operator Supplied Data
12.4 Provide Rncillary Data
i I
4.0 Operate Core Systems
4.3 Support Flight Crew Activities
4.3,5 Operations & Procedure Support
14.3.5,1 Maintenance & Repair Procedures m
14.3.5.2 Operations Procedures I
04.3.5.3 Emergency Procedures i
I I
4.5 Monitor and Status System
14.5,4 Mass Properties Configuration Update
I I
4.5.5 Diagnostics Support
14.5.5.1 Schematic Presentations m
14.5.5.2 Expert Systems I
14,5.5.3 Trend Analysis
I l
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5.0 Manage Facilities and Resources
5.1 Manage Flight System Facilities
5.1.1 Flight Data Base Management
15.1.1.1 Update/Access Synch I
15.1.1.2 Data File Mgmt l
15.1.1.3 Mass Memory Resource Mgmtl
]5.1.1.4 Archival Storage ]
I I
5.2 Manage Space Station Control Center Facilities
5.2.1SSCC Data Base Management
15.2.1.1 Update/Access Synch I
15.2.1.2 Data File Mgmt I
15.2.1.3 Mass Memory Resource Mgmtl
15.2.1.4 Archival Storage I
I I
5.3 Manage SSDS Satellite Centers Facilities
5.3.1 Center Data Base Management
15.9.1.1 Update/Access Synch I
15.3.1.2 Data File Mgmt I
15.3.1.3 Mass Memory Resource Mgmtl
15.3.1.4 Archival Storage I
I I
5.4 Manage Data Handling Center Facilities
5.4.1DHC Data Base Management
15.4.1.1 Update/Access Synch I
15.4.1.2 Data File Mgmt I
15.4.1.3 Mass Memory Resource Mgmtl
15.4.1.4 Archival Storage I
I I
5.5 Manage Development Support Facility
5.5.1 Development Data Base Management
15.5.1.1 Update/Access Synch I
15.5.1.2 Data File Mgmt I
15.5.1.3 Mass Memory Resource Mgmtl
15.5.1.4 Archival Storage I
I I
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7.0 Support Space Station Program
7.1 Develop Logistics Plan
17.1.I Transportation Plan I
17.1.2 Spares and Repair Parts I
17.1.3 Maintenance Schedules I
17.1.4 Training Schedules I
i i
7.3 Maintain Manuals
17.3.1 Maintain Operations Procedures I
17.3.2 Maintain Maintenance Procedures I
17,3.3 Maintain Satellite Services Proceduresl
17.3.1 Maintain Emergency Procedures I
I I
7.4 Control Inventories
17.4.1 Customer Hardware I
17.4.2 Station Material I
17.4.3 Resources I
I I
7.5 Configuration Management
17.5,1 Interface Specifications I
17,5.2 System and Subsystem Specifications I
17.5.3 Configuration Plans I
17.5.4 Configuration Status I
I I
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2.1,1.6.0 SUPPORTING MATERIAL
APPENDIX B
DATA BASE REQUIREMENTS DEFINITION SOURCES
This material is exerpts from the documents indicated in the headings. The
paragraphs referenced are those that specify detail requirements that will
drive the DBMS design.
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CUSTOMER REQUIREMENTS FOR STANDARD SERVICES
FROM THE
SPACE S'TA'I"IOI_INFORMATION SYSI"EM
(sszs)
SEPTEMBFR 19, 1984
pp. 2..-4para. 2.2.4
The SSIS/SCS shall implement standards at OSI layer 7 and below(where
applicable) for catalogs of archived data and archived Space Station
System ancillary data. As a goal, generalized standarized access protocols
shall be developed for all archived data. As a minimum, a standard Format
shall be used to indicate the form and the format of the archived data.
pp. 3-4 para. 3.4 DAI-A ARCHIVE/CATALOG/RETRIEVAL
para. 3.4.1
]he SSIS/SCS shall maintain data archives in two categories: customer data
and engineering/ancillary data,
para. 3.4.1.1
Customer data storage shall be furthur divided into two subcategories:
short term and long term. Both subcategories shall contain levelO (raw
data) and level 1A data if required.
para. 3.4.1.2
Short term archives .....
para. 3.4.1.3
Long term archiving .....
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para 3.4.1.4
Engineering/ancillary data (see section 4) shall be archived for a minimum of
two years ......
para. 3.4.1.5
...... The response time for average catalog query shall be comparable to
similar commercial systems.
para. 3.4.1.6
....... provide the customer an inventory on what levelO and IA data are
available from the archive; .....
para. 3.4.1.7
........ maintain a log of customer data transfer requests and there
disposition; ......
para. 3.4.1.B
......... to ensure the integrity of the data catalog.
para. 3.4.1.9
.... provide a system of file, catalog, index, and customer controls that
will permit access to customer data. It shall include access controls _o
restrict access or modification to specified files, catalogs, or indexes;
para. 3.4.2
..... on-line data storage for customer data for 12 hours. A rapid recall
off-line storage of up to I week ....
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para. 3.4.3
....... shall provide archived data to the customer...... negotiation with
customer.
para. 3.4.4
The SSISISCS shall make available archived data to customers in standard
formats,
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SPACESTATIONREFERENCEONFIGURATIONDESCRIPTION
AUGUST 1984
pp. 451 para. 4.4.4 "Information and Data Management"
pare, 4.4.4.1.3 "Data Protection"
para. 4.4.4.2.2.2.1 "Data Storage"
pare. 4.4.4.2.2,2,4 "Data Base Management"
pp. 799 pare. 5.2.6 "Information and Data Management System"
para. 5.3.6,4 "SS Reference Hardware Applicability"
para. 5.9.6.5 "Platform Reference Design"
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SSIS FINAL REPORTJPL D-1737 (AUGUST1984)
VOLUMEi EXECUTIVESUMMARY
pp.3-4 SERVICE REQUIREMENTS SUMMARY
Database Management Service
Provides facilities for design, generation, storage, retrieval,
manipulation, and summarization of discipline oriented information
files and their contents.
pp.30 INFORMATION SYSTEM SERVICES
3.B Database Management Service
The Database Management Service provides discipline-oriented data and
information bases with the following security-protected access
capabilities in either interactive or batch mode:
generate and store new databases;
modify, retrieve, maintain, copy, delete, update, abstract, search,
index, sort, and merge any information entities stored within the
data base;
and generate reports, in canned or user-prepared formats, resulting
from any of the above actions (with user interaction in interactive
mode to be driven by any of three selectable options: query, menu, or
command)
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SPQCE STATION DEFINITION QND PRELIMINQRY DESIGN
REQUEST FOR PROPOSAL
(SEPTEMBER 15,1984)
pp. C.-2-10 para. 3. I. 3 "Command, control and Comm. Support"
"The data management services shall provide data storage, processing,
presentation, and transmission services adequate to accommodate the customer
requirements."
pp. C-2-18 para. 4.8.2"Data Storage"
"This parameter is the sum of the digital data storage requirement per year
for each active mission." Table C-2-1 "1501.1 gigabits" (max value of data
storage)
pp. C-4-31 para. 2.2.5.1b"Information security"
'"The DMS shall provide data partitioning and protection to assure mission
success and accommodate data privacy, commercial proprietary data, and
security measures."
pp. C-4-32 para. 2.2.5.2 "Functional Requirements"
"'The initial DMS shall support data base access .... on-line capabilities such
as .... program generation and debug, word processing, graphics, and electronic
mail capabilities, health monitoring ...... display of performance and trend
data, subsystem performance data ........ "
'"The DMS shall support a user-friendly language for the man/machine
interface ....... a11 phases of development and operations."
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pp. C-4-33 para. 2.2.5.3 "Design and performance reqmts"
e,
m,
"Data storage and retrieval,and delivery services for for the core system
data. Short term storage shall be provided onboard and selected data for
transfer to archival storage on the ground. This service shall facilitate
rate buffering, lifetime records. Rate buffering shall be provided for
user data transmitted from the Space Station."
"A Data Base Management System (DBMS) shall be provided to support the
convenient and effective storage, exchange, manipulation, and retrieval of
data by ali appropriate Space Station subsystems and users.
The DBMS software shall be capable of interfacing directly with software
programs and the network operating system to ensure access to the
operational data base."
n. " ..... rates greater than 225 MBPS for both payloads and subsystems ..."
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pp. C-6-7 Figure C-6-I TMIS-FUNCTIONAL
LEVEL B
o Centralized,controlled
Data Bases
o Program Mgmt Info
o SE&I Tools and Data
o Centralized document
Library
o Change Control Board
Activities
<--I
NETWORK
I NASA HDQTRS
Io Level A/Level B
I Info Exchange
Io Electronic Mail
--llo Presentations
Io Documentation
I
I
I
I
m
I
I
NASA Centers
o Level C Analysis
o Electronic Mail
o Presentations
o CAD/CAM/CAE
o Documentation
o Statusing
o Level C Data Bases
I--I
Contractor(Typical)
o Analysis
o Schedules
o CAD/CAM/CAE
o Presentations
o Electronic Mail
o Documentation
o Statusing
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6.0 SUPPORTING MATERIAL
APPENDIX C
DIS"I"RIBUTED RELAT'IONAL DATA BASE
TUTORIAL
(TANENBAUM CHAPTER iO)
TANENBAUM REFERENCES :
Chu, W. W., "Optimal File Allocation in a Multiple Computer System", IEEE
Transactions on Computers, Vol. C-18, pp. BB5-BB9, Oct. 1969
Casey, R. G., "Allocation of Copies of Files in an Information Network",
Proceedings SECC, pp. 617-625, 1972
Mahmoud, S., Riordan, J. S., "Optimal Allocation of Resources in Distributed
Information Networks", ACM Transactions on Database Systems, Vol. 1, pp.
66-78, March 1976
Menasce, D. A., Popek, G. J., Muntz, R. R., "A Locking Protocol for Resource
Coordination in Distributed Databases", ACM Transactions on Database Systems,
vol. 5, pp. 104-138, June 1980
Badal, D. Z., "On the Degree of Concurrency Provided by Concurrency Control
Mechanisms for Distributed Databases", in DISI"RIBUTED DATA BASES, C. Delobel
and W. Litwin (eds.)Amsterdam:North Holland, pp. 35-48, 1980
Wilms, P., "Qualitative and Quantitative Comparison of Update Algorithms i.n
Distributed Databases", in DISTRIBLJTED DATA BASES, C. Delobel and W. Litwi.n
(eds.), Amsterdam:North Holland, pp. 275-294, 1980
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O RELATIONAL DATA BASE MODEL (CODD, 1970)
OO INFORMATION STORED IN RECTANGULAR TABLES CALLED "RELATIONS"
ooo ROWS OF RELATIONS CALLED "TUPLES"
ooo FIELDS OF RELATIONS CALLED "ATTRIBUTES"
ooo COLUMNS OF RELATIONS CALLED "DOMAINS"
ooo DOMAIN IS SET OF VALUES FROM WHICH ATTRIBUTES ARE SELECTED
oo EXAMPLES OF RELATIONS
FLIGHTS*
[FL IGHT#_,"
106 J-FK
108 HPN
452 AMS
632 LI_
808 SFO
ORIGIN DESTINATION PLANE
AMS
BOS
NBO
CDG
JFK
RESERVATIONS
DATE FLIGHT # BOOKED NAME
747
CNA
AB3
737
DI0
29 MAR
21 FEB
16 MAR
01SEP
106
108
632
108
210
OO5
105
000
BARBARA BONGO
CAROL CURLEW
MARIA MARMOT
BARBARA BONGO
*RELATION
_DOMAINS (OR ATTRIBUTES) _,-'**"_TUPLES
PERSONNEL
NAME TITLE ISEXMARRIEDSENIORITY
MARILYN MANATEE
SUZANNA SPRINGBOK
BARBARA BONGO
MARVIN MOONFISH
ANDREW AARDVARK
MANAGER F
PUBLICIST F
PILOT F
ENGINEER M
PROGRAMMER M
N
Y
N
N
Y
4
3
3
6
I0
AIRCRAFT
[PLANE ISEATS
747
737
DI0
AB3
CNA
ENGINES
45O 4
I00 2
270 3
260 3
4 1
DICTIONARY
RELATION LOCATIONI# TUPLES TUPLE SlZEl# DOMAINS
FLIGHTS
RESERVATIONS
PERSONNEL
AIRCRAFT
AMSTERDAM
NEW YORK
NAIROBI
MELBOURNE
1,000
365,000
10,000
10
12
30
35
8
4
4
5
3
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O0 EACH RELATION HAS A "KEY"
ooo KEY IS ONE OR MORE DOMAINS THAT UNIQUELY DETERMINE
VALUE OF THE DOMAIN
ooo FOR FLIGHTS THE FLIGHT # IS THE KEY DOMAIN
ooo FOR R£S£RVATION THE KEY IS THE DATE AND FLIGHT itDOMAINS
OO RELATIONS CAN ALSO BE STORED AS A SPECIAL RELATION CALLED THE
"DICTIONARY"
ooo USED TO FIND WHERE RELATION IS STORED
O0 DATA BASE MAY BE "FULLY PARTITIONED" OR "FULLY REPLICATED" OR
SOMETHING BETWEEN
ooo "FULLY PARTITIONED" - EACH RELATION STORED IN EXACTLY
ONE LOCATION
ooo "FULLY REPLICATED" - EACH RELATION STORED IN ALL LOCATIONS
O0 REPLICATION IS NOT DESIREABLE IF UPDATES ARE COMMON
ooo DIFFICULTY IN KEEPING COPIES IDENTICAL
ooo NETWORK DELAYS
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QUERY LANGUAGES
oo ALL DATA BASES ALLOW "QUERIES" AND "UPDATES"
oo FOR RELATIONAL DATA BASES THERE ARE TWO CATEGORIES OF QUERY
LANGUAGE
ooo PROCEDURAL OR "RELATIONAL ALGEBRA"
ooo NON-PROCEDURAL OR "RELATIONAL CALCULUS"
O0 TBREE MAJOR OPERATIONS : RESTRICTION, PROJECTION, JOIN
000 "RESTRICTION" TAKES RELATION AND "PREDICATE"
(ARBITRARY BOOLEAN EXPRESSIONS ON VALUES OF DOMAIN)
AND PRODUCES SUBSET OF TUPLES MEETING PREDICATE
E.G., RELATION PERSONNEL, PREDICATE SEX = 'M'
ooo "PROJECTION" TAKES TWO RELATIONS AND A COMMON DOMAIN
AND PRODUCES NEW RELATION WITH SPECIFIED DOMAINS
000 "JOIN" TAKES TWO RELATIONS AND A COMMON DOMAIN AND
PRODUCES A NEW RELATION MERGED ON COMMON DOMAIN
E.G., FLIGHTS AND AIRCRAFT COULD HAVE "PLANE" AS
JOINING DOMAIN
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USE OF QUERY LANGUAGES
OO RELATIONAL ALGEBRA QUERY EXAMPLE - LIST ALL DATES WHERE
THERE ARE OVERBOOKED FLIGHTS FROM BOS TO SFO
000 ALGEBRA QUERY GIVES INSTRUCTIONS ON HOW TO GET ANSWERS
T1 = RESTRICTION OF FLIGHTS BY ORIGIN = BOS AND DESTINATION = SFO
T2 = JOIN OF T1 AND AIRCRAFT ON PLANE
T3 = PROJECTION OF T2 ONTO FLIGHT # AND SEATS
T4 = JOIN OF T3 AND RESERVATIONS ON FLIGHT 4#
T5 = RESTRICTION OF T4 BY BOOKED > SEATS
OO RELATIONAL CALCULUS QUERY USES "TUPLE VARIABLES" TO SPECIFY
CONDITION RESULT MUST SATISFY
000 TUPLE VARIABLE RANGES OVER ONE RELATION - E.G., F IS
TUPLE VARIABLE OVER FLIGHTS FROM F.ORIGIN IS DOMAIN OF
FLIGHTS
ooo SAME PROBLEM AS ABOVE IN RELATION CALCULUS:
RETRIEVE R.DATA
WHERE
R.FLIGHT # = F.FLIGHT # AND F.PLANE = A.PLANE
AND
F.ORIGIN = B0S AND F.DESTINATION = SFO
AND
R.BOOKED > A.SEATS
000 CONCEPTUALLY, QUERY CAN BE ANSWERED BY THREE NESTED LOOPS,
ONE ON EACH TUPLE VARIABLE - INSPECT EACH COMBINATION OF
THREE TUPLES (ONE FROM R, F, A RELATIONS) TO SEE IF IT
MEETS PREDICATE.
ooo TEST WOULD BE MADE 1,000 x 365,000 x I0 TIMES
oo DATA BASE SYSTEM MUST AVOID IMPOSSIBLY LONG BRUTE FORCE SEARCHES
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OO
PROBLEMS INTRODUCED BY DISTRIBUTING DATA BASE
(I) WHERE TO PUT RELATIONS.
(2) HOW TO PROCESS QUERIES?
(3) HOW TO KEEP MULTIPLE TRANSACTIONS FROM INTERFERRING?
(4) HOW TO MAINTAIN INTEGRITY WHEN SYSTEM CRASHES OCCUR?
DISTRIBUTION PROBLEM
oo DATA BREAK DOWN TO HOSTS (SUBDIVIDE RELATIONS?, SMALLER
FRAGMENTS? )
oo RELATION DISTRIBUTION TO HOSTS? (TRADES)
oo ASSUME FULLY PARTITIONED DATA BASE AND EACH RELATION COMPLETELY
STORED AT A SINGLE HOST
oo DICTIONARY RELATION LIKELY WILL BECOME BOTTLENECK SO REPLICATE
AT EACH HOST (SELDOM CHANGES)
oo PROBLEM HAS BEEN SOLVED FOR FULLY CONNECTED FULL-DUPLEX NETWORK
WHERE PRINCIPAL TRAFFIC IS DUE TO QUERY RESPONSE AND DELAY DUE
TO QUEUEING (CHU 1969)
oo SOLUTION IS AN ASSIGNMENT OF ONES AND ZEROS TO THE MATRIX X
oo CHU FINDS ANALYTIC EXPRESSION FOR qij USING QUEUEING THEORY
BUT SOLUTION USES ZERO-ONE LINEAR PROGRAMMING (CASEY 72',
MAHMOND, RIORDAN 76 ')
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GIVEN:
11 = NUMBER OF HOSTS
m = NUMBER OF RELATIONS
b°
1
C.
l
= STORAGE CAPACITY (IN BYTES) AT HOST i
= COST OF STORAGE (PER BYTE PER SECOND) AT HOST i
= SIZE OF RELATION j
= TUPLE SIZE (IN BYTES) FOR RELATION j
L°
J
i.
J
r.. = TUPLES/SEC FROM HOST i FOR RELATION j
ij
T.. = MAXIMUM ACCEPTABLE DELAY FOR HOST i TO A RELATION j TUPLE
ij
Cik = COMMUNICATION COST (PER BYTE) FOR TUPLES FROM i TO k
Q
qi=J= DELAY FOR QUERY FROM i TO j
VARIABLES:
X.. = I IF RELATION j IS AT HOST i, 0 OTHERWISE
13
CONSTRAINTS :
El
EX... = I
i = IIJ
(1 < j < m)
m
EX..L. <b.
j =liJ j i
(l<i<n)
qi < T..j= 1.1 (I < i < n, I < j < m)
GOAL:
n m n n m
MINIMIZE TOTAL COST =i=l_ j=12Xij.c.L_j +i=lZ k=IZ J-_IXkjCkirijlj I
STORAGE COMMUNICATION
COST PER COST PER SECOND
SECOND
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O QUERY PROCESSING PROBLEM
OO
OO
TWO POSSIBLE METRICS TO MEASURE GOODNESS OF A QUERY
DISTRIBUTION STRATEGY
(I) QUERY RESPONSE TIME (INTERACTIVE APPLICATIONS)
(2) TOTAL BANDWIDTH CONSUMED (BATCH TRANSACTION PROCESSING)
SIMPLIFYING ASSUMPTION - REASONABLE TO ASSUME COST AND TIME
TO MOVE DATA IS SAME FOR ALL PAIRS OF HOSTS
OO STRAIGHT FORWARD APPROACH
ooo QUERIED HOST COMMANDS OTHER HOST TO SEND REQUIRED RELATIONS
ooo QUERY HOST DOES PROCESSING
ooo ALWAYS WORKS BUT THERE ARE MORE EFFICIENT SOLUTIONS
°
OO AVOID MOVING LARGE RELATIONS
ooo IN EXAMPLE CONSIDERED ABOVE QUERY HOST COMMANDS FLIGHT HOST
TO SEND RELATION TO RESERVATIONS HOST AND ALSO AIRCRAFT
HOST TO SEND RELATION TO RESERVATION HOST
i I
i FLIGHTS I
I I
[ 12000
I I ? I I
l RESERVATIONS l_l QUERY l
I I I I
I 1
[ AIRCRAFT I
I I
O0
O0
O0
QUERY HOST DOES NOT HAVE ENOUGH INFORMATION TO MAKE
OPTIMAL DECISION
CAN STILL DESIGN ALGORITHMS THAT GIVE OPTIMAL PERFORMANCE UNDER
CERTAIN STATISTICAL CONDITIONS (CHU, HURLEY 1979)
DO PROCESSING BEFORE RELATIONS ARE MOVED
ooo QUERY HOST BROADCASTS QUERY TO ALL RELEVANT HOSTS
ooo LOCAL PROCESSING DONE ON RELATIONS (RESTRICT TO DOMAIN
VALUES IN QUERY)
ooo PROJECTIONS DONE LOCALLY (EXAMPLE CONSIDERED DOESN'T
NEED A.ENGINES, F.PLANES SO DON'T SEND)
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CONCURRENCY CONTROL PROBLEM
oo CONCURRENCY CONTROL ALGORITHMS MUST MAXIMIZE PARALLEL ACTIVITY
WHILE MAINTAINING DATA BASE CORRECTNESS
OO
O0
O0
O0
DEFINE "TRANSACTION" AS SET OF READS
R = R(Xl,X2, ... xn) AND SET OF WRITES
w = w(Yl, Y2' ""Yn )
DEFINE A "LOG" AS TIME ORDERED SEQUENCE OF READS AND WRITES
EXAMPLES FOR TWO TRANSACTIONS
LOG I = RIWIR2W 2
LOG2= R2W2RIW 1
L0G 3 = RIR2WlW 2
LOG IS "SERIAL" IF EACH R. IS IMMEDIATELY FOLLOWED BY W.
1 1
OTHERWISE IT IS "INTERLEAVED"
O0 INTERLEAVED LOGS DO NOT NECESSARILY PRODUCE CORRECT RESULTS
OO IF INTERLEAVED LOG CAN BE SHOWN TO BE EQUIVALENT TO SOME
SERIAL LOG ("SERIALIZATION") THEN IT PRODUCES CORRECT RESULTS
(E.G., R.W. = W.R. IF OPERATE ON DISJOINT SETS OF DATA; READS
i O j l
CAN BE REORDERED OR PERFORMED IN PARALLEL)
OO MOST ALGORITHMS ACHIEVE SERIALIZABLE LOGS BY ALLOWING TRANSACTIONS
TO "lOCK" PART OF DATA BASE BEFORE STARTING
OO SIMPLIEST LOCKING SCHEME - SINGLE LOCK OF ENTIRE DATA BASE
(ONLY ONE TRANSACTION AT A TIME CAN RUN)
oo COULD ALSO LOCK RELATIONS
OO OTHER POSSIBILITIES
(I) LOCK INDIVIDUAL TUPLES
(2) LOCK INDIVIDUAL DOMAINS
(3) LOCK INDIVIDUAL VALUES
(4) LOCK PHYSICAL DISK SECTORS
oo ASSUME RELATIONS ARE UNIT OF LOCKING
oo LOCKS MUST BE ACQUIRED SEQUENTIALLY
OO
"DEADLOCK" SITUATION CAN RESULT (E.G., HOST A LOCKS RI,
HOST B LOCKS R2, EACH HOST NOW ATTEMPTS TO LOCK OTHER RELATION)
oo "TWO PHASE LOCKING" PROTOCOL SOLVES PROBLEM
OO HOSTS GO THROUGH PHASE OF ACQUIRING LOCKS AND THEN A PHASE OF
RELEASING LOCKS; ONCE SOME LOCK HAS BEEN RELEASED NO OTHER LOCKS
CAN BE ACQUIRED
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O DISTRIBUTED DATA BASE CONCURRENCY CONTROL
oo ILLUSTRATED BY ONE POSSIBLE ALGORITHM (SIMPLE EXAMPLE BUT
DOES NOT ALLOW MAXIMAL CONCURRENCY)
oo ALGORITHM BASED ON ASSIGNING UNIQUE NUMBER TO TRANSACTIONS
O0
O0
O0
O0
O0
00
O0
O0
[ TIME [ HOST I
UNIQUE TRANSACTION NUMBER
CLOCKS OF HOSTS NEED NOT BE SYNCHRONIZED
EACH HOST MAINTAINS FOUR VARIABLES:
t =NUMBER OF CURRENT TRANSACTION
n = NUMBER HOSTS IN TRANSACTION
k = LOCK COUNTER
s = CURRENT STATE (IDLE, LOCKING, PROCESSING, UNLOCKING)
QUERY ARRIVING AT HOST IN IDLE PROCEEDS AS FOLLOWS:
(1) SWITCH TO LOCKING STATE
(2) SET k = o
(3) BROADCAST PLEASE LOCK MESSAGE TO n-1 HOSTS (MESSAGE
CONTAINS TRANSACTION NUMBER, ETC.)
(4) WAlT FOR n-1 PLEASE LOCKMESSAGE TO COME BACK
D
QUERY ARRIVING AT HOST NOT IN IDLE IS QUEUED
PLEASE LOCKMESSAGE ARRIVAL AT HOST IN IDLE PROCEEDS AS FOLLOWS:
(I) SWITCH TO LOCKING STATE
(2)-SET k = 1
(3) SET t = I MESSAGE TRANSACTION NUMBER
(4) SET n = NIJMBER OF HOSTS IN TRANSACTION (IN MESSAGE)
(5) REBROADCAST MESSAGE TO n-I HOSTS
PLEASE LOCKMESSAGE ARRIVAL AT HOST IN LOCKING STATE PROCEEDS
AS FOLLOWS:
(I) CHECK TRANSACTION NUMBER
(2) IF TRANSACTIONNUMBER LOWER THAN t THEN QUEUE PREVIOUS
TRANSACTION AND START OVER WITH NEW TRANSACTION AS IF
PLEASE-LOCK ARRIVED WITH HOST IN IDLE STATE
(3) IF TRANSACTION NUMBER = t THEN INCREMENT k
(4) IF TRANSACTION NIIMBER > t THEN IGNORE
WHEN k = n-I (ALL HOSTS HAVE SENT PLEASE LOCK MESSAGE) THEN HOST
CAN BEGIN PROCESSING AS FOLLOWS:
(1) QUERY PROCESSING ON RELATIONS
(2) WHEN PROCESSING COMPLETE THEN SEND n-I HOSTS PLEASE UNLOCK
MESSAGE
(3) WHEN n-I RETURN MESSAGES RECEIVED THEN HOST SWITCHES TO IDLE
BETTER ALGORITHMS PROPOSED
(I) MENASCE ET AL 1980
(2) BADAL 1980
(3) WILMS 1980
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2.1.1.7.0 GLOSSARY OF TERMS
ad-hoc query: a request for information made to a database system that was
not specifically planned for and programmed into the system
Atomic: non-decomposable so far as the system is concerned
Audit trail: a report or file generated by a DBMS that records transactions
that add to,change,or delete from the DB
B-tree index: short for balanced tree, a way of organizing the pointers to
information in DB's that allows quick retrieval of any single
specified record; The combination of the "index set" and the
"sequence set" defined in VSAM is sometimes called a B-tree
CODASYL: an acronym for Conference On Data Systems and Languages a federally
sponsored industry committee that developed standards which led to
the COBOL language and many of the more complex types of data bases
Hashing: replacement of a sequential search by an address look-up; the
address look-up is through an address function called the hashing
function
Key: each relation has a key consisting of one or more domains that uniquely
determine the values of the other domains
Navigation: the process of traveling through the DB, following explicit
paths from one record to the next in search for some required
piece of data
Normalization: the process that results in an end file design where only data
about the prime key is in each relation
Stored record address(SRA): a unique value created by the access method to
distinquish the stored record occurrence from
all others in the DB (e.g. the physical address
of the occurrence in the storage volume)
B1
View: a way of presenting the contents of a DB to the user, not
necessarily the same as the way the fields and records are stored in
the DB
VSAH: Virtual System Qccess Method consisting of two index sets; The
"sequence set" is a single-level dense index to the actual data;
provides fast sequential access The "index set" is a tree structure
to the "sequence set"; provides fast direct access to the "sequence
set";
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SSDSCOMMANDMANAGEMENTANDRESOURCEMANAGEMENT
2.1.2.1.0 INTRODUCTION
1.1 Purpose
The primary purpose of this activity is to identify options for the
implementation of Functional requirements, as shown in Ill, For two (2) major
functions: Function 2.0 Manage Customer/Operator Supplied Data, and function
3.0 Schedule and Execute Operations. In the areas of command management and
resource management, some key options will be identified. Major issues
associated with each option will be briefly described and key options
characterization will be discussed.
A command is defined as a set of instructions which cause a payload or core
system to execute a specific operation or set of operations. Commands are
separate From (and expected to be a small part of) the general data uplink.
Resources are defined as those common commodities and services available for
use and shared among payloads and SSDS systems. Resources of special
inportance onboard the spacecraft include electrical energy, thermal heat
rejection, local area network and communications bandwidth, and crew operator
time. Ground resources of special importance include mass storage for data
capture and archive, level 0 processors, and communications bandwidth, as well
as facilities supporting development integration and checkout of hardware and
software.
While the primary thrust of the paper is to the Space Station, it is
anticipated that the options described will also support platform command and
resource management. The specific modifications necessary include:
o
0
o
No onboard customer or operators.
Higher degree of onboard automation essential.
Greater emphasis on integrated, planned operation, with probable use
of expert systems for scheduling.
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1.2 _Ap_p_roach
Options for command and resource management will be developed and
characterized through the following five steps:
0 Establish a context for the options. A majority of the context for
command and resource management derives directly from requirements
specified in the GSFC "Customer Requirements for Standard Services"
(CRSS) document of Reference 2. The remainder of the context derives
from Space Station requirements [3], mission requirements [4], MDAC
analyses, and other NASA and contractor analyses. The context serves
to limit the scope of options which may be considered, and to
identify the events which must take place to satisfactorily perform
these functions. However, MDAC understands that attractive options
should not be automatically excluded because they fail to meet all
requirements and criteria. NASA should have the opportunity to
modify the requirements to admit effective solutions.
Identify the full range of attractive system concept options. This
step will be accomplished first at the system level to ensure that
there is no inadvertent failure to identify promising overall
approaches.
Define a reference system. The detailed steps in command and
resource management must be identified in order to show the complete
functioning of the system. However, options of major importance will
only exist for some of these steps. The implementation of the
remainder will be left for Task 4. The reference system also serves
a second, very important role. When properly described, the system
will be sufficiently flexible to intrinsically contain the full range
of system level options. The options development may then be
combined to synthesize a broad range of potential methods for command
and resource management.
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O Identify key option areas. Those steps which are keys in defining
the command and resource methodology will be identified in Sections
2.1 and 3.1. These options will be selected based on their role in
establishing the nature of the command and resource management
functions. Steps not selected for options development will also be
shown for comparison.
O Develop and characterize options. Options will be defined to cover
the attractive approaches to accomplishing each selected step. These
options will reflect current and recent NASA programs and planning,
%
as mell as the MDAC team analyses and concepts. Characterization
will include meeting requirements, resolving key issues, and
applicable aspects of cost, performance, risk, and convenience.
1.3 Context, Concepts and Reference Systems
These first three steps in the methodology are still introductory in nature,
as they establish the scope of the investigation.
1.3.1 Context for Command and Resource Management
The command management function must include the steps shown in Table 1.3-1.
Variations in the sequence of the steps and the routing of commands through
the steps are permissable.
The table shows the steps and one or more requirements that the step will
completely or partially fulfill. Note that these requirements do not
necessarily demand each of these steps. However, the MDAC system functional
analysis has confirmed the importance of each step.
Requirements which provide direction on the nature of the command management
function are shown in Table 1.3-2. This listing combines essential features
of one or more representative requirements into a single summary statement.
The design of the function should consider the complete text of all applicable
requirements. A listing of these requirements is provided in Reference i.
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Table 1.3-1
Essential Steps for Command Management
STEP SOURCE
o Authenticate Command Sender and Address
o Determine Command Classification
(Restricted, Constrained, or Non-restricted)
o Pass non-restricted commands and data to
their destination with no further checking.
o Determine whether restricted and constrained
commands are executable.
o Pass executable, restricted/constrained
commands to their destination at appropriate
times.
o Attempt to resolve problems with not-executable
commands.
o Return not-executable commands to sender.
o Report all command disposition and status to
sender.
o Provide mechanism for customer to cancel
commands.
CRSS 2 1.1.4
CRSS 6.1.6
CRSS 6.1.6.3
CRSS 6.1.6.2
CRSS 6.1.3.1
CRSS 7.3.4.1
CRSS 7.3.4.1
CRSS 7.3.4.1
2. Customer Requirements for Standard Services, Reference 2
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Table 1.3-2
Requirements for CommandManagement
STEP SOURCE
o Provide for CommandData Privacy.
o Process all commandsin a manner consistent
with Customer Real Time, Interactive Operation.
o Support generation and real time change of
stored command sequence.
o Support Customer Payload Commanding
o Make Command Entry and Resolution User Friendly.
o
o
Enable Customer Payload Control to be
essentially the same as if the payload were
in his own laboratory.
Rccept commands originated by the payload and
onboard core systems.
RFP 3 C-4-2.2.6.2t
CRSS 2 5.4.4
RFP C-3-3. l,d
RFP C-3-3.1.R
CRSS 2.2.2
CRSS 1.1.9
CRSS 6.2.1
CRSS 6.2.1.2
CRSS 6.2.1.3
CRSS 6.1.5
CRSS 6.2.1.4
CRSS 6.3.1
CRSS 6.1.2
CRSS 6,3.2
CRSS 6.1.1
CRSS 1.1.4
CRSS 1.1.B
CRSS 6.1.3
CRSS 6.3.1
CRSS 6.3.2
2. Customer Requirements for Standard Services, Reference 2
3, Space Station RFP Section C, Reference 3
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Essential steps for resource management are shown in Table 1.3-3. Note that
one step is not supported by a specific requirement. MDAC has assumed that
Space Station program major events such as NSTS launches, payload additions
and removals, maintenance actions on free fliers such as the Hubble Space
Telescope, OTV launches, etc. will be planned and scheduled by the Space
Station program and provided to the SSDS as a skeleton around which to build
the operating schedules.
Resource management requirements summary statements are shown in Table 1.3-4.
As with command management requirements, the complete text of all applicable
requirements should be used to design the function.
1.3.2 System Options and Reference System for Command Manaqement
The two extremes of command management are illustrated in Figures 1.3-1 and
1.3-2. The system in Figure 1.3-I places responsibility for classifying
commands as to restricted, constrained, and non-restricted on the customer or
payload. Conditions for executability of constrained commands are determined
by the customer, and non-restricted and executable, constrained commands are
sent to the payload. 'The payload may execute self generated, non-restricted
commands without any checking. The SSDS has no role in processing these
customer and payload initiated commands. SSDS responsibility is limited to
determining the executability of customer initiated restricted commands and
payload initiated restricted and constrained commands. Those executable are
sent to the payload. Those not executable are rejected. The determination of
executability depends only on impacts on the Space Station safety. Since
there is no command dictionary or equivalent method of determining
executability of a top level in this system the SSDS must read and understand
the command in order to determine executability.
The system illustrated in Figure 1.3-2 places minimal responsibility on the
customer. The SSDS receives and processes all commands from the customer and
restricted and constrained commands from the payload. Those commands unknown
to the SSDS are rejected. Those found executable, including non-restricted
commands, are delivered to the payload. Those not executable are returned to
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Table 1.3-3
Essential Steps for ResourceManagement
STEP SOURCE
o Accept and verify operations requests from
customers and station operators.
o Receive and confirm Major Event SSP from SSP.
o Negotiate Communications Requirements with NCC.
0
0
0
Develop optimum schedule consistent with
constraints of power, crew task selection,
communications bandwidth, and non-interference
among payloads and Space Station systems.
Revise schedule in accordance with changing
requirements, priorities, opportunities, and
capabilities.
Hold scheduled commands and dispatch at
appropriate time.
o Support onboard, near term planning, crew
CRSS 2 8.4.2
CRSS 7.2.2
MDAC Analysis
CRSS 5.1.4
CRSS 5.2.9
CRSS 0.3
CRSS 7.2.1
CRSS 7.2.2.1
RFP 3 C-3-2.4g
CRSS 7.2.6
CRSS 6.3.1.1
RFP C-3-2.4c
2. Customer Requirements for Standard Services, Reference 2
3. Space Station RFP Section C, Reference 3
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Table 1.3-4
Requirements For Resource Management
STEP SOURCE
o Provide customers and operators data on Space
Station resources and availability.
o Provide a single point of contact For Customer
Communication Reallocation Requests.
o Accommodate a phase degree of Space Station
autonomy.
o Make Resource Management User Friendly.
0 Ensure customer and core system do not
interfere with each other and do not
endanger the health and safety of the Space
Station system.
CRSS 2 7.2.4
CRSS 5.1.4
RFP 3 C-4--2. I.8
CRSS 1.1.4
CRSS 1.1.8
CRSS 6.1.6.1
2. Customer Requirements for Standard Services, Reference 2
3. Space Station RFP Section C, Reference 3
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the customer. The SSDS may be required to read some or all commands to
determine classification and executability, or some or all commands may have
been previously classified and conditions for executability determined in
order to allow the SSDS to process the command without sending it.
Since the purpose of this section is only to introduce the range of system
options, implications and relative merits of these scenarios will not be
discussed in this section. The more significant point is that a series of
additions and function relocations can transform the system of Figure 1.3-1 to
that of Figure 1.3-2. Hence, it is feasible to define a reference system
which contains all of the steps of Table 1.3-1 and options which can transform
it to either system extreme.
The reference system selected is shown in Figure 1.3-3. This system contains
all of the essential steps from Table 1.3-1 and all of the elements necessary
to represent the systems of Figures 1.3-1 and 1.3-2, as well as provisions for
requirements from Table 1.3-2. The boundaries shown are those of the command
management system, and do not represent any physical equipment or locations.
Commands may be issued by customers, operators, or their systems. The
commands are authenticated. The valid commands are sorted by timing, with
those for real time execution bypassing the command scheduling function.
Those commands with no timing designation are treated as real time. This
arrangement expedites the processing of interactive and other real time
operating commands. It also passes non-restricted commands with no timing
designation around the scheduling function.
Commands to be scheduled are passed to the schedule check function. Three
possible determinations are made: scheduled, permissable, or need
resolution. Scheduled commands are those for which prior provision has been
made in the Space Station schedule. This provision will normally be as simple
as scheduling a payload for operation. In some cases, specific provisions are
required to draw on resources, vent, emit radiation, or perform other
operations which may interfere with the operation of other payloads or core
systems. Permissible commands are those not specifically provided in the
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schedule, but permissible under currently forecast conditions. Other commands
require resolution to either modify the payload operations or the schedule to
eliminate identified conflicts. These commands are referred to the customer
and operator for resolution.
Scheduled and permissible commands are loaded into the operating schedule for
execution at their requested times. A final check is made just prior to
issuance to ensure that the commands are still executable. Those executable
are issued, those not executable are reported back to their point of origin.
1.3.3 System Options and Reference System for Resource-Manaqement
The two extremes of resource management are illustrated in Figures 1.3-4 and
1.3-5. Figure 1.3-4 depicts a system in which resources are allocated on
demand according to whether a request for resources can be met. These
requests may be issued by the customer or operator or automatically by their
onboard or ground systems, e.g., payload processor. In this simplest
implementation, requests that exceed capability are rejected.
The resource management system of Figure 1.3-5 utilizes a multi-tier
scheduling process to allocate resources. A long term schedule is formed
about a nucleus of program level events and the resultant master plan. The
short term schedule adds detail and resolution to the long term schedule.
Inputs may originate from customers, operators, or their automated systems.
The operating schedule contains the individual, time phased commands necessary
to implement the schedule. Additional levels of schedule could be added to
reduce the size of steps between schedules.
Again, the intent of Figures 1.3-4 and 1.3-5 is to show extremes of attractive
options and to provide guidance to the formulation of the reference system for
resource management. This reference system must embody both extremes
intrinsically, incorporate the essential steps for resource management from
Table 1.3-3, and embody provisions for meeting the requirements of Table 1.3-4.
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The selected reference system is shown in Figure 1.3-6. Operations requests
are received from customers, operators, and internal generation sources within
their systems. The requests are validated and entered into the system. The
requests are separated into those affecting existing schedules and those to be
incorporated into new schedules. New schedule operations requests are
accumulated until the time for the scheduling cycle to begin. A trial
schedule is assembled and checked for conflicts such as resource limits,
interferences, and Space Station safety. Conflicts are referred to the
customers and operators for resolution. The schedule continues to be iterated
to provide the progressive levels of detail required by the system. In
addition, each level of schedule may be perturbed by new requests from the
customers, operators, and their automated equipment, changes in resource
forecasts (e.g., failed fuel cell reduces power available), major program
event schedule changes, and priority changes. Onboard crew planning will
influence the shortest term schedule, and may drive some aspects of that
schedule.
The operating schedule is created from the shortest term schedule by the
assembling of time tagged implementation commands entered by customers,
operators and system equipment or stored within the system.
The number of levels of scheduling and the detailed content of each schedule
is left unspecified in this reference system. Note that the case of resource
allocation on demand bypasses the entire flow chart of Figure 1.3-6, as there
is no schedule. However, the linking of command management and resource
management through the operating schedule allows the execution check required
by Figure 1.3-4 to be performed by command management, in the absence of
schedules.
2,1.2.2.0 COMMAND MANAGEMENT
2.1 Description
Command management includes the entire end-to-end process of receiving
customer and operator commands into the SSDS, validating and checking for
executability, and delivering the commands to their addresses on the Space
Station or Platform. Table 1.3-1 of Section 1.2.1 shows the steps essential
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for command management. Variations in sequencing the given steps and routing
of commands through the management process are to be considered in developing
the command management function. Table 1.3-2 provides a list of
representative command management functional requirements and references to
detailed functional requirements provided in references 2 and 3. This
section, command management, provides a brief description of "command" and
indicates the command management functional steps selected for key options
development and characterization.
2.1,1 Command
A command is a customer/operator user-defined message which is addressed to a
specific application process onboard the receiving spacecraft [5]. For this
discussion, a command will refer to the complete set of instructions necessary
to implement an operation by the payload or subsystem being commanded. A
command message is formatted with variable length so that the user/operator
will not be constrained by the particular transport system.
A command can be a payload command or a core command issued by an authorized
customer or operator. A core command is an operator command issued to a core
system that maintains the environment in which the customer/operator performs
his required services.
2,1.2 Customer/Operators
Customers are those people either on the ground or onboard, commanding
payloads and receiving data by using Space Station Data System (SSDS)
service. Operators are Space Station Program (SSP) personnel onboard and on
the ground.
2.1.3 Payload
A payload is a customer supplied package mounted in or on the Space Station.
Some payloads may utilize optional SSDS data processing and/or operator
services.
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2.2 CommandManaqement Key Options and Options Characterization
The technical discussions given in previous sections, cover briefly the
command definition, the customer/operator definition, the essential command
management functional steps and requirements, and the functional interface
processing between command management and resource management. These steps of
command management selected for further technical discussions and options
development are:
Command Format
Command Classification
Checking for Command Executability
Priority
Each of these steps will be described in detail. Options will be discussed
based on the description. The selection of the option to be implemented will
be left to the Task 3 trade studies or the Task 4 design activity.
2.2.1 Command Format
2.2.1.1 Description
a. Command Recoqnition. As specified in section 5.3.2.1 of reference i,
upon receipt of a user command, the customer/operator identification shall be
checked to ensure that the customer/operator is authorized to issue the
command or data to the address in the header. If unauthorized, the command
will be rejected, and the originator notified.
b. CCSDS Command Formattinq. As shown in [5], the CCSDS (Consultative
Committee for Space Data System) has designed a standardized telecommand
packet (TC packet) for a customer/operator command containing a user-4efined
message which is addressed to a specific application process onboard the
receiving spacecraft. A TC packet, formatted for a user.-command, is the data
entry passed end-to-end from the point of origin (e.g., the customer's
facility) to spacecraft (or spacecraft to spacecraft) data network. Figure
2.2-i illustrates the telecommand packet format as proposed by CCSDS [5].
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The primary header consists of three data fields: the packet identification
(including application process ID and version number), packet sequence control
(including packet name or sequence count), and packet length between the first
bit of the secondary header and the last bit of the optional packet error
control. The optional secondary header is designed to provide ancillary data
for interpretation of the command data in the packet. The command data field
contains the user command information to be used by the application process.
For very long packets device of packet segmentation and use of virtual channel
are proposed by CCSDS for implementation for uplink telecommand transmission
[63.
c. CCSD$ Command Transmission from Sendinq to Receiving. The
customer/operator's command, formatted as a telecommand packet, is submitted
to the SSDS for transmission. It can be a simple TC packet, a sequence of
packets, or a file of packets, together with command data information
concerning operation procedures to be used. Figure 2.2-2 illustrates the
logic flow of the CCSDS proposed layered command formatting for end-to-end
command handling and data network processing [5]. A user application process
presents user packet(s) of information from the application process layer to
interface with the packet layer. The packet layer may append packet(s)
containing transfer control directions in accordance with transfer service
requests. The transfer frame layer service is provided by the sender to the
receiver jointly performing agreed command operation procedures within
transfer frame layers [6]. The services of the TC channel coding layer, which
provides a standard encoding technique for required reliability of bit
transfer, are used to establish and operate the physical data channel [7].
The receiving transfer frame layer is responsible for transfering the transfer
frames reliably to the receiving packet layer onboard the receiving
spacecraft, where the packet assembly process in the packet layer reassembles
each packet and monitors its delivery to the designated receiving application
process.
This completes the CCSDS proposed layered command data network logic from
ground to space for uplink telecommand transmission.
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According to the command ata information from a sending packet addressed to
the receiving application process, mission data are generated, assembled, and
delivered to the ground user via telemetry packets as defined in the CCSDS
blue books [B] [9].
d. User Control Requirements for Command Processinq.
0 User Privacy Requirement: As shown in [2], users requiring secure
commanding of their payloads shall be responsible for command
encryption and decryption within the payload and on ground.
Therefore, the SSDS should be able to support user's payload
operation without reading the user;s command.
O Real Time Data for Interactive Control: As specified in [1] and [2],
the SSDS shall provide the user a real time, interactive control
capability for non-restricted commands and shall include restricted
and constrained commands, in so far as possible.
0 Time Tagged Commands: All restricted and constrained commands must
be time tagged options for time tagged non-restricted commands.
2.2.1.2 Option Characterization
The command format option characterization will be discussed in the order of
the command format descriptions given in the previous section 2.2.1.i, as
follows:
a,
O
User Identification and Command Recoqnition
The customer/operator - The user command for payloads can be
generated at or issued from at least the following three locations
[2]: the user's facility, the ground control center(s), and the
Space Station. The SSDS must have a way to determine whether the
user is authorized to command that payload.
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Some user or system control requirement, such as a data base user
name directory, must be provided for checking user identification and
authorized commands. This user ID is also important for end-to-end
data distribution (after demultiplexing of transfer frames at the
ground data processing control centers) to return mission data to the
user who had issued the command. There is no mention of the user ID
and authorization in the development of the telecommand packet
standards [5].
The customer/operator identification can be implemented easily by any
of several methods in current commercial practice. The merits of
some alternative approaches will be considered in Task 4. The major
concern is with any impact SSDS requirement may have on the
development of the CCSDS/ISO standards for end-to-end data interface
networking.
o Command Recognition - Each command must be classified as
non-restricted, constrained, or restricted. Command processing will
depend on this classification. Since some customers will want to
maintain command security, it is desirable to process commands based
on information in the command headers.
This can be done by a command identification code, by only allowing
encryption of non-restricted commands, or by customer determination
of which commands may be executed.
b. Use of CCSDS Standards and the ISO/OSI Reference Model for
Telecommand Transmission. As defined in [2], user interface standards shall
be defined in accordance with the International Standards Organization (ISO)
7-layer reference model for open system interconnect (OSI) as first
preference. The SSDS reference system (as it is defined in previous section
1.3) shall use each of the 7-layers existing internationally accepted
standards at first priority. When practical, appropriate standards from the
sources such as the CCSDS layered design standards as shown in Figure 2.2.-2,
shall be used at the upper layers to supplement the ISO/OSI 7-layer reference
model.
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d, User Control Requirements for Real-Time Operation and Data
Distribution
i. Option characterization of User Requirements for Real-Time Operation
- Rs specified in section 6.2 in [2], the SSDS reference system shall:
o Support user operation of their payloads in real-time.
Permit the use of customer unique software to support the real-time
interaction which applies to non-restricted commands, and to
restricted and constrained commands to the maximum extent possible.
O Make the real-time interaction capability available to the flight
crew or the ground users.
O Support the ground or payload specialist to change automated command
sequences in real-time operation mode.
o These user requirements included in the command for real-time
operation can be added to the CCSDS/ISO primary or secondary header.
The standards or format requirement specifications for the user
real-time operation will be left to Task 3 for trade studies and to
Task 4 for system design.
2. Option characterization of User Requirements for Real-Time Data
Distribution - The SSDS reference system shall provide users with real-time
and near-real-time data return by performing the following:
o Provide real-time payload data.
O Provide level-O payload and monitor data in near-real-time for
quick-look monitoring.
O Deliver core system monitor data for ground operators in real-time or
near-real-time.
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0 Account for real-time and near-real-time data until all data are
delivered.
o Provide real-time distribution of real-time and near-real-time data,
including level-<) processing, demultiplexing, buffering, routing, and
retransmission in accordance to user telecommand.
0 These user requirements for level-<) payload real-time and quick look
data distribution should be contained in the user command headers
(primary and secondary), to enable the SSDS to arrange communications
links and bandwidth to support the end-to-end networking.
0 The user command should contain a tagged timing requirement
parameter: real-time or near-real-time defined as zero hour timing,
or a specified time for the command to be issued.
2.2.2 Command Classification
2.2.2.1 Description
As described in previous section 1.3, the customer/operator command shall be
checked to see whether the command is issued by an authorized user. If so,
the command shall be checked against the command dictionary for authentication
and then differentiated for identification. Consequently, the user command
shall be handled appropriately based on its classification.
2.2.2.2 Option Characterization of Command Classification
a. General Option Discussions. The option of command classification
shall be characterized, in general, by following the technical discussions
given in section 4.3.4 in [1], as follows.
The ground user command shall be verified, checked, and classified
prior to telecommand delivery to the payload.
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O The customer/operator command issued onboard shall be verified,
checked, and classified onboard the space station.
o The classification of an authorized user command shall be determined
(against the data base command dictionary) in the following three (3)
types:
- Non-restricted commands, which are neither restricted nor
constrained.
- Restricted commands, which are payload/core commands that could
endanger the SS safety or its payload and constellation elements.
- Constrained commands, which are those payloads that require
coordination with other users or core systems to insure that
users do not interfere with each other and to coordinate SS
systems support of customer requests for services.
According to its executability, a restricted or constrained, i.e.
command can be determined as executable cleared for execution on a
specific schedule.
Non-restricted commands and data are passed directly to payload or
core with no further checking beyond the address of the destination.
O Restricted and constrained commands receive command management with
conditions checking for command executability by one of several
alternative processes.
O Some restricted and constrained may be processed for immediate
execution, consistent with real time, interactive control. They will
be routed directly to their destination without further delay. The
goal is no significant increase in delay over that for non-restricted
commands.
O Some restricted and constrained commands may be processed for later
execution. The command accepted for later execution may become
unexecutable prior to its scheduled time due to unforeseeable system
or payload status changes.
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O Commands executable at a scheduled time are held until the time for
its release, then routed to the payload for execution.
O Some commands being held for later execution may become not
executable due to the schedule changes resulting from equipment
failure, system capability loss, or preemption by other commands with
higher priorities. The commands so affected will be treated as any
other "not executable" command.
O Commands which are not executable will be referred to the
customer/operator for re-planning and re-scheduling.
b. Specific Option Discussions. Other options of command classification
that are noteworthy are briefly discussed as follows.
o The command identification process is completely apriori. That
implies the command classification is determined apriori
(pre-<Jetermined).
Another concept is that the command classification is accomplished at
the time it is submitted.
0 As described in previous section 1.3.2, in one extreme of command
management, customer takes the responsibility to classify commands as
restricted, constrained, or unconstrained. Customer determines the
conditions for executability of constrained command. Only
non-restricted and executable, constrained commands are passed to the
payloads. The SSDS has only the limited responsibility of
determining the executability of restricted commands.
In another command management extremity, as shown in Figure 1.3-2,
customer plays only limited role in command classification. The $SDS
receives and processes all customer/operator commands. By checking
against the data base command dictionary, the executability of the
command is determined. Unknown (unlisted) commands issued by
authorized customers will be rejected.
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The requirements specification for the command classification, whether it is
apriori, as submitted, customer determination, or SSDS-_oes-it all, will be
left to Task 3 for trade studies and to Task 4 for system design.
2.2.3 Checkinq for Command Executabilit V
2,2.3.1 Description
As briefly described in section 1.3.2, there are two extremities in the
command management system for checking the command executability. One extreme
of the reference system claims full responsibility for SSDS to read all
customer commands, to classify them, and to check their executability. The
other extremity places maximum responsibility to the customer for determining
command classification, checking executability of constrained commands, and
sending commands to the payloads or SSDS, as appropriate.
At the same time, each of the extremities will interact with the resource
management for command scheduling by checking against the resources
availability and limitations.
The SSDS command management system shall be responsive during checking for
command executability to support alerts and rapid replanning for unique
payload opportunities (such as volcano eruptions and solar flares) in a
real-time or near real-time operation mode.
2.2.3,2 Opti0n Characterization
The option characterization of checking for command executability will be
discussed as follows.
a, All customer responsibility - One option is to designate the customer
with full responsibility to check constrained command executability.
In a command management system adopting this extreme approach, the
customer shall be required to:
o Issue all commands.
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o Determine a11 command classifications as to non-restricted,
constrained, or restricted command.
o Check constrained command executability and send the
non-restricted and executable, constrained commands to the
payload.
o Send only restricted commands to SSDS which, in turn, interacts
with the resource management system by checking against
resources availability, safety and other limitations. If the
commands are executable, they are sent to the payload.
Otherwise, SSDS wil send the unexecutable commands back to the
customer and provide assistance in clearing for execution, to
include at least the reasons for non-executability.
This extreme minimizes $SOS's responsibility to process only
restricted user commands.
b, All SSDS Responsibility - Another extreme in the command management
reference system places minimal responsibility on customer. SSDS has
full responsibility in checking for command executability by
performing the following:
o Check the timing tag included in the user command as to whether
it is real-time, or near-real-time, scheduled, or undesignated.
o Check for executability with: (i) information data provided by
command dictionary: command classifications, conditions For
command executions, sensitivity and impact associated with
command payload operations, and (2) information data provided by
resource management: resources availability and limitations,
sensitivities and scheduled/planned operations, and (3) command
priorities.
o The executable, constrained/restricted commands and
non-restricted commands will be sent to payload for execution.
Both will be consistent with real-time operations, in so far as
practical.
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The not identifiable and not executable commands, together with
command status will be sent to the disposition function in the
command management. Appropriate assistance will be made
available to the customer to aid in resolution of not-executable
commands.
C, Intermediate Options - Between these extremes lie many optional
systems which will resolve difficulties with the extremes and
maximize benefits. These options will all be considered in the Task
3 trade studies.
The implementation of Checking for Command Executability will be left to Task
3 For trade studies and to Task 4 for system design.
2.2.4 Priority
2.2.4.1 Description
As specified in Section 5.1.4 in [2], the SSDS reference system shall support
the capability for on demand reallocation of data resources to meet customer"
priorities. In the extreme application, customers with highest priority will
get what they have requested all time, provided the requested resources are
available and sufficient. Customers with lower (or lowest) priorities will be
scheduled later (or last) or never, due to limited resources. This options
area is concerned with the various ways of utilizing priorities, short of this
extreme application.
Priorities can be established by the policy-making space station program
committee or through negotiations among customers and the committee. As
stated in Section 5.1.2 in [23, SSDS shall manage transfer of customer data.
SSDS determines the priority of the customers' requests for data transfer
based on customer data accessibility, data volume. Then SSDS shall assign
valid custmer data transfer requests to demand or batch priority.
Under certain circumstances SSDS shall accommodate customer requests for
dynamic priorities by interrupting some operation(s) in current execution and
executing the customer requested operation(s) on demand a in real-time
operation mode.
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2.2.4.2 Option Characterization
Option characterization of customer priority implementation will be discussed
as follows.
a. Straiqht Priority Versus Time Allocation
Straight priority can be simply defined in the case of command
management, as an orderly command processing, such that the command,
which carry a higher priority request will be processed and
implemented in preference to commands carrying a lower priority.
o Priority is usually assigned by customer. In some cases, when
customers choose to ignore, SSDS will have to assign priorities, such
as FIFO (first in, first out), and LIFO (last in first out). These
are often referred to as queueing disciplines in queueing theory.
o
Time allocation for operation is an alternative for priority
implementation. Customers with high priority are allocated more
operating time (or a higher proportion of critical resources), but
a11 customers will be guaranteed an operating time commensurate with
priority and mission objectives.
b. Charge for Priority Versus Allocation by Need or Merit
o Priority assignment is usually associated with a fee. That is, a
customer command assigned with a higher priority will pay more for
the services supplied by the SSP.
The criterion for assigning a high or low priority to a customer may
absolve based on some measure of need or merit. The factors given
below should be considered as a basis for priority determination:
I. Value Judgment
2. Fee Structure
3. Pecking Order
4. Political Considerations
5. Impacts of Resource Demands
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c. Dynamic Priority For Unique Payload Opportunities
Dynamic priorities often arise under unexpected circumstances, such
as volcano eruption and payload observation over a specific ground
target under specific circumstances. This kind of dynamic priority
request for unique payload opportunities may be accommodated by the
SSDS resource management system by flexible scheduling algorithms.
However, the development cost and complexity grows with the degree oF
Flexibility provided..
The implementation of managing user command priorities will be left to Task 3
for trade studies and to Task 4 for system design.
2,1,2.3.0 RESOURCE MANAGEMENT
3.1 Description
A brief discussion on system options and reference system For resource
management was given in previous Section 1.3.3. 'This section, in addition,
provides some generalized descriptions on resource management as Follows.
O Overall SSDS Schedulin 9 Requirements
The SSDS overall scheduling requirement is to provide for short term
scheduling and executing of all operations required by the space station
customers and operators. The SSOS shall support customer/operator
interactive development of appropriate operating schedules based on master'
plan data developed by the Space Station Program (SSP).
The SSDS Scheduling Objective
The SSDS develops an "optimum" schedule which integrates multiple customer
requests and payload accommodation requirements consistent with
constraints of Space Station resources.
1.17
O Critical Space Station Resources and Constraints
The critical Space Station resources and constraints include:
- Power and Electrical Energy
- Crew Activity and Flexibility to Accommodate Crew Task Selection
- Uplink/Downlink Bandwidth
- Crew and Space Station or Platform Safety
- Payload and Space Station or Platform System Interaction and
Interference
- Data processing resources that include computers, storage
devices, and networks supporting the SSDS data processing
facilities.
o The Master Plan
The term "Master Plan" requires definition in order to understand the
envisioned interface between the Space Station Program and the SSDS
resource management function. The Master Plan is a listing of the major
program level events that will affect the scheduling of Space Station and
payload operations. A partial list of these events is given in Table
3.1-1, together with data sources and responsibilities. The data required
in the Master Plan are generally appropriate for collection and
coordination by the Space Station Program. The Master Plan will be
maintained by the SSDS.
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Table 3.1-i Major Program Events Included in the Master Plan
EVENT SOURCE-RESPONSIBILITY
NSTS Orbiter Visits
- Date
- Duration
- Cargo Manifest
- Return Cargo
SSP - Planning, Coordination with MCC
- Initial Schedule
MCC - Schedule Updates
o Payload Changes, Servicing
- Additions
- Returns
- Upgrade/Refurbish
SSP - Coordinate Requirements
with Customers
- Coordinate Transportation
with MCC
o OTV/OMV Flights
- Date
- Mission, Payload
- Duration
SSP - Coordinate with Customers
- Initial Schedule
- Schedule Updates
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Table 3.1-I Major Program Events Included in the Master Plan (Cont'd)
EVENT
Free Flier Servicing
- Date
- Free Flier
- Sensitivities,
Interferences
- Time Line
SOURCE-RESPONSIBILITY
SSP - Coordinate Schedule with Customer
- Identify Restrictions, Constraints
Customer - Provide Mission Data
O SSPE Servicing
- Date
- Element
- Sensitivities,
Interferences
- Time Line
SSP - Coordinate Schedule
- Identify Restrictions, Constraints
SSPE - Provide Mission Data
Space Station Additions
- Date
- Resource Impact
- Addition Time Line
- Sensitivities,
Interferences
SSP - Coordinate Transportation with MCC
- Provide Resource Impact, i.e.
Capabilities, Demand
- Identify Changes in Reference Data,
e.g. Restrictions, Constraints,
Priorities
- Provide Mission Impact Data
3.2 Resource Manaqement Options and Option Characterization
In the area of resource management, selected for further technical discussions
are the following three (3) key options:
o Schedule objectives
o SSDS scheduling scope
o Scheduling conflicts resolution
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Each of the key options will be described and option characterization will be
discussed based on the option description. The option resolutions and
implementations will be left to Task 3 for trade studies and to Task 4 for
system design.
3.2.1 Schedule Obiectives
3.2.1.1 Description
The scheduling function in the resource management system provides the Space
Station operating schedules based on customer/operator requests which demand
Space Station resources. The SSDS scheduling can be accomplished: a)
interactively in most cases with the customers/operators who issued the
requests and commands, b) automatically with the aid of some automated
scheduling algorithms, such as the "expert system" derived from artificial
intelligence which will be briefly discussed in the next section for option
characterization, and c) manually - sometimes it is still considered as
practical and operational. The major objective of the scheduling function in
the SSDS resource management is to develop optimum schedules which are
consistent with the constraints of power, crew time, communication link
bandwidth, and other SSDS resources within limits that ensure that customer
and core systems do not interfere with each other and do not endanger the
health and safety of the space station system.
Optimization must be performed on some quantitative figure of merit, such as
the value of products generated by the payloads or the adequate allocation of
Space Station resources and services to a spectrum of customers. Other
figures of merits can be summarized as follows:
o Accountability for success and loss of operations.
o Accommodation of all customers (including customer commands with low
priorities).
o Maximum utilization of all resources, especially critical resources.
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3.2.1.2 Option Characterization
The option characterization of schedule objectives is discussed in the
following:
Maximum Resource Utilization versus Value of Products: The
utilization of the Space Station resources, such as data processing
throughput, buffer allocation, power/energy communications bandwidth,
and crew time can be optimized with existing conventional
linear/non-linear programming algorithms, so that the value of
products is optimized in accordance with customer requirements,
priorities, and opportunities. However, if the Space Station
resource utilization is maximized in order to optimize the value of
products, it will be more difficult to accommodate customer dynamic
priority demands for resources and services.
Flexibility versus Optimization: the primary objective of the SSDS
scheduling function can be optimized between the use of the
Space Station resources to maximize the value of results to the
customers and provide a flexible schedule which is able to
automatically or interactively accommodate changing customer
requirements, priorities, and opportunities.
0 Priorities versus Accommodation of all customer's objectives:
arguments presented in the above two paragraphs can be equally
applied here.
The
O Expert System (using artificial intelligence) for scheduling: A few
schedulers have already been developed in the aerospace sector by
using expert system approaches and several others are currently under
development. Dr. Karl Kempf, Section Manager of the newly formed
Artificial Intelligence Laboratory at MDRL, is specializing in
software for control of automated production systems involving
robotics and scheduling with expert systems. MDTSCO at Houston and
KSC, both are under contract with NASA to develop expert schedulers
for two different appliations. The KSC application is for expert
scheduling space vehicle fueling sequences of events, and the other"
at Houston is for an expert scheduler for scheduling launch and
flight operations. It should be noted that, in general, expert
schedulers such as those mentioned above are not necessarily
reconfigurable to a new application, such as an expert SSDS scheduler.
Expert schedulers are in the current state-of-art of technology and
in use in several applications. They are not, however, an
off-the-shelf item. The development of expert system technology
tailored for an expert SSDS scheduler requires Tasks 3 and 4
activities.
3.2.2 SSDS Schedulin 9 Scope
3.2.2.1 Description
As specified in [1], SSDS plays a major role in scheduling. The Space Station
Program develops the master plan impacts for program schedules as discussed in
detail in previous section 3.1. The customers/operators on the ground and
crew on board participate in schedule development and scheduling conflicts
resolutions.
3.2.2.2 Option Characterization
This section provides brief technical discussions on the option
characterization of the SSDS scheduling scope as follows.
a. Long Term Schedule or No Schedule: No Schedule does not mean there
will be no SSDS scheduling at all. A no-schedule approach is accomplished by
simply performing the following:
o Receive the customer/operator requests demanding SSDS resources.
O Check customer/operator requests against the Space Station resource
availability and command restrictions and constraints.
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o If Space Station resources are available and meet customer demands,
and the customer/operation command is otherwise executable, the
command will be accepted and delivered for execution.
o Otherwise, customer/operator command will be rejected.
Additional levels o? schedule which may be provided to aid in optimizing the
schedule and meeting customer and program requirements include:
i) Operating Events Schedule - A short to very short term schedule
containing time tagged commands to implement events planned for
operation.
2) Short Term Schedule - Used to optimize and hold the events planned
for operation. Would normally employ interactive optimization by
both customers and system operators.
3) Intermediate Term Schedule - Provides information similar to the
Short Term Schedule, but with less resolution.
4) Long Term Schedule - Provides estimated block allocations of
operating time at low resolution.
5) Master Plan - Contains program events which will be major
perturbations to "normal" operations.
The role and value of these levels of schedule will be assessed in the Task 3
and 4 activities.
b. Responsibility for SSDS scheduling to meet customer objectives: As
specified in sections 5.3.3 and 6.2 in [I], the resources management reference
system develops the following schedules to meet customer objectives:
i) Develop master plan as discussed in previous section 3.1.
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2) Retain and maintain normal day and major event day schedules. These
schedules may be used as baselines for developing schedules for
normal and major event days, by
o Supporting interactive payload planning and scheduling.
Integrating customer payload operating requests with Space
Station resource availability.
o Supporting customer requests for non-SSIS resources.
o Providing projected data on Space Station resources.
O Interactively developing integrated Space Station element
schedules.
3) Develop short term schedules: The SSDS shall support the interactive
development of short term Space Station schedules by Space Station
system operators and customers. Specifically, the SSDS shall:
o Allow near-term planning entries by the onboard crew.
o Coordinate communications allocations for all SSPE's with the
network control center. Resolve all SSP requirements
conflicts. Provide type of service, data rates, desired times,
and allocations to SSPE's.
0 Support interactive planning by payload and core system
operators including significant orbital parameters, such as
time, orbital position, and object ephemerides, which may
influence payload and Space Station operations.
O Provide indications of Space Station resource capabilities and
availability to support payload output optimization.
o Optimize utilization of Space Station resources and maximization
of payload output.
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0 Support rapid replanning to allow customers to take advantage of
payload opportunities.
0 Support clearing of restricted and constrained payload commands
to assist in real-time payload operation.
o support customer requests for non-ssIs resources.
o Develop integrated SSP operations schedules.
0 Provide accountability of the disposition of restricted and
constrained commands.
Schedule use of Space Station resources by other SSPE's (e.g.,
platform - space station communications, crew time, etc.) and
resolve conflicting requests.
0 Support interactive schedule development with appropriate data
processing input/output and display.
4) Develop operating events schedules: The SSDS shall develop an
operating event schedule containing the time sequenced operating
events in the short term schedule, together with the commands
necessary to initiate these operations. Specifically, the SSDS shall:
Check restricted commands and constrained commands for execution
within the existing short term schedule.
Deliver immediately or incorporate into the operating event
schedule, as appropriate, those restricted and constrained
payload and core commands which are executable.
0 Alert the customer and operator to those restricted and
constrained payload commands which are not executable in the
current short terms schedule. Transfer these commands to
Function 3.2 for disposition.
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O Support real-time reallocation of data distribution resources to
help meet customer priorities. Coordinate communications
requirements with network control.
Store customer payload commands for execution according to a
schedule, sequence of events, or another stored command.
Provide accounting of commands incorporated into the operating
event schedule.
3.2.3 Schedulinq Conflicts Resolution
3.2.3.1 Description
The final area for option development in resource management is resolution of
customer commands which exceed constraints or violate restrictions. 'The
scheduling conflict conditions may result from the following circumstances:
Scheduling which takes place closer to the time of execution
frequently involves conflicts resolution between customers requests
for limited Space Station resources.
Customers attempting to operate their equipment in a manner not
anticipated in the schedule.
o Space Station equipment failure or other loss of capability.
o Schedule preemption by a user higher priority operation.
o Error conditions.
o Operations interference between customers.
3.2.3.2 Option Characterization
This section provides technical discussions on the option charcterization of
the scheduling conflicts resolution as follows:
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a. Utilization Level of Resources: The utilization level of Space
Station resources has to be optimized in such a way that optimum schedules can
be developed consistently with constraints of power, crew activity,
communications bandwidth, and non-interference among payloads and space
station systems. Desired level of resource utilization can be established by
using mathematical optimization techniques or expert system technologies
through simulation modeling.
b. Allowance for Opportunities: To avoid scheduling conflicts
resolution, SSDS shall maintain resource utilization at an appropriate level
and support short term schedule revisions down to the last minute for
execution to accommodate customer dynamic changes in payload observations and
target of opportunity operations. At the same time, customer desires
interactive involvement with SSDS in system schedule development, including
real-time adjustments to accommodate target of opportunity without causing any
scheduling conflict.
c. Early versus "On The FIv" Resource Manaqement:
I) Early resource management includes:
O Development of major event schedule (master plan) as discussed
in section 3.1.
Development of single or multiple layered schedules, and
operating event schedules as discussed in previous section
3.2.2.2.
0 Short term schedule revision close to the time of execution to
accommodate customer changes in payload observations.
O Real-time scheduling adjustment to accommodate customer targets
of opportunity.
O Maintenance of an adequate resource utilization level for
optimum scheduling without causing any scheduling conflicts.
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2)
_)
"On the fly" resource management allocates space station resources as
they are going to be utilized to fulfill customer requests. If
customer commands can be scheduled with available resources at a time
satisfactory to the customer, it will be accepted and scheduled for
execution. Otherwise, customer commands must be rejected.
Scheduling conflicts resolution:
o The SSDS should attempt to resolve scheduling conflicts.
o Resolution can be resolved by an operator, automatically by the
SSDS software, or interactively, with or without
customer/operator involvement.
o An interactive procedure for conflicts resolution with
customer/operator involvement is currently preferred.
2.1.2.4.0
o In case scheduling conflicts cannot be resolved, customers must
be informed of the reasons for rejection, because they may need
assistance in replanning. In this case, the SSDS will be
required to provide reasons for rejection, and the Space Station
program provides assistance in replanning.
TRACEABILITY CROSS REFERENCE MATRIX OF OPTIONS VS RFP PARAGRAPH
NUMBERS (AND REQ # DESCRIPTOR)
The cross reference matrix is given, by definition, for cross referencing the
technical discussions on selected options with their associated RFP
requirements. The top-down and bottom-up traceability matrices are presented
in Table I Appendix A-5 and A-6 respectively.
In column i, the number in the form of 2.1, e.g., indicates paragraph 2.1 at
level 3 in section 5 of [I]. Whereas paragraph 2.0 relates "Command
Management", and paragraph 3.O relates "Resource Management", in this paper.
The number in column 4 in the form of 6.2.1.2, e.g., indicates paragraph
6.2.1.2 of [2], and c-3-2.4.g indicates paragraph 2.4.g on page c-3 of [3].
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2.1.3 DISTRIBUTED OPERATING SYSTEM DESIGN
This white paper supports the trade study of operating systems for the Space
Station project.
Nhat is an operating system? An operating system (OS) can be roughly thought
of as the interface between a user program and the hardware on which it is
meant to run, although some definitions also include library facilities such
as data format conversion routines. Traditionally, this interface has
involved the distribution of limited resources among a number of users, the
provision of an effective user interface to the hardware, and the management
of processes being executed. The scope of these ?unctions becomes even more
complex as processors, file systems, etc., are organized in the form of
computer networks. In addition to managing a large set of devices, the
operating system must also govern communications between these devices and, in
a distributed system, make the network of devices appear as a single entity to
multiple users. In the context of this paper, the terms device and resource
are used interchangeably.
The purpose of this white paper is to examine the options available for
implementing ?unctions associated with a network-wide operating system for
Space Station. Operating system design involves the implementation of many
functions, with a limited number of options for each ?unction. The
combination of these options can lead to drastically different operational
characteristics. These characteristics include implementation cost, runtime
cost, speed, data capacity (in network OS), reliability, ease of use (level of
transparency), and ease of modification (expendability). Unfortunately, the
optimization of one characteristic generally leads to degradation of other
desired characteristics. The trade study should therefore carefully address
desired operational characteristics in order to determine the proper options
for implementing OS ?unctions.
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Nhat is a distributed operating system? R distributed operating system (DOS)
is a relatively new concept which extends the concept of an operating system
from individual machines to ones connected through a network. 3ust as
operating systems for individual machines have evolved to the point of
providing transparency from multiple users (time sharing), transparency of
files (a file may be on one of several disks), and interprocess communication,
the goal of designers of distributed operating systems is to extend the
notion of resource access transparency and interprocess communication to
machines in a network. Before doing so however, several constraints have to
be met. These include the development of protocols to assure error-free,
timely transmission of messages across the network, assuring that interprocess
communication between two hosts is possible, and if so, implementing an
efficient algorithm for interprocess communication, and finally, implementing
the protocol for resource access transparency.
The major topics discussed in this paper are:
o Requirements of the Space Station Data Management System (DMS)
o Functions of a network-wide operating system
o Verification of customer and operator commands
Determination of whether an operating system function should be local to
each processor in the network or centralized
o The implementation of resource access transparency
The implementation of an interprocess communication mechanism across the
network
o The management of tasks and workloads in processors
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The implementation of functions associated with network communication
protocols, such as routing, congestion control, and communications and
tracking system)
o Commands may be for immediate execution, for delayed execution, or stored
0 Commands may be issued directly to the system or as secondary requests
from other commands or subsystem functions
0 The DMS shall provide links for command authentication as well as provide
data and command privacy
o The SS should be capable of autonomous operation between scheduled periods
o Capable of maintenance with minimum interference with other operations
o Provide for monitoring, checkout, and fault detection
The underlying operating system to support the requirements-listed above must
be capable of at least the following:
o Handle high volumes of data at real-time speeds
Transparency -- Ability to look upon the network as a single machine.
Facilitates sharing of resources and the transfer of a process from one
machine to another. If a number of onboard processors are dedicated to a
unique function, dynamic allocation of processors may be restricted to
non-critical functions
The operating system or an application program must be capable of
verifying and scheduling user commands as well as ensure privacy of same
o A means of monitoring network operations must be provided
o The operating system must be extendable and reliable
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2.1.3.1 OPERATING SYSTEM FUNCTIONS
The SSOS will need to perform all the functions associated with traditional,
single machine operating systems. These functions include task management,
memory management, file management, input/output (I/O) management, managing
communication between processes, and the user interface. Since the Space
Station (SS) will consist of a number of local area networks (LANs), the
management of communication between machines is an added issue.
Task management is the allocation of resources to accomplish a given
task. Time sharing of a CPU and the allocation of processors to tasks in
a network are examples of task management.
o Memory management is the allocation of required memory to programs. Due
to problems of concurrency control and efficiency, memory is generally not
shared between processors in a network, making memory management a problem
of individual machines in the network.
o File management is the ability to support the creation, opening, closing,
reading, and writing of files. The file manager must regulate access to
files and prevent multiple users from concurrently modifying a file.
o The operating system must manage communication between programs and the
initiation of subtasks. In a network, if a process requires communication
with another machine, the SSOS should be capable of executing another
process while waiting for information for the first.
o The operating system also provides the user interface to a machine. A
user (operator or customer) of the SSOS should be able to access a remote
resource with commands of the same complexity as for accessing local
resources, i.e., the network must be transparent to the user.
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Finally, in a network, a number of unique, communications-oriented problems
arise, including addressing, sequencing, routing, buffering, ?low control,
error control, and security. These issues fall between layers 2 through 6 of
the standard 7 layer International Standards Organization (ISO) reference
model of open systems interconnection (OSI). Layer 7 tasks are addressed in
the implementation of traditional operating system functions. Layer 1
functions, addressing the physical media which comprise the network, are
discussed in a separate white paper (1.7.1.i). A description of the OSI model
is provided in the final section of the paper for those who may be unfamiliar
with the concepts.
In addition to the functions listed above, several other management-related
Functions are necessary in order to meet the DMS requirements. These may be
implemented within the SSOS or as application programs utilized by the SSOS.
The Functions include command verification, scheduling user access to SS
resources, network configuration management, network status monitoring, error
detection, and error recovery. Of these, only command verification and
scheduling of resources is addressed in this options paper. Discussions of
the other functions may be found in references 3-5.
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NASA, September ig84
3. Marjory J. Johnson, "Network Control," RIACS TR 84.4, NASA Ames Research
Center, July 1984
. Larry Wittie, "Specifications for Space Station Network Operating System
for Data Communication Server," November 1984
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5. Raymond Turner, "Network Operating System Functional Requirements,"
March 1985
, Edwin C. Foudriat, et. al., "An Operating System For Future Aerospace
Vehicle Computer Systems", NASA Tech. Memo 85784, NASA Langley Research
Center, Hampton, VA, April 1984
2.1.3.2 SPACE STATION ONBOARD CONFIGURATION
As obtained from the Phase B RFP, Figure 1 shows a possible onboard
configuration of Space Station. The onboard configuration will consist of at
least two independent networks, "housekeeping" and "payload". As shown in
Figure 1, within each individual local area network (LAN), application
programs which control the vehicle (core) and payload operations will execute
in any of several processors (labeled SDP). The SDPs will be interconnected
by a local area network (LAN) that consists of a number of network interface
devices (IDs) and a communication medium. Multiple LANs configurations may
exist due to the placement of an individual LAN within each of the SS modules,
or due to the implementation of separate core and payload network, among other
possible combinations. Individual LANs will be interconnected by bridges or
gateways. Telecommunication to external systems, ground networks, or orbital
free flyers will take place through gateways. For the purposes of this paper,
the IDs in Figure I will be referred to as Network Interface Units (NIUs) to
be consistent with the NIU options paper (Network Interface Devices, 1.7.1.2).
2.1.3.3 SCOPE OF THE ONBOARD DISTRIBUTED OPERATING SYSTEM
The requirements of the onboard component of the SS data management system as
well of an onboard network-wide operating system have been introduced. This
sections describes the scope and terminology of this white paper before design
options for implementing the functions of an onboard network-wide operating
system are presented.
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Onboard Con fi-guration
TERMINOLOGY RND SCOPE
DOS - The Space Station network-wide operating system. Functionally, the DOS
allows a user to look upon the onboard network as a single entity. This gives
the advantage of resource transparency, both with peripherals and processors.
Physically, the DOS will exist partially in the NIUs and partially in the
attached SDPs, where the SDPs may be performing core or payload functions.
Customers may also provide their own host processors, which are then connected
to the network through an onboard NIU. The NIU will perform as many of the
network communication functions as feasible, both to offload the SDPs and to
provide as much transparency of the network as possible to the customers who
wish to develop their own processors. It is important to note that some
authors refer to the component of the DOS which executes in the NIU as the
Network Operating System (NOS). Such a definition has been utilized in the
Network Interface Devices options paper.
R given DOS function may be reside physically in every NIU/SDP (distributed),
in particular NIUs/SDPs (centralized), or reside partially at every NIU/SDP as
well as at a centralized location (partially distributed). While the terms
centralized, distributed, and partially distributed are used frequently in
reference to the residency of a given DOS function, no attempt is made to
divide a function between NIUs and SDPs. The division of network
communication functions between NIUs and SDPs is addressed in the final
section of this white paper as well in the Network Interface Devices option
paper (1.7.1.2).
In summary, the remainder of this paper describes options for implementing
functions required of the onboard DOS.
2.1.3.4 DESIGN ISSUES FOR GLOBRL OPERRTING SYSTEMS
The concepts of DOS has been introduced by the previous section. 'This section
will address the implementation of functions of such a DOS. The functions
include:
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Verification of customer and operator commands (this function may be
thought of as an application function rather than as part of the DOS)
The determination of whether DOS function is to be centralized,
distributed, or partially distributed
o The implementation of resource, access transparency
o The management of tasks and workloads in processors
O The mechanism by which the application program accesses network resources,
be it a need to access a remote sensor or to set up and maintain an
interactive session with a remote process
O The implementation of specific functions associated with network
communication protocols, including scheduling, routing, congestion
control, flow control, security, and segmentation of messages
o The distribution of network communication functions between NIUs and hosts
2.1.3.4.1 GROUND/SPACE CUSTOMER INTERFACE
Ground customers will communicate with $$ onboard systems through the
ground/space customer interface. This interface may be implemented through
the use of formatted telecommand and telemetry packets. The CCSDS reference
model provides an example of such formatted packets. The operator/customer
interface functions of concern to the DOS are the questions of "where does
command verification take place" and "where does the execution of the command
take place." The former is a question of safety while the latter is a
question of privacy.
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2.1.3,4.1.1 Command Verification
Telecommand verification is a necessity for ensuring that such commands will
not cause the payload for which the command is intended to take action as to
interfere with other operations or to present a safety hazard. The options
for ground sourced telecommand verification are (I) on the ground before the
command is transmitted from ground to SS or (2) to do the verification
onboard. Ground verification will be cheaper, potentially faster due to more
powerful processors, be of better numerical accuracy again due to more
powerful processors, but must deal with older or insufficient status
information than would be available onboard. A telecommand which is verified
on the ground may be transmitted directly to a payload processor if it is
found to be unrestricted (i.e, the command does not present any potential
safety or interference problems).
Onboard command verification will be necessary for commands generated by
onboard operators and customers. Since a verification capability will exist
onboard anyway, the trade study must determine whether all commands should be
verified onboard versus any ground pre-filtering of ground sourced commands.
2.1,3.4.1.2 Processing of Commands
Once a command is found to be unrestricted, the remaining question is "where
is the command executed?" Telecommands may be parsed and executed by a
designated SDP (standard data processor) or be delivered directly to the
payload processor. The former allows the customer to take advantage of
services provided by SS while the latter assures privacy. The customer may
have the option of choosing between the two techniques mentioned above.
If a customer interface SDP approach is followed, the commands will have to be
carefully determined. For example, such a command may be "at intervals of 'X'
seconds, issue command 'Y' to payload 'Z'." The SDP will be responsible for
issuing 'Y' to 'Z' at the specified intervals. However, as a side effect, a
SDP telecommand processor allows the DOS to be aware of the load in each
payload processor.
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2.1.3.4.2 SHOULD A TASK BE DISTRIBUTED OR CENTRALIZED?
A DOS must be capable of memory management, file and I/O management, task
management and user interface in addition to communication between processes
(in a single machine) or between machines (in a network). These functions may
be distributed among the processors in the network, or be managed by a
dedicated processor. For the purposes of this report, the terms machine and
processor are used interchangeably, and may refer to NIUs, SDPs, or both. In
addition, the terms "SDP" and "host" are also used interchangeably.
2.1.3.4.2.1 Memory Management and Local Process Control
Memory management is the allocation of memory resources between programs which
are running on a given machine. The existing operating systems running on
individual hosts can be utilized For this function, making memory management
local to each machine. Similarly, communication between processes executing
in a given machine is a function handled locally. These functions can be
implemented using traditional techniques.
2.1.3.4.2.2 The User Interface and Task Management
The user interface and network task management may be a distributed or
centralized function. The user interface for onboard users will consist of a
series of packages such as command line interpretation, graphics display
software, debugging tools, and monitoring functions among others. Multiple
user interface processors will provide ease of access to the system at the
cost of replicated software.
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Distributed
When distributed, a user may make a request through any of the host
processors. The existing user inter?ace capabilities of the existing
operating systems in the hosts may again be utilized. However, software for
processing user commands must be included in every processor equipped with an
user interface capability. The actual processing of the command may involve
invoking a process on another machine, as is the case in processing the
command "Execute process 'X' at payload 'Y' at time intervals of 'Z' " Thus,
task management (allocation of resources) is also handled locally.
Diverging slightly, one of the factors which is of importance in determining
whether to centralize the task management function is the extent of
capabilities of the DOS. Specifically, should a processor be capable of
requesting another processor to handle one of its tasks? This capability will
be useful, for example, in temporarily transferring the processes executing on
a machine scheduled For maintenance. Notice that this scheme implies that
each of the host processors must know the location and workloads of other
processors in order to determine the appropriate processor to which processes
are to be transferred. This may involve high overhead due to the need to
update messages stating "I am processor X and this is my workload".
Since only non-time critical processes are likely to be distributed, an
alternate approach is for a local host to send a broadcast message or
selectively poll remote hosts and request load information when it wishes to
distribute its workload. Upon receiving replies, the local host can determine
the appropriate remote host for executing the process. This scheme will
require update messages only when absolutely necessary and yet ensure that
user interface and task management functions are local and distributed.
The democratic scheme outlined above does not consider the issue of priority.
If an unexpected, but time critical situation should arise, such as a failure
of some kind, a processor must be assigned to a task in a dynamic manner.
Each host must therefore have a criterion based on the priority o? a broadcast
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request for considering itself to be busy when polled. The other alternative
is to dedicate a machine for handling unexpected situations. Doing so,
however, would require a careful study to determine the maximum resource
requirements (e.g., processor, memory) of a given abnormal situation.
Centralized
The second option is to leave the user interface and task management function
to a dedicated processor. Centralization avoids duplicated software, but
raises the question of "What if the dedicated processor becomes
unavailable?". The latter problem may be solved by introducing redundancy
into the design. From the viewpoint of task management, a centralized user
interface makes _t possible to maintain some knowledge of the workloads of
network processors, enhancing the ability to choose a processor to execute a
time critical request. The polling method suggested above may be utilized
when it is desired to transfer the processes executing in a machine scheduled
for maintenance.
Trade: User Interface and Task Management: Global or Local?
Local (distributed):
o Robust and reliable
o Useful if need for processing on remote hosts is limited
o Will require replication of software in each processor involved
o Loads in other processors are not known
Centralized:
0 Useful if a great workload is being imposed on a limited set of resources
(allows balance of workload among the processors)
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Can promptly assign a remote host to an emergency request as all workloads
are known
o State of manager is unreliable, so redundancy is required
O
'Task management can coexist with the user interface if processors are not
permitted to transfer processes to other machines
A compromise between a fully distributed user interface and a centralized one
is a partially distributed one. Here, processors capable of functioning as
the user interface will be dispersed throughout SS to provide ease of access
to the onboard users. However, such a function will not be totally
distributed, thus saving storage space.
2.1.3.4.2,3 File Management
The file management function can be divided between a centralized processor
and the hosts of the network. Assuming that files common to a network can be
accessed by any member of that network, a dedicated processor may maintain
file consistency. This processor may be the file server itself if the server
is capable of such a function. The individual processors provide the
environment for editing.
2.1.3,4.2.4 I/O Management
Local I/O management will be handled by the individual processors. The
management of shared output resources, however, is appropriate for
centralization. The term "shared output resources" refers to stand-alone
devices such as teletypes and printers. Since the onboard utilization of such
devices will be very limited, a simple queue management system at the NIU
interfacing the output device to the network may be sufficient.
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Summary of the functions as local or centralized:
Local Memory management, local process management, file
management, local I/O management, local task management
Optional -- User interface, network task management
Centralized -- Management of shared I/O resources and files
Optional -- User interface, network task management
Part ia Ily w Optional m Network task management Distributed
2.1.3.4.2.5 Address and Routing Tables
In addition to DOS functions, the trade study must address the issue of where
necessary information is to be stored. In particular, the DOS will have a
need to access various address tables and routing tables during its
operation. Address tables will be required for sensors, effectors, and active
processes, as well as for frequently accessed variables and other data. These
tables are required to facilitate interprocess communication. For example,
any monitoring function provided for SS users will need to contact the system
being monitored in order to obtain necessary sensor values and other data.
However, address tables will be required in order to determine the location of
the desired process and data. The contents of these tables are discussed in
later sections.
The given table may be centralized, partially distributed, or fully
distributed.
0 Centralized tables save memory but introduces a finite access time to
determine an address or route, in addition to the need for redundancy.
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0 To reduce the need to access the central source to determine an address, a
local cache may be utilized. A central source may maintain a table of all
addresses, but the addresses of frequently accessed resources will be
stored locally.
0 A fully distributed approach trades local memory space for potentially
faster access to addresses and routes.
2.1.3.4.3 RESOURCE ACCESS TRANSPARENCY
Files, output devices, sensors, and effectors are examples of resources often
shared between the processors in a network. Further, multiple copies of such
resources may be physically dispersed throughout the network. In a
non-transparent system, it is necessary for the user to explicitly address a
resource. A file access may be "get this file from that file server." In a
distributed system, the user only needs to specify "get this file." The DOS
determines the location of the File and accesses it.
Resource transparency for static resources can be accomplished by storing
tables mapping logical names to physical locations. On the non-technical
side, there is a need to provide the user with logical names for a class of
resource and physical locations if appropriate. If the user has the need to
access a given class of device, but is not aware names used within the
network, a list of devices and associated logical names will be very helpful.
This section will present options for implementing address transparency (of
processes in particular) and for implementing transparency of dynamically
changing resources, with the specific example of file access.
Along with knowing the location of a resource, it is also necessary to know
whether a resource is active or down. This information may be incorporated as
a flag beside each name in an address table. When such a resource as a
processor becomes active, it broadcasts a LOGON message stating its location
and function. Similarly, a LOGOFF message is issued when a resource goes
down. Any sudden crashes will be detected in due time and will result in the
issuing of a LOGOFF message by a second party.
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2.1.3.4.3.1 Process Address Transparency
In addition to achieving transparency of physical resources such as sensors,
ef?ectors, and files, the processes running within the network must also be
transparent. A application process must be Capable of contacting any other
process by logical name rather than having to specify the physical location
and path. Process address transparency can be implemented through address
tables in SDPs, NIUs, or both. The trade study should weigh the advantages
and disadvantages of the following addressing schemes:
Each NIU contains the address of every process in SS, including processes
which may be active in other networks (Figure 2a). This has the advantage
of a potential increase in access speeds and certainty regarding the
location of any process, but has the disadvantage of large overhead and
makes the addition o? a new processes within the network more complex
(i.e., a broadcast message must be sent to every NIU on every onboard
network stating the location of the new process).
An alternative technique would take advantage of the fact that the number
of onboard networks will be limited. In this scheme, a host/NIU in a
given network contains physical addresses for only the processes local to
that network (Figure 2b). When an application requests that a message be
sent to a process, the table of local processes is searched for the
requested process. If the process is not found, the request is sent to
the gateway(s)/bridge(s). The portion of the gateway which belongs to the
next network contains address tables for that network, which is then
checked. In this manner, the message is sent to all the networks of the
SS until the process is found. This scheme, while efficient in its use of
storage resources, can waste bandwidth and time by its need to search all
onboard networks. If the SS is to contain only a small number of
networks, and if the need for communication between hosts in separate
networks is limited, the second scheme'may be appropriate. Note that this
scheme has the property of poor response to bad news. If a user-requested
process does not exist, that news will be slow in reaching the sender. In
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addition, this scheme reduces the size of the message when a transmission
is intended for another network. This is due to the need for the logical
process name to be carried with the message in order to search the address
table of the next network. As an supplementary solution, a cache of
important internetwork addresses may be maintained within each NIU.
0 A third approach is again to have addresses for only local processes, but
rather than automatically sending the request to the gateway, a message is
broadcast asking for the location of the desired process. If t_e
requested process exists, the bridge possessing knowledge of the requested
process sends an acknowledgement to the requesting application. This
scheme provides better feedback to the sender, but is wasteful of
bandwidth and slow as well.
0 A fourth approach is to have addresses for only local processes, but also
to know of a central source whether other desired addresses may be found.
A cache of important internetwork addresses may also be maintained.
Methods two and three above may be involve wasted time and bandwidth, but
do not require a central storage facility for address tables. Regardless,
method 4 may be preferred over 2 or 3 due to the potential difference in
speed.
2.1.3.4.3.2 File Access Transparency
The term file access transparency is misleading. In a distributed system, not
only should the DOS be capable of accessing a file given only its logical name
(logical path), but the DOS should also be capable of several other functions,
including data access control, concurrency control, serializing transactions,
deadlock control, and recovery to a consistent state in the event of failures
(I). A number of different techniques are employed by existing distributed
file systems for implementing the above-mentioned properties. These existing
systems include XDFS (XEROX Distributed File System), LOCUS, MULTICS, DEMOS,
and CFS (Cambridge File Server) among several others (I). The options for
implementing the mentioned properties will first be described before the LOCUS
method (2) for implementing access transparency (logical names to physical
locations) is presented.
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DATA ACCESS CONTROL
The unit of data access can be through a file, sequential subset of a file, a
page (used by LOCUS), or a subset of page. Access control is necessary to
prevent unauthorized access. The two techniques which have been employed to
control access are capability based and identity based systems. In a
capability based approach, a user must have an explicit permission to access
an object (in this case, a file), while in a identity based scheme, the user's
identity is also checked in addition to capabilities in order to provide
better security.
CONCURRENCY CONTROL AND SERIALIZATION
Concurrency control allows transaction-type access to shared files. This
function is.generally a part of the file system of the operating system, but
can be left to the user (XDFS)(1). Concurrency control is the process of
locking access to files or pages (i.e., the unit of storage allocation) in
order to preserve consistency. Control is generally implemented to follow the
following two guidelines:
I. A file/page may be read if it is not being written;
2. A file/page may be written if it is not being reador written.
SERIALIZING is the process of ensuring control over several simultaneous
requests for file access. The two techniques, which are described in detail
in section 2.1.1, are two-phase locking and timestamp ordering. In the
former, a user transaction must acquire locks on the entity to be accessed.
Once all required locks have been obtained, the transaction is carried out,
after which the locks are released for use by other transactions. The
two-phase lock approach maintains consistency by ensuring that a file or
database is not updated until the transaction is fully authorized to do so.
It is possible for the two-phase locking method to be unfair (3). The
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timestamp ordering approach is a fair technique which provides access to
resources on a FIFO (first-in, first-out) basis. The server machine stamps
the arrival time of each request. The timestamp approach is also free of
deadlocks, which may occur with the two-phase locking approach.
DEADLOCKS
A deadlock may occur if two transactions require access to each of two files
and each transaction has a lock on one of the files. The file system may
handle deadlocks in the following ways:
1. Deadlocks may be prevented if all required files are declared before a
transaction begins.
2. Deadlocks may be detected and resolved by aborting one transaction in
favor of another.
, While the system is not congested, a timeout mechanism for waiting on a
lock may be employed. If a transaction is not able to obtain the required
locks within a declared period, that transaction aborts and tries again at
a later time.
. Timestamps may be combined with two-phase locking to allow older
transactions more time to acquire the necessary locks than younger
transactions.
. A priority based scheme may be employed, with one of the other techniques
serving as a backup to resolve conflicts between transactions with equal
priorities.
6. Deadlock handling may be left to the users.
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STRUCTURE OF FILE SYSTEMS
File systems may be organized as a multilevel tree of fixed-size blocks, of
variable-size blocks, or as a set of fixed-size blocks. To implement
RECOVERABILITY, the most common solution is the SHADOW-PAGE TECHNIQUE. In
this scheme, only file pages which have been modified are written into free
blocks on the storage device. The file page map is then updated to indicate
the new mapping of files to storage blocks.
Requests for file access may follow one of the following protocols:
1. send request/receive response
2. send request/receive response/send acknowledgement
3. a single step, no-wait send
In addition, a file access protocol may be specialized (2) or be the same as
the general purpose interprocess communication (IPC) facility used for
communication between processes on different machines (4) These techniques are
discussed in detail in the following section.
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THEFILE ORGANIZATIONSCHEMEOF LOCUS
In this subsection, the file organization scheme of the LOCUS distributed
operating system is presented as a technique to enable the user to specify a
file by logical name without specifying the physical location. LOCUS is a
functioning DOS developed at UCLA and is based on the UNIX operating system.
LOCUS is approximately one-third larger than UNIX.
LOCUS uses an UNIX-like tree structured directory system for its files (Figure
3). The location of the root of the tree (/) is known to every file storage
site. Each directory represents a collection of files which form a
filegroup. A filegroup may contain subdirectories. LOCUS treats each such
filegroup as a separate entity. Each logical filegroup has several physical
locations allocated to it. A given file in that subgroup may be present in
any of the designated locations, including multiple locations. Each file is
uniquely represented by (logical file group number, file descriptor number).
Current file operations include open, create, read, write, commit, close, and
unlink. LOCUS maintains file consistency across multiple copies and uses a
shadow-paging commit protocol for writes. Multiple copies are supported for
easier and faster access, with the penalty of a complicated consistency
control mechanism.
As stated before, the user specifies a desired file through its pathname. The
use of pathnames and directories has special appeal for the Space Station.
Each major function, such as GN&C can have its own directory, with all
pertinent files stored within that directory. Note that individual files may
be spread across different physical locations. A user need only know the name
of the desired file and its category. Such helpful UNIX facilities as dtree
(draws the subtree of directories and files starting from the current working
directory), and whereis (provides the pathname to a user-specified file) can
be provided to aid the user.
LOCUS requires that only the location of the root directory and the location
of current working directory be known to every site. Once the user requests a
file, the pathname is expanded as described below.
If the pathname begins at the root, the root directory is searched for the
next pathname component. Note that pathnames consist of directory names, with
the last entry being the name of the desired file. If the root directory
exists at a physical location different from the current one, the directory
may either be paged across the network and searched at the local site or be
searched at the remote site. Once the location of the next directory is
determined, it is accessed and searched for the next element in the
pathname. This continues until the desired file is located. If the directory
tree is deeply nested, accessing a file may be a slow process. To obtain
better performance, the following modification of the LOCUS approach may be
appropriate.
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Rather thanstoring only the location of the root and current working
directories at each site, the locations of a number of directories may be
stored in tables at each node in the network. When a file access request is
received, the pathname is searched, component by component, within the local
table. At the point when a directory is not listed in the table, the LOCUS
method of pathname expansion can be utilized.
Consider the following example. Assume that the local tables contains the
locations of the high level directories root, designated by "/" Netl, and
GN&C. If a user issues an access request for the file specified by
/Netl/GN&C/Guidance/NeededFile, the search of the local table expands the
pathname until Guidance is encountered. At this point, the GN&C directory is
accessed by the LOCUS method and the location of Guidance is determined. A
search of the Guidance directory reveals the location of NeededFile.
Another option is presented in (5). Here, to differentiate between files used
regularly by time critical functions and others, a two part file system is
proposed - a real time component and a time shared component. The user must
declare all system requirements (file contiguity, communications bandwidth,
etc.) during the creation of and while opening real-time files. A real-time
process is required to open all necessary files before starting execution.
The time-shared component follows a UNIX like approach. It is suggested that
an exception processing capability be added to handle communication or node
failures.
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2.1.3.4.4 TASK MANAGEMENT - SHOULD THERE BE DYNAMIC TRANSFER OF PROCESSES?
New tasks, ones which have not been assigned a processor, may occur in one of
three ways:
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o A new memory load
o New user/customer applications which require a processor
o A processor requests that a process be transferred to another machine
The last of these cases was introduced in section 2.1.3.4.2.2. The ability to
handle the first two cases is necessary, but not the third. This section will
examine this third case in detail and present the trades of having such a
facility.
Possible scenarios at the time of a request to transfer a process to a remote
processor:
0 The ideal case is a process for which all pertinent data and execution
software is available at the remote processor. The only costs would be
initial transfer of the process to the remote machine and the cost of
transporting the results back to the local machine. The ideal case
applies, for example, to redundant machines.
0 The next case is the existence of execution software at the remote machine
with pertinent data at the local machine. I? the data can be copied to
the remote machine, there is increased delay due to the transfer of data
and an increase in the needs for storage at the remote site. If the
amount of data is large, the process may execute at the remote machine,
but accesses data ?tom the local machine through the network. This would
involve high delays due to network transmissions. It is important to
recognize that certain data may be very difficult to transfer, if at all.
Consider, for example, the prospect of transferring a process which
requires data from sensors physically connected to the local machine.
0 The third case occurs when both execution software as well as data need to
be transferred. Assuming that the remote machine has the necessary CPU
and memory resources, this "total" transfer may not present major problems
for Space Station, the reason being the projected use of common
language(s) and processor(s). Of course, the obvious overhead is the cost
of network transmission of a large file of execution software.
In addition to those mentioned above, another problem encountered in
transferring processes is not in the transfer itself, but in updating address
tables. Be?ore this update is completed, a second process may attempt to
initiate a conversation with the process which was moved. A mechanism for
re-routing such requests is therefore necessary. Such a mechanism must also
re-route any conversations which may have been in effect be?ore the transfer.
The next question is the determination of when a process should be transferred
to a remote machine.
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The local machine may temporarily be overloaded, a process may arrive which
has not been assigned to a machine, a machine may be due for maintenance, but
is not part of a redundant set, and so on. In addition to the "emergency"
situations mentioned above, a process may be relocated simply to make better
use of available resources. The DOS must include an algorithm for assessing
the benefits versus costs of moving a process. Such an algorithm would need
to take into the account the loads (CPU and memory utilization) of the local
and remote machine, the needs of the process at hand, and the network
conditions among other possible factors.
Certainly, the ability to transfer a process is not without overhead. The
trade study should carefully examine the needs for such a dynamic transferring
capability. The alternative to dynamic transfers is to design the Onboard
system is such a way that situations requiring a dynamic transfer capability
do not arise. Such techniques include assigning every possible task to a
machine, having sufficient resource redundancy, and ensuring that any given
machine will not be overloaded. Clearly, such techniques will be wasteful of
resources since they must be designed with worst-case situations in mind. The
trades of having a dynamic transfer capability are examined below.
2.1.3.4.4.1 Dynamic Transfer of Processes Vs. Confined Processes
The advantages and disadvantages of confining processes to the machine where
they exist as opposed to the ability to transfer a process to a remote machine
are discussed below:
Rdvantages of confined processes:
w Reduces complexity of OS, reduces network overhead
N Predictable execution times
Better security by reducing possibility of user interactions
The disadvantages of confined processes include:
Increased hardware costs, power costs, space requirements due to
wasted resources in designing to meet worst-case conditions
.-- Potential difficulty of reconfiguration and need for redundancy
The advantages of dynamic transfers include:
-- Freedom and extendability
Better use of resources, requires a smaller number of resources
.... Rllows graceful degradation of the network, easier to reconfigure
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The disadvantages of dynamic transfers include:
.-- Difficult to test and verify
-- Initial design of DOS more complex
Increased checking by the DOS .q For example, should not transfer a
process into a machine being utilized by a customer requiring a high
level of security
-- Immature technology
•-- High cost of development
2.1.3.4.5 INTERPROCESS COMMUNICATION MECHANISMS
There will be much need for communication between processors in the SS
network. Conceptually, such communication may be in one of three forms:
o Accessing data from an non-processing device, such as a sensor
Submitting commands, such that by the user interface processor to the
payload or submitting a job to an output device
Calling on a process on a remote machine to compute and supply a result
which is then utilized by the caller machine to finish its task
As with the discussion of task management, the first two cases are necessary,
with the third being suitable as a growth item since such a capability may be
useful in a payload environment.
The options for implementing the ability to talk to a remote machine are:
i , A Space Shuttle-like approach where the code is written to transport a
necessary sensor value to the process which, requires it at the instant
when it is required. This approach will make the initial design much more
difficult and will also be difficult to modify. For these reasons this
method will not be considered further.
. The second technique is to have a set of commands for interprocess
communication. Such a command may be GetSensorValue(Sensor). The
advantages of this technique are that the application programmer knows the
syntax of the commands and that tables of only resources which may be
accessed are necessary.
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, The third technique is to have a general IPC facility. With this approach
an application process on one machine directly contacts a process on the
remote machine. The DOS only serves as a facility to transport a message
from the local machine to the remote one. While the second technique also
requires an IPC mechanism and addresses the same issues as the third, the
third approach provides the ability for any process to talk to any other.
However, overhead will increase with the need to maintain the location of
all processes. In addition, during development of application processes,
there is a need to maintain contact with other developers to ensure type
matching, proper inputs and outputs, etc.
While the implementation details of an IPC facility are beyond the scope of
this report, it may be beneficial to point out that there are several methods
by which an IPC facility may be implemented. Two frequently encountered
approaches are message passing (2) and remote procedure calls (3,4).
The issues addressed by these techniques include:
o The facility for creating a process on a remote machine
o The facility for properly initializing the remote process
O The interprocess communication mechanism (IPC). The IPC across the
network should have the same semantics as the IPC for a single machine.
O The ability to maintain a consistent state in the event of failures in
portions of the network.
o The ability to reflect error conditions across network boundaries.
The IPC mechanisms employed for communication across a network are extensions
of facilities for IPC within a single machine. The conceptual view of a
remote procedure call is shown in Figure 4. The interested reader may refer
to (3) for further details.
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Figure 4: Remote Procedure Call
Source: Birrell and Nelson
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2.1.3.4.5,2 Moving Data to the Process
The primary need for interprocess communication is for accessing data, whether
in the form of computed results or raw sensor readings. If such data is
accessed on a regular basis, much bandwidth can be wasted due to the need for
every process requiring that data to contact the process governing the data.
An easier, more efficient approach is to make the data available through a
database or through broadcasting the information. This may be especially true
?or ancillary data.
If a broadcast approach is followed, all data which is required by SS
processes on a frequent basis is broadcast regularly by the process which owns
the data. While the broadcast itself will consume quite a bit of bandwidth,
processes needing the data need not send explicit messages requesting the
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data. This may not only be faster, but also reduces the size of address
tables within each NIU. Note that the size of any centralized address table
will not be reduced for reliability reasons. Further, an IPC facility will be
necessary as a backup since broadcasting is not I00 percent reliable.
The alternative to broadcasting is to send all frequently accessed data to a
common database. This again reduces the size of address tables within each
NIU and also allows a process to request and obtain all the data values it
needs with a single request. This technique may also require an IPC mechanism
as a backup since a centralized database may itself be unreliable. Further,
traffic in the vicinity of the database will be heavy, bothdue to updated
data values and requests for the data values.
2.1.3.4.6 NETWORK PROTOCOLS - FUNCTIONS
This section provides a summary of the issues which arise in implementing the
network-oriented communication functions of a DOS. These issues include
scheduling, security, segmentation, routing, congestion control, and flow
control. Another issue, addressing, has been discussed in section
2.1.3.4.3.1. Further, the type(s) of service (connection-oriented vs.
connectionless) to be provided by the network protocol is discussed in the
Network Interface Devices (1.7.1.2) white paper.
2.1.3.4.6.1 Scheduling
Scheduling, or prioritizing, is a necessity in a network with limited
resources. Scheduling will be required for handling a number of situations,
including time dependent requests and requests dependent upon the order of
execution. In a priority-based system, there is a danger of deadlock if
requests in contention have equal priorities. A priority scheme might be
based on the type of process (read, write, etc.), the user, or importance of
the data to the requesting process. The algorithm of timestamp ordering,
developed primarily for concurrency control, may provide a means for ordering
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user requests. Further, the operating system will need to maintain
concurrency control over file systems and common databases. Concurrency
control algorithms, including timestamp ordering and two phase locking are
discussed in section 2.1.1 (Distributed Database Management).
A scheduling algorithm may be based on several characteristics:
Type and amount of state information used:
- Queue lengths
- CPU utilization
- Amount of free memory
- Estimated average response time
o How and when update information is transmitted
o Degree and type of cooperation between distributed scheduling entities
(i.e., are decisions made with local or global information?)
o How often is the scheduling algorithm invoked?
o Adaptability of the algorithm
o Stability of the algorithm
Comments on characteristics mentioned above:
o State Information: Is the data too old? Is it accurate?
Invoking the scheduler: Too often, overhead, too infrequent, cannot adapt
quickly to changing conditions
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adaptive scheduler:
- light loads m turns off the scheduler, expect a network load monitor
- medium loads .-- make full use of scheduler
- heavy loads m use of scheduler may make the system even slower. Use
of bidding (poll processors for an available one) or reverse bidding
(a free processor requests work) is a second option
o Measuring network conditions: overhead versus benefit
o Moving a process to a remote machine: overhead versus benefit
REFERENCE: SCHEDULING ALGORITHM CHARACTERISTICS
1. John A. Stankovic, "A Perspective on Distributed Computer Systems", IEEE
Transactions on Computers, Vo1. C-33, No. 12, December 1984
2.1.3.4.6.2 Security
The operating system is responsible for providing a protected environment for
the execution of operations which require security. This can be accomplished
by scheduling secure tasks to specific machines and ensuring that these
functions are not subject to dynamic allocation. In addition, the operating
system may provide the user with encryption services. The significant portion
of the responsibility of ensuring that data is properly encrypted and secured
will lie with the user.
2.1.3.4.6.3 Message Routing
Assuming that a mesh topology is not chosen for the SS LAN, the need for
routing arises only in internetwork communication. Consider that the SS
network consists of five networks connected in a line. It is not sufficient
for a host in network 1 to obtain the address of network 5 in order to
communicate with a host in 5. There is a need to determine the way to get
from network 1 to network 5, hence the need for routing.
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The DOSis responsible for routing messages throughout the network to isolate
the application programs and hosts from needing to know the topology which
interconnects the various parts o? the network. The algorithm for determining
a route will have tradeoffs with correctness, simplicity, robustness,
stability, fairness, and optimality. A variety of routing schemes exist and
fall under one of the major categories of static and dynamic routing.
STATIC ROUTING
Static routing algorithms require that a table of network hosts and paths to
them be loaded into each node of the network and not changed thereafter.
These tables provide information regarding the best path, second best path,
third best, and so forth along with a weighting scheme for each path. The
node determines the outgoing path based on the generation of a random number
and its relation to the weights of paths (e.g., if the best path has a weight
of .7 and second .3, a random number between 0 and 7 in a range of 0-i0 will
result in the choice of the best path). Static routing schemes have the
following properties:
.... Simple to implement
-- Can make good use of alternate routes
•-- Can give good performance
-- Useful only if topology and traffic conditions are stable over time
-- Cannot adopt to sudden adverse conditions (congestion, NIU down)
DYNAMIC ROUTING ALGORITHMS
Static routing algorithms have the serious problem of being nonadaptable.
Dynamic routing schemes circumvent this problem by basing a route on current
network conditions. Dynamic routing schemes may employ a central router or a
local router.
165
In a central routing scheme, a single host in the network functions as the
router. All other nodes periodically send messages to the router stating
their workloads and the number of packets sent out on each local line by the
node. The central router calculates the optimal route from each node in the
network to every other node and sends updated routing tables to every node in
the network. The central router scheme has the following advantages and
disadvantages:
m
Generates optimal routes
Relieves individual NIUs of the task of calculating routes
Increases network traffic in the form of update packets
Central scheme always less reliable than a distributed scheme since
the _entral controller may fail
If a NIU in the network suddenly goes down, the central router scheme
is not robust
Heavy concentration of traffic around the central router
NIUs close to the central router will get updated routing tables
before further NIUs. This may lead to inconsistencies
LOCAL ROUTER$
Local routing algorithms may be based on local traffic conditions (isolated
adapting algorithms) or be distributed and based on network-wide traffic
conditions. The latter trades increased network traffic (update messages from
one NIU to another) for more optimal routes. Tanenbaum (1) discusses the
options and trades for each of these two algorithms in detail. Here, only the
trades between isolated and distributed algorithms are given.
Isolated Adaptive Algorithm Characteristics:
Path chosen may only be locally optimal, the next node may have a
very long queue or even be down
Easier to implement and does not result in network traffic overhead
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Distributed Routing Algorithms:
.I More complex
Require network traffic overhead for update packets
Can determine a route in a more optimal manner
Recommendations:
Since the SS configuration and network traffic flow conditions will not change
significantly on a regular basis, a static routing table may be sufficient.
If a dynamic routing algorithm is desired, the following recommendations are
offered:
Since one of the primary requirements of the Space Station data management
system is to handle large quantities of data in realtime, isolated algorithms
are not recommended. The determination of central router versus a distributed
algorithm is more difficult, but a distributed algorithm is recommended for
its reliability over a central one and for the characteristic that network
traffic overhead due to updates is distributed over the network rather than
concentrated at one node, as is the case with the central router scheme.
BROADCASTING
Broadcasting is a useful technique when a message has to reach all the nodes
in a network, such as routing information in a central router scheme. The
obvious approach of sending such a packet out on every output line other than
the one the packet arrived on can be wasteful of bandwidth since the scheme
can result in multiple copies of a packet being delivered to a given node.
Special care must also be taken to ensure a loop does not result. In
addition, the transmission may not reach every node due to such adverse
conditions as static during transmission and local congestion in parts of the
network. Several algorithms have been developed for efficiently implementing
the broadcasting function, and are described in (I).
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2.1.3.4.6.4 Congestion Control
Congestion is the degradation in network performance due to an overload of
packets in the network. In a shared-bus LAN, restricted access to the bus is
sufficient as a congestion control mechanism in most cases. However,
congestion can occur when a particular NIU or gateway is swamped with packets
from several different sources. A congestion control scheme will be required
to restore order to the network. A number of congestion control algorithms
have been developed. These include:
I. Preallocation of resources to avoid congestion
. Allowing NIUs to discard packets at will sets a timer. The receiver is
required to send an acknowledgement before timeout or the message is
retransmitted. An acknowledgement will not be received if either the
original message never reached its destination or if the acknowledgement
is lost during transmission. The sender must maintain a copy o? the
message in its buffers until it is acknowledged.
The packet discard technique takes advantage of this data link protocol by
assuming that a packet will be retransmitted. This technique is sufficient if
congestion is not a regular problem, the data being sent is not time critical,
and if the congestion is only temporary.
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RESTRICTED NETWORK ENTRY
Congestion can be avoided by restricting the number of packets in the
network. This can be implemented by the use of permits for entry into the
network and controlling the number of permits. This technique has a number of
drawbacks which point to its avoidance for Space Station. A NIU can still be
swamped, the distribution of permits may not be fair, and a permit may be
destroyed, thus reducing the carrying capacity of the network.
CONGESTION CONTROL THROUGH FLOW CONTROL
Flow control algorithms may be used in some cases for congestion control.
Tanenbuam (1) argues that optimal flow control cannot be designed when
congestion control is a function of that algorithm. However, flow control has
been effectively used for congestion control in such networks as the ARPANET
and the Canadian public data network, Datapac. Connections between flow
control and congestion control are discussed in the next section.
CHOKE PACKETS
All four of the schemes which have been described have the potential for
wasting bandwidth. The use of choke packets is a more dynamic technique of
congestion control. In this scheme, each NIU maintains of record of the
traffic on connected lines. If the utilization of a line is reaching its
critical point, every incoming packet is checked to see if it needs to be
output on the highly utilized line. If so, a message is sent to the sending
host requesting that transmission be reduced by a percentage. If the host
does not receive any other choke packets for some time, it reverts to its
normal mode of operation. For handling cases of extreme congestion, this
scheme has been combined with the packet discard approach. The packet discard
backup will be an effective means o? fault tolerance in the event that a choke
packet does not reach the host for whom it is intended.
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I. Channel @ueue Limit Scheme: allocate buffers for each output channel.
Packets are distinguished by the output queue they must be placed into.
2. Rllocate buffers based on hop counts - the number of NIUs traversed by a
packet.
Rnother design issue is the degree of sharing of buffers:
I. fixed, uniform buffering among buffer classes
2. buffer proportional to traffic in each class (no sharing)
3. oversell buffers -- sum of buffer limits of each class is larger than the
pool
4. Dynamically adjust buffer limits based on traffic flow
Channel @ueue Limit (CQL) Scheme:
m
..m
Eliminates Performance Degradation at Peak Loads
Eliminates direct store-and-forward deadlocks (1)
Optimal sharing best scheme for throughput reasons
Does not prevent indirect store-and-forward deadlocks
Rccording to Gerla and Klienrock (I), "Some form of CQL flow control is found
in every network implementation." The RRPRNET protocol contains the following
CQL strategy:
Maximum number of buffers (per NIU): 40 Minimum of 2 input buffers and 1
output buffer per line. lO buffers for reassembly before going to hosts.
Maximum buffer limits: Reassembly 20, Output 8, Total Store and Forward 20
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Generally a window scheme that provides for the storage of N
messages. A collective acknowledgement is sent once all N messages
have arrived. A sender may not place more than N messages into the
network until an acknowledgement is received. The sender may
eventually time out and retransmit.
--- Implementation issues:
Window sizes -- Is error control and loss control to be provided? --
Retransmission timeout interval
NETWORK ACCESS FLOW CONTROL
m Throttle external inputs based on internal network conditions.
-- Options: Permits for access, Choke packets, and Input buffer limits
Input Buffer Limits
Limit entry traffic in favor of transit traffic at every NIU. Drop
input packets when buffers are full
--. Achieves better throughput, but can be unfair
Buffer allocation may be based on input message throughput versus
total message throughput at every node
TRANSPORT LEVEL FLOW CONTROL
--.- Uses credit window scheme
- Sender requests the right to transmit. Receiver sends a credit
allowing transmission based on buffer and processor capacity.
Lost credits can leave both sides hanging, so timeout mechanisms are
necessary.
173'
COMMENTS ON FLOW CONTROL TECHNIQUES
Hybrid forms combining the four layers of flow control may be
warranted
What is the interaction between levels of flow control?
A conservative hop-level flow control algorithms will limit the need
for complex schemes at higher levels.
..
Although there are many options, flow control design is limited by
preexisting protocol structure, limits of storage, and limits of
processing resources.
Flow control algorithms which are both efficient and prevent
deadlocks and congestion are hard to implement and difficult to
verify.
Gateways may require a special algorithm of flow control since they
may have to interconnect networks employing incompatible flow control
techniques.
REFERENCES: FLOW CONTROL ALGORITHMS
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2,1.3.4.6,6 Message Segmentation
The application programs will be allowed to request movement of large blocks
of data, with no regard for the physical limitations imposed by the message
transfer implementation. For example, the user may ask to read fifty thousand
characters of text from a file, even though the network transfer medium is
designed for maximum block lengths of one thousand characters. The host
processor is also likely to have maximum message lengths which it can handle,
such as _n input/output limit of thirty thousand characters per block. The
trade study must determine the sizes of packets to be transmitted. A number
of packet sizes may be utilized to facilitate both small and large scale data
transfers. The actual segmentation will be done in the hosts.
If fixed block sizes are utilized, an implementation issue is whether or not
to allow multiple messages to be sent within one block. If only one message
is allowed, there is a large potential for wasting bandwidth, such as a data
item of a few bytes being sent in a 1KB block. If multiple messages are
allowed, should all the messages be destined for one user? If there is a bit
error during transmission, should all the messages be retransmitted? If not,
what is the mechanism which points out the proper message to retransmit? An
example is the common practice of sending an acknowledgment to a previous
packet along with the next message packet. Once the packet arrives, the
acknowledgement and message are treated independently.
2.1.3.4.7 DISTRIBUTION OF NETWORK-ORIENTED DOS TASKS AMONG NIUS AND HOSTS
Network oriented functions such as routing, flow control, and error control
have to be divided among the NIUs and hosts in the network. A significant
portion of the network protocol will be resident in the NIUs.
The distribution of tasks between the NIU and host can be readily determined
by studying the OSI 7-layer protocol. In this system, network communications
functions are addressed by layers 2-4. All higher layers (5-7) address
user-oriented function such as security, assisting in remote logins, and file
transfer packages. Since layers 5 and 7 are dependent upon the application,
they are generally handled within the hosts.
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Layer 2, or data link protocol, is responsible for media access, framing
individual packets, handling transmission errors, and flow control. These
functions are best suited for the NIUs. Options for data link flow control
are described in section 2.1.3.4.6.5 Media access control and error control is
addressed in a separate options paper (2.5.3.2).
Level 3, or NETNORK LAYER, is concerned with such issues as "What does the
NIU/host interface look like?", routing within the network, and
handling/preventing congestion and deadlocks in the network. Of these,
congestion handling/prevention and routing schemes are better suited for
implementation in the NIUs as these functions are dependent upon knowledge of
network conditions. The implementation of the NIU/host interface, however,
requires careful study.
Layer 4, or TRANSPORT LAYER is concerned with end-to-end connections between
processes. This layer is responsible for the initial breakup of messages into
segments. Within the header are segment number of the message and the source
and destination processes. This layer may also include a final error check to
ensure that packets were not garbled in transmission from the last NIU to the
host.
Layer 5, can be thought of an interface between higher level presentation and
application layers and the network communications functions handled in layers
2-4. Services such as maintaining a record of the progress of such
communication (checkpointing) are performed by this layer.
Layer 6, or presentation layer, is concerned with packages for changing the
format of the data. This may be done through encryption, character code
conversion, or graphics format conversion, among others. Of the functions,
security belongs in the host to preserve end-to.-end security. The other two
functions may be performed in either the host or the NIU.
Layer 7, or application layer, consists of a set of functions which may be
frequently utilized by application programs. One such function is a file
transfer protocol.
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One possible method of dividing network communication functions between hosts
and NIUs is provided below. Further discussions of this topic may be found in
the Network Inter?ace Devices (1.7.1.2) options paper. The Onboard Local Area
Network Trade Study will further address the issue of task division between
hosts and NIUs.
Network functions which may be performed in the hosts include:
Initial breakup of messages into segments, including placing sequence
numbers and src/dest, processes in the header.
.... Addressing (optional)
--. Error checking to ensure end-to-end error control
End-to-End flow control
Reassembly of segments into messages and duplicate control if not
done in the NIUs
Some layer 6 functions (may split with NIUs)
NIU tasks may include:
All data link layer functions
-- Frame packets, media access, NIU-NIU flow control, error control
All network layer functions
-- Packetization/Reassembly of packets
•-- Routing, flow control, and congestion control
-- Duplicate control
Transport layer functions (optional)
-- Converting from logical to physical addresses (Optionally in
hosts)
Some presentation layer (6) functions (e.g., encryption)
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2.1.3.5 NETWORK PROTOCOLS - THE ISO/OSI 7-LAYER PROTOCOL
A number of varying protocols have been used for network communication,
including, among others, the ARPANET protocol, IBM's SNA (System Network
Architecture), and Digital Equipment Corporation's DECNET. 'The International
Standards Organization's Open Systems Interconnection (ISOIOSI) reference
model is intended as a first step towards standardization of the various
protocols.
The ISO/OSI model, like others, divides the task of network communication into
layers of abstraction. Each level is independent of the others and lower
levels are completely transparent. With this type of model, the protocol
governing host-host communication need not worry about network details such as
routing and congestion control. This section will briefly present the 7
layers of the OSI reference model and lists the functions associated with each
level. Figure 5 summarizes the interaction between layers. Note that the
figure shows only layers 1-3 as being performed in the NIUs. This division,
as indicated by the previous section, is a subject of much controversy and
study. For further details, the interested reader may consult (I) or (2).
(I) is a general text reference, (2) is oriented towards the requirements of
Space Station.
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Layer
1
2
Name
Physical Layer
Data Link Layer
Network Layer
Transport Layer
Session Layer
Presentation Layer
Application Layer
Function
Transmission of data bits across physical media
Transmission of data blocks across a physical
link. This link may connect two adjacent NIUs
or connect a host and its associated NIU
Transmission of data blocks across the network
End-to-End communication between two hosts
End-to-End communication between processes
Performs necessary syntax conversions between
incompatible data formats and device access
formats
Performs mechanics of information exchange on
behalf of source/sink user application processe
The principle functions addressed by each layer are the following:
Data Link Layer (2) m
Network Layer (3)
Transport Layer (4)
Session Layer (5)
Presentation Layer (6)
Application Layer (7)
Framing, Error Control, Media Access,
Sequencing (optional), and Flow Control
Routing/Switching/Relaying, Flow Control,
Sequencing (optional),
Error Control (optional), Financial Accounting
Type of service: Virtual Circuits or Datagrams
Address Mapping (optional)
End-to-End service: VCs or Datagrams?
Segmentation/Reassembly, Error Control,
Multiplexing Connections, Flow Control,
Sequencing (optional), Address Mapping
Sequencing (optional), Checkpointing
Data Encryption, Character Code Conversion,
Data Compression, Graphics Syntax Conversion,
Virtual Terminal Protocols
Virtual file protocols,
Resource Access Transparency,
Interprocess Communication Mechanisms
IBO
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2.2.1 Fault Tolerance
System requirements for high reliability and availability are achieved by a
combination of fault avoidance and fault tolerance. Fault avoidance reduces
the possibility of hardware failures through conservative design procedures
and use of high-reliability components, and the possibility of software
failures by testing and verification procedures. Fault tolerance uses
redundancy to recover from failures. The SSDS cannot meet availability
requirements by fault avoidance alone (for example,physical damage must be
considered), so that fault tolerance must be provided. This paper describes
several classical techniques for fault tolerance, in four general steps.
First, detection that a fault has occurred. Second, immediate treatment of
the fault to minimize damage and begin recovery. Third, assessment of the
problem. And fourth, full recovery and continuation of normal operations.
None of these techniques is applicable to the data management system as a
whole, but may be applicable to individual parts such as processors, network
interface units, interconnection media, etc. Several techniques rely on
customized design, such as processors with internal redundancy, which have the
potential for high maintenance costs because of their non-standard nature.
Some techniques are useable for standard equipment. Also, in many instances,
the SSDS will include commercial, military, or NASR off-the-shelf equipment
for which the fault detection and recovery is already built-in and outside the
control of the SSDS trades. For example, most ground processors will be
commercial equipment; the on-board processors are likely to be a space
qualified version of a large volume military or NASA processor; and both the
ground and on-board data base management software are expected to be based on
a commercial product instead of a new development. Individual applications
must make the judgement of which methods are available and applicable to meet
their requirements. In particular, ground SSDS requirements for fault
tolerance are quite different from the on-board requirements, in view of the
long resupply cycle, the possibility for EVA (extra-vehicular activity) for
replacement, and the potential for unmanned operations.
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Most functions of the core and payload systems will utilize their own internal
methods for fault tolerance. Typical examples are cross correlation of
different sensors in navigation of the space constellation, integrity checks
within the data base management system, Or leak detection of the reaction
control system. This paper cannot cover the wide variety of special methods
available to each SSDS function. The paper does address the methods for fault
tolerance of the data processing and local area networks used to support those
functions.
Current application needs for fault tolerance reflect five concerns:
1) Reliability. Reliability is essential in even the most basic computer
applications. As the cost of the system decreases, the cost of
maintenance and downtime grow to dominate system life-cycle costs,
dovetailing with the users' need for less expensive maintenance
approaches. System developers can offset the increasing cost of on-site
service with systems that are more reliable and allow deferred repair.
2) Integrity. The system must be able to detect failures and, once a failure
has occurred, restore the data to a consistent state before allowing
computation to proceed.
3) Availability. As on-line access to information becomes more essential to
an operation, long periods of downtime become less and less tolerable.
The system must have the redundant resources to permit quick recovery.
The allowable downtime varies, ranging from under a second for real-time
control to several minutes or hours for less critical functions.
4) Degradation. Some applications require the computer equipment to operate
in isolated locations (space vehicles, relay stations, etc.). For these
applications, the computer system must continue functioning for very long
periods of time, even if operation of the system is degraded.
5) Continuous cooperation. Because downtime can cause reduced productivity
or even loss of life, continuous operation is often required. Downtime
must be held to an absolute minimum in such applications.
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2.2.1.1 Error Detection
The first requirement for fault tolerance is to be able to detect that a fault
has occurred, Some techniques also recover from the fault at the same time,
usually with status available to an external monitor.
2.2,1,1.1 Description
Several widely used methods to detect errors within a data processing system
are :
m
m
u
Built-in test equipment (BITE)
Watchdog timers
Parity
Cyclic redundancy checks (CRC)
Error correction codes (ECC)
External checks
Fault detection may be performed either internal to a single unit or by use of
an external monitor. Internal checks are sometimes called built-in test
equipment (BITE), and is used by the manufacturer both for unit checkout and
to satisfy specified levels of fault detection and isolation required For
maintenance. The BrTE may include watchdog timers to detect loss of critical
functions (such as oscillator stopped or a dead interface unit). Many
movements of data within a unit can be checked by simple parity or CRC to
detect errors, or be enhanced to include error correction coding (ECC) to both
detect and correct errors. Movement of data between units may use simple
parity for error detection, or more complex cyclic redundancy checks (CRC), or
ECC for both detection and correction of errors. External checks may include
voting of the outputs of two or more units to detect and identify a faulty
unit. Watchdog timers, parity, CRC, and ECC may also be used external to a
single unit to detect problems with data transfers.
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2.2.1.1.2 Option Characterization
BITE is usually active in a unit, providing a continuous detection
capability. The coverage is often in the range of 80 to 95 percent of the
failure rate of a unit, so that BITE by itself does not give the very high
coverage (such as 99.99 percent) required for fault isolation and repair.
BITE will typically be I0 percent of the total hardware in a unit.
Watchdog timers are usually used for coarse checks on interfaces between
separate physical units, such as between a processor and an external device.
Detection of a completely failed external device is very good, and prevents a
processor from waiting forever for a failed device. Assessment of data
quality (such as meaningless content or lost bits) is poor. Watchdog timers,
either hardware or software, are usually an insignificant amount of a unit.
Parity, cyclic redundancy checks (CRC), and ECC are common methods of
detecting errors in computer data transfers. Parity is the classic method to
detect loss of a single bit of data, where the correlation of errors between
bits is known (or presumed) to be negligible. Most computer memory devices
include parity checks or better detection methods. CRC extends the parity
concept to detection of multiple bits in error for cases where errors are
likely to be grouped, such as serial transfers over a communication link. ECC
is a further enhancement that uses redundancy within the information (extra
bits) to detect and to correct errors. The parity/CRC/ECC type of detection
provides very high detection of errors that fall within the designed types of
errors. (For example, parity gives lO0 percent detection of single bit
errors, but only 50 percent detection of multiple bit errors.) Parity used in
a memory adds one bit for every 8 or 16 bits (depending on the memory
system). Parity used in a serial link uses one bit for every 8 or 16 bits
transferred. CRC used in a serial link uses 8 or 16 bits for the entire
message, and there?ore uses only a small part of the bandwidth. ECC is being
applied more widely as memory prices fall, with a common practice being to use
6 ECC bits for each 16 data bits in memory to correct any single bit error and
detect any two bits in error. ECC on communication links, to cover long
bursts of noise or data dropouts, can use much of the available bandwidth.
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Voting and external checks provide good coverage of the failures for which the
checks are designed. Coverage is virtually I00 percent i? all outputs can be
guaranteed to be identical with the equipment operating normally (a difficult
goal to meet in practice). Coverage of non-identical outputs can range from
very good for "sudden" failures, to poor for slowly diverging data. The
general problem for non-identical outputs is to define tolerance levels that
detect ?ailed units without also rejecting good units that are near their
specified performance limits.
2.2.1.1.3 Projected Capabilities
BITE and watchdog timers are classic methods to provide fault detection in the
80 to 95 percent range. No substantial improvement is expected during the
Space Station timeframe.
The parity/CRC/ECC type of fault detection can be expected to evolve toward
increased use o? ECC to mask errors in memories as these devices increase in
storage capacities and decrease in price/bit. Rpplication o? ECC such a
Reed-Solomon encoding to serial communication links can be expected to
increase as higher bandwidth channels evolve which can tolerate the loss o?
data bandwidth inherent in such encoding.
2.2.1.1.4 References
None.
2.2.1.2 Hardware Replication and Reconfiguration
This category includes options that represent broad classifications ?or the
better known redundant hardware configurations (both static and dynamic). The
options include the following:
Standby Sparing
Reconfigurable Ouplexing
Pair-and-Spare
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wN-Modular Redundant (NMR) Voting
Reconfigurable Voting
Reconfigurable Multicomputers
Reconfigurable Multiprocessors
2.2.1.2.1 Description. The most common redundancy strategy used to
achieve high fault tolerance "coverage" is hardware replication. This can
take the form of static redundancy where fixed configurations can tolerate
failures (e.g., majority voting schemes) or dynamic redundancy where
configurations can be dynamically changed to respond to faults or to allow
online repair (replacement strategy). Static configurations are mature and
have been used in many NASA and military applications. Dynamic redundancy
represents an evolving technology that is closely tracking the evolution of
distributed data processing. As a result, many distributed configurations
have the potential to support reconfiguration and replacement (self-repair)
strategies. In addition, some degree of static redundancy is often
incorporated as part of an overall reconfiguration scheme.
Reconfiguration is triggered either by internal detection of faults in the
damaged unit or by detection of errors in its output. Thus, fault detection
techniques (defined in Section 2.2.1.1) will significantly influence a
system's chance of successful reconfiguration. Other important factors
include methods for fault confinement (limiting the impacts o? a fault),
damage assessment (identifying the extent of the effects of a fault), and
resource switching to recover from the fault. After detection and
reconfiguration (if necessary), the effects of errors must be eliminated
through some form of recovery procedure (described in Section 2.2.1.4).
2.2.1.2.2 Option Characterization
a0 Standby Sparinq - This is a dual-redundant configuration based on a
replacement strategy where a previously unused component is directly
substituted for the failed primary (active) component. The replacement
strategy can be manual, dynamic or spontaneous as defined below:
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Manual - The system takes no part in the replacement strategy (e.g.,
recabling, unit replacement, etc.)
Dynamic - The system, responding to external stimuli, uses automated
provisions for reorganizing future activities.
Spontaneous - Strategy is carried out entirely by the system itself
(self-repair) such as the JPL Self Test and Repair (STAR) system.
Standby replacement strategies can also be characterized by the degree of
readiness of the backup component (i.e., time required to execute the
replacement and recovery). Backup spares can be powered-down or inactive
(cold backup), or executing redundant software (hot backup). The BELL ESS
series and several transaction-oriented commercial systems (i.e., TANDEM,
AURAGEN, etc.) use some form of checkpointing or synchronization to
provide active backup capability. In the TANDEM NONSTOP system, process
pairs execute in separate CPU's. The prima?y process handles a111/O and
data base modification while the backup tracks all I/O messages at primary
checkpoints and can take over "on-the-fly".
The key to implementing a dual-redundant replacement strategy is the
ability to detect faults in the primary system. This can be accomplished
by a variety of self-check techniques such as "I'm-alive" messages,
timeouts, diagnostics, error detection codes, etc. (see Section 2.2.1.1).
An alternative approach for active standby systems is to use hardware
comparators to detect mismatches. In this case, both units are operating
in parallel but only one is connected to the system output via a physical
or logical switch. Once a fault is detected as the result of a comparator
mismatch, the difficulty is to determine which unit is faulty (See
2.2.1.3).
The common techniques to identify the faulty unit are:
0
0
0
0
Run self-test diagnostics (BELL ESS 2)
Include additional self-checking circuitry. A joint occurrence of an
internal fault and a comparator mismatch determines faulty unit.
Watchdog timer (BELL ESS 2)
External unit to compare results of known computations with stored
constants, etc.
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As an alternative, two pairs (quad redundancy) can be used (see
pair-and-spare below) and a mismatch in the primary pair will result in
automatic switching to the backup pair.
bo Reconfiqurable Duplexinq. This approach has been employed in many
dual-processor systems where both units are used to enhance system
throughput (i.e., non-redundant processes). The duality of these systems
offers some features to support a level of reconfigurability in the case
of processor failure. This, of course, results in degraded performance
and generally requires significant time to reconfigure and cold start the
system. In reality, these systems have many single-point failure
components, do not support the removal or return of components without
powering-down, and lack sufficient software support. -
Reconfiguration limited to a duplex configuration will probably receive
little attention in the future for fault tolerance. The extension of
reconfiguration to multicomputer and multiprocessor systems is discussed
later in this section.
C. Pair-and-Spare - The pair-and-spare concept employs two pairs of
components (quad replication) with one pair functioning as the backup
"spare". Each pair (often on a single board) is self-checking and each
pair consists of identical functions that receive identical inputs.
Output comparators generate an error signal whenever the outputs of a pair
don't match. Normally, the two pairs are tightly synchronized and should
one pair detect an internal mismatch, it merely "disconnects" and the
spare continues to carry the load, all without missing a beat. This
technique is employed in the Stratus computers, the AT&T 3B20D processors
and Intel's 432 as well as several other in-development systems.
One of the major advantages of this approach is that no explicit recovery
action is required since the process continues with the spare while the
faulty unit is replaced. When a repaired unit is returned, an interrupt
can be generated to re-establish synchronization. Since no other recovery
is required, the system appears to the user to be a conventional computer
requiring no special fault tolerant programming consideration.
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This degree of redundancy has become practical (cost-effective) because of
the advent of powerful microprocessors such as those described in Section
1.3. This is further enhanced by new microprocessor features, such as
those provided by the Intel 432 family, which facilitate the construction
of pair-and-spare and/or self-checking systems. These features are
"built-into" the chips and can be activated by external signals. However,
the approach is of limited value when physical damage must be tolerated,
since the tight synchronization requires only a small spacial separation.
d* N-Modular Redundancy (NMR) Votinq. This approach is one of the oldest
techniques for achieving fault tolerance with fixed replication and
majority voting. The most common example of this technique, Triple
Modular Redundancy (TMR), involves three identical modules and majority
voting circuits which check the module outputs for exact equality. It is
thus designed to "mask" the failure of any single module, by accepting any
output that at least two of the modules agree on. The voting mechanism
can also include a means of identifying the faulty module and providing
notification. TMR is also incorporated into more sophisticated
reconfigurable strategies such as SIFT and FTMP, below.
Schemes such as TMR are based on the assumption that failures in the
different modules are independent of each other. Thus, a design fault
(hardware or software) may not be masked. In addition, it is necessary
that the modules do not interact with each other. The Charles Stark
Draper Laboratory (CSDL) has developed a fault-tolerant multiprocessor
(FTMP) based on groups of TMR processors.
Most TMR voting systems use hardware voting circuits. A variation on this
theme is the Software Implemented Fault Tolerance (SIFF) system developed
by Standard Research Institute (SRI). As the name implies, the emphasis
is placed on using software techniques to minimize the amount of special
purpose hardware. This allows fault tolerant systems to be constructed
using general-purpose modules and standardized networking capability. T'he
SIFT approach has now been adopted in new commercial system (i.e. August
Systems).
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Reliability characterization of NMR static configurations is relatively
well understood, and well-established predictive models exist.
Another approach to modular redundancy is illustrated by the Space Shuttle
on-board computer system. During the critical ascent and entry phases,
the system uses quad-redundancy (4 computers) for the primary processing,
and a fifth computer with independently programmed backup software
tracking all sensor input data and ready to take over vehicle control.
The switch to the backup is manually commanded by the crew if they judge
that the primary system has failed. Orbital operations normally use
dual-redundancy for vehicle control, with a simplex computer used for
system management and manipulator arm processing. From experience, the
most important fault detection technique is a "fail to sync" of one of the
computers of the redundant set, which has been caused by problems like a
permanent computer failure, an internal register transient failure, a
software timing error, or a fault in the input/output processor. The
exchange and cross-comparison of critical data has almost never detected
an error before a loss of sync. With three or more computers in the
redundant set, the failed unit is easily identified by a majority vote.
With one or two computers, the faulty unit is usuall.y identified by the
loss of updates to the display controlled from that computer. The crew is
responsible For turning off the failed computer and reassigning any
devices to the control of another computer. An early policy decision was
that there would be no automatic reconfiguration of computers or
reassignment of input/output control, because of the concern that a
computer might fail in such a way as to enter that code by mistake and
preempt control of the vehicle.
e. Reconfigurable Voting - This is a variation of the NMR static
configurations where additional spares can be substituted for failed
modules of the primary voting set. This requires a "disagreement
detector" and a switching mechanism that can identify the faulty module,
inhibit it from further participation, and enable an active spare module
to be included in future voting. This hybrid approach can result in
substantial improvements in reliability over standard NMR.
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f. Reconfigurable Multicomputers. This classification includes a wide
variety of loosely-coupled distributed configurations that have benefitted
from recent advances in network communications and VLSI processing
capabilities. The flexibility offered by standard networking schemes
allows the system designer to easily adapt to meet the needs of growth
and/or changing requirements. Such systems can be reconfigured for
"graceful degradation" and/or can include additional on-line spares for
replacement of faulty units. A key features of these configurations is
the potential for cost-effectiveness since a large number of processors
can be "backed up" by a relatively small number of spares. However, most
existing systems still use multiple pairs (i.e. Tandem) or TMR Triads
(SIFT, August Systems, etc.). In the more sophisticated concepts using
multiple TMR Triads such as SIFT or FTMP (classified as a multiprocessor)
a pool of spares can be used to replace failed triad members.
Representative systems include the following:
o SIFT
o TANDEM NON-STOP
o AUGUST SYSTEMS
o AIPS
As the configuration interconnections become more complex and the methods
for fault detection, reconfiguration/self-repair, and system recovery
become more sophisticated, our ability to predict (model) system
performance becomes more uncertain. This is particularly true for system
reliability where the straight-forward and well-understood combinatorial
techniques are limited in value. Complex configurations require a more
detailed modeling capability such as Markov and fault-free analysis
techniques. While these techniques are employed in modern modeling codes
(i.e., CARE III, AAIES, MARK l, etc.) their ability to effectively model
various network interconnection reliabilities is yet to be establislned.
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g, Reconfigurable Multiprocessors - This approach has the same general
attributes as those described above for loosely-coupled system except that
processors share memory in a tightly-coupled configuration.
Representative systems include the following:
0
0
0
0
0
Fault Tolerant Multi-Processor (FTMP)
C. mmp (Carnegie Mellon Univ.)
Synapse N + 1
Sequoia Systems
Pluribas
R disadvantage to this approach is that the shared-memory can become a
single point of failure and a memory fault can wipe out critical
information. This generally requires special provisions in the memory
controller and the interconnection logic to minimize these effects. R
more serious disadvantage is the lack of substantial growth potential to
increase throughput since the shared memory can often become a system
"bottleneck" (unless cross-strapped, multi-ported memory is used). This
limitation may not be important for some applications and multi-processors
can be used as NMR nodes in an expandable loosely-coupled network (i.e.,
C.UMP, RIPS, etc.). One approach to alleviating this limitation is the
use of high-speed cache memory within each processor to minimize
memory/bus contention. This approach is used by the Synapse N+I where one
more processor than is required is configured as a spare.
2.2.1.2.3 Projected Capabilities
Networks of distributed processors are advancing rapidly, making the use of
reconfigurable multicomputers practical in the lgB7 and later time-frames.
The network approach, including redundant communication paths among the
processors, permits spatial separation for damage considerations, as well as
growth by adding more processors to the network. This kind of system is
emerging as the main processing element of the SSDS.
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Two or more processors executing as a loosely coupled redundant set is an
established technique for hardware, but does require that the software be able
to reliably detect unacceptable differences between the outputs. This ability
is highly dependent on the subsystem applications.
Tightly synchronized processors is a state-of-the-art technology that will
advance by IgBT. Because of its ability to detect and possibly recover from
component faults, this approach may be useful for special single-board
subsystem processors, especially where replacement may be difficult and
continuous operation is necessary. The technique is unlikely to be applied to
general processors or where physical damage of the entire unit is a design
consideration.
2,2.1.2.4 References
None.
2.2.1,3 Damage Rssessment
2.2.1.3.1 Description
Damage assessment will determine the degree of damage to the unit itself (as a
start forward repair) and the effects on the system. This step may precede or
follow actual error recovery, dependent on the particular application and
failure. The classic techniques are self tests of a unit and correlation of
trouble reports from multiple units or problem occurrences. R developing
technique for ground processors is to control the diagnostics from a remote
location (such as a phone link) so that the repairman can bring the required
parts on a single service call.
2.2.1.3.2 Option Characteristics
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2.2. I. 3.2.1 Self Test
Fault detection will not necessarily isolate the failed unit. For example, a
dual redundant set may indicate a disagreement, but show no explicit failure
of either unit. Even for an explicit unit failure indication, repair
activities will need a reasonable indication of the most likely failed
internal components. A widely used technique to identify the failed unit, and
the components within the unit, is to execute a self test. The basic
requirement is that the unit is sufficiently good to execute a detailed
diagnostic program. Therefore, the technique is not useful for failures of
basic components like power supplies. The details of a self test depend
strongly on the nature of the unit. For a processor, the approach is to
perform a series of tests which build up confidence that the processor can
execute every type of instruction (branch, add, logic, etc.), can read and
write every memory location, can store various data values in memory, and can
interface to all parts of its input/output section which do not actually
activate external interfaces. If all these functions perform correctly, the
self test can begin to transmit and receive data (for safety, usually after
permission by an operator) to further check the unit's interfaces. Any
failures are recorded. Perhaps go to g5 percent of the time, this self test
will indicate both the failed unit and an idea of the possible failed
component. The technique is very effective against solid failures, but does
not do well in isolating transient failures or failures which depend on data
values, sequences of operations, or timing.
If self test does not isolate the failed unit and/or component, it is probably
necessary to remove all suspect units for return to the manufacturer for
special analysis, such as stress tests of thermal cycles or vibration, using
equipment not normally available at field sites. For the on-board system, the
number of spares must consider the inability to always isolate the failed unit.
2.2.1.3.2.2 Trouble Reports Correlation
Transient failures are notoriously difficult to isolate, both because of their
infrequent occurrence and because they often may be due to any of several
units. Self tests, both in-place and at the manufacturer, are likely to show
no problem, with the units returned for continued use. The usual method to
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eventually solve such problems (?or those that do get solved) is to build up a
correlation of trouble reports over time. The record keeping is critical to
this effort. The units involved in each occurrence (including serial
numbers), the time of occurrence, any unusual activities, etc. must be
recorded. A pattern may eventually emerge to indicate some units or
conditions that seem to induce a problem which suggests special tests that may
force frequent enough failures to isolate the problem.
2.2.1.3.2.3 Remote Diagnostics
The use of remote diagnostics is developing as a cost effective method of
assessing failures of a unit. Repair personnel use a phone link to start and
control self tests or other diagnostics from a central location, with the
intent of determining which parts will need to be carried to the site for
replacement of the failed component. The technology for successful remote
diagnostic capability applies to the SSDS ground processing system, and may
also be applicable to the on-board processing system. Expert systems are
evolving as a means to automatically analyze the diagnostic data to identify
the most likely failed components, reducing the average down time of the
system.
2.2.1.3.3 Projected Capabilities
Processors executing as a redundant set are an existing method of detecting
faults in a system. The redundancy may be either at a low level (tightly
synchronized) or at a high level (loosely synchronized, possibly tolerance
checks instead of identical results). The decreasing cost of hardware
relative to total system costs and the developing use of networks of
processors should lead to increased use of redundant processors for fault
isolation.
Remote diagnostics are emerging as a cost effective way to assess the cause of
a fault for commercial equipment. The same technology which makes this a
success can be expected to lead to improved diagnostics for the SSDS,
including the on-board processors. The direct effect is that dual redundant
processors, rather than triple redundant (for easy identification of the
failed unit) may become practical even for critical on-board uses.
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Fault diagnosis is one area that continues to be mentioned as an application
of expert systems. This technology is not likely to be useable in the 1987
time frame, but may develop by 1995.
2.2.1.3,4 References
None.
2.2.1.4 Error Recovery
Error recovery will resume normal'operations after a fault. This step follows
the fault detection and treatment to limit damage and start a replacement
processor. Recovery may precede or follow damage assessment_ depending on
whether it is first necessary to determine, for example, which of a pair of
processors has failed. Error recovery may be classed as either backward or
forward. Backward error recovery anticipates errors by saving past states
(such as checkpoints) or taking other actions before the occurrence of a
fault. Forward error recovery reacts after an error has occurred, and does
not rely on earlier actions. The preferred technique will depend on the
particular application.
2.2.1.4,1 Description
The classic techniques are designed to protect primarily against hardware
failures by providing a means to turn off a failed unit, turn on a replacement
unit, go back to a previous point in time, validate the data at the point, and
extrapolate to the current time. Protection against software errors includes
the classic technique of independent backup software, and newer academic
techniques of recovery blocks and N-version programming.
Software fault tolerance is defined as "a system's capability to perform its
intended function in the presence of software faults". Most of the techniques
in this category are still in the research stage and have seen little
practical application. Current emphasis is placed on fault avoidance rather
than tolerance, employing such techniques as structured design/programming,
automated analysis/deign tools, and extensive testing verification validation.
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A major issue associated with such techniques is that software reliability is
difficult to model since software does not "fail"; it only contains residual
design errors. While testing may detect most errors, it cannot guarantee the
absence of all faults. As a result, software reliability predictions are
typically based on the number of errors found during testing and the amount o?
testing; methods with high uncertainty at best.
2.2.1.4.1.1 Checkpoint/Rollback
This approach depends on the provision of recovery points for which the state
of a process can be recorded and later reinstated. Such techniques have been
used in many fault tolerant designs including those that are reconfigurable or
self-repair (dynamic hardware redundancy), such as the 3PL STAR, TANDEM's
NONSTOP, Raytheon's FTSC, etc. The specifics of this technique vary depending
on the hardware configuration and the amount of specialized hardware support
for recovery. Fixed overhead is incurred to establish regular recovery points
whether or not faults occur and variable overhead for rollback procedures when
a fault is detected.
2.2.1.4.1.2 _udit Trail
Audit trails are used in conjunction with checkpoints for failure recovery in
a number of applications. A typical application is in reconstructing critical
data after a failure, such as banking transactions or data base updates. In
these cases it is not adequate to simply go back to an earlier point in time
(such as the bank accounts at yesterday's close of business), since mandatory
changes may have occurred since that time. The audit trail is a record of all
transactions since a checkpoint, at least up to the next checkpoint, that is
adequate to supplement the checkpoint in reconstructing the current state.
The minimum requirement is to record all changes in the audit trail before
committing the change to the actual data base. Some applications may also
require that access to data be recorded, as well as changes.
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2.2.1.4.1.3 Information Validation
Most applications provide a degree of fault tolerance by validating
information before its use. The validation may be part of recovery operations
after a failure, or part of normal operations. Within the SSDS, a typical
validation during recovery might be to check the integrity of a data base to
make sure that the failure did not occur in the middle of an update, which
could cause the data to be invalid. Normal operations frequently validate
sensor readings for reasonable values, typically by comparison to an earlier
reading of the same sensor or some average of a set of redundant sensors, both
to detect failed sensors and to prevent action based on a fault reading. The
particular method is highly dependent on the application.
2.2.1.4.1.4 Recovery Block
In the recovery block approach, there exists an ordered list of alternatives
for a program, the first alternative being called the primary alternative.
The alternatives are executed in order as required. Upon termination of an
alternative, an acceptance test is performed to determine the
"appropriateness" of the output. If successful, then the recovery block
terminates with the output. If unsuccessful, then the next alternative in
line is placed.into execution after the local state has been reset. If all
alternatives have been attempted without success, then the recovery block
terminates with an error code.
Recovery blocks are an attempt tohave the software protect itself against
errors in itself. They are largely academic with little actual use. Some
problems are the devising of acceptable alternative algorithms, the devising
of acceptance tests, and the argument that adding the additional software to
detect software errors just increases the chance of errors.
2.2.1.4.1.5 N-version Programming
N-version programming, like recovery blocks, has multiple copies, or versions,
of a program. But unlike recovery blocks, there is no priority assigned to
the different versions and all versions are executed upon a call to the
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program. (Execution may be sequential or parallel depending upon the
computational resources available.) The final output of the program is
determined by "vote" of the different versions. N-version programming can be
integrated in a natural way with N-version hardware to provide for both
hardware and software fault tolerance.
N-version programming is also an attempt to have the software protect itself
against errors inthe software, with the same problems as recovery blocks.
2.2.1.4.1.6 Backup Software
In the case of backup software, a separate backup system is maintained in the
event that an emergency situation makes execution of the primary software
untenable. Once control is passed to the backup software, the backup mode
remains in effect until remedial action can be taken to correct the primary
software. Typically, the backup system provides only those functions
essential to safe operation.
2.2.1.4.1.7 Compensation
Recovery from some errors is done by compensation for the error condition,
which may be incorrectable. This is a kind of reconfiguration, usually done
within the software algorithms and data rather than by actual switching of
equipment. A real example from Space Station would be the compensation for
loss o? a part of the attitude control system, such as a reaction jet used for
reboost. The recovery requires compensation within the flight software by
firing some other jets for a longer period of time to make up for the lost
thrust. Checkpoints, backup software, or other techniques are not relevant to
such failures. Nithin the data distribution of the SSDS, the message routing
software might compensate for a failed or degraded link by selecting an
alternate route, without actual reconfiguration or switching of any
equipment. The form of compensation depends on the particular application and
the anticipated failure modes.
2O3
2.2.1.4.2 Option Characteristics
One or more of these approaches can be applied in most situations to meet the
needs of particular applications. The most common technique is to use
checkpoints at a high enough frequency to permit fall-back to a pre_ious point
in time, followed by extrapolation to the current time (possibly by the use of
an audit trail since the checkpoint). The generation of checkpoints may be
initiated manually, or by the application, or by some automatic service within
an operating system. For example, an operator may checkpoint customer records
at the end of each business day, or Space Station navigation may checkpoint
its state every ten minutes, or a data base management system may generate a
checkpoint and related audit trail every hundred updates. Each application
must determine the appropriate frequency and data to be saved. Validation of
information is nearly always required, to cover cases of slow degradation that
may have polluted one or more of the previous checkpoints.
Recovery block and N-version programming have limitations. In terms of
efficient use of computational resources, recovery blocks have a decided
advantage over N-version programming since the recovery block executes an
alternative version of a program only when a fault is detected. With
N-version programming, however, all versions are executed. There is little
difference between the two approaches in terms of storage requirements. There
is another criterion, in addition to efficiency, that distinguishes the two
approaches. In the recovery-block approach the output of a program is
subjected only to a generalized acceptance test, a test which in most cases
will not embody total correctness. In N-version programming, on the other
hand, the outputs of multiple versions of a program are compared, which really
amounts to a check on the total correctness of a computation. The N-version
programming and recovery-block techniques have seen relatively little use to
date.
Backup software has a high tolerance of faults in certain applications,
notably those where the backup software can take over with no prior dependence
on the suspect primary system. A typical application might be for safing
procedures in a process control environment. Somewhat less tolerance exists
if the backup software must rely on the primary software to some extent. The
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Space Shuttle backup software is typical of this type, since it gathers most
of its sensor data while the primary software is in control by "listening" to
sensor data which was requested by the primary software, and even uses some
data computed by the primary software. Little fault tolerance exists if the
backup software is highly dependent on the primary software, such as a data
base management system for which the failure of the primary may have scrambled
the data base.
2.2.1.4.3 Projected Capabilities
The classic techniques will continue to dominate error recovery. These are
validation of information (sensors, etc.) before its use in computations, and
checkpoints (including audit trails where appropriate) containing adequate
data for resuming normal operations after a failure. Backup software can be
used in very critical applications (safing of dangerous conditions) where
there is a significant concern that the primary software may contain residual
errors in critical processing even after extensive verification. Note that
backup software can nearly double costs where it is used (two development,
verification, and maintenance efforts), and should therefore be considered
only for critical applications.
Recovery blocks and N-version programming are likely to remain as topics of
theoretical software development, and find little use in practice. This
opinion is basGd on the difficulty of finding multiple equivalent algorithms
for complex applications, of defining adequate acceptance criteria to select
the "correct" algorithm or version, and of assuring that the additional
software does not itself contribute more errors than are being avoided.
2.2.1.4.4 • References
1) AIPS Technology Survey Report, CSDL-C-5691, February 1984, by The Charles
Stark Draper Laboratory, Inc., Contract NAS9-16023.
2) Workshop on Applied Fault Tolerant Computing for Aerospace Systems, Fort
Worth, Texas, B-IO November 19B2, sponsored by NASA OAST and AIAA.
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2.2.2 Autonomy/Automation
The application of autonomy and automation to Space Station is a topic of
considerable interest and controversy. The two primary issues are i) to what
extent can the Space Station be made independent of a "cast of thousands" on
the ground, and 2) what functions can be automated by machine without
requiring interaction by ground or flight crew. Numerous studies have already
been performed on this subject and most of the results from these studies tend
to favor a maximal amount of function automation and space autonomy. The
usual considerations driving these results being that a fully automated space
station provides for maximal onboard productivity and a highly automated space
station can be autonomous thereby requiring only a few ground crew people.
These studies have, for the most part, not considered the cost-effectivity of
implementing maximal space automation/autonomy.
Factors other than cost also affect the implementation of automation and
autonomy. From an operation perspective, studies performed on the way people
control complex systems in circumstances analogous to a space station (e.g.,
polar research stations, offshore oii drilling rigs, submarines) indicate that
the onboard crew should have the prime responsibility to run the space station
with the assistance of automation where appropriate. For example, if a human
operator has to follow or track the details of what an automated system is
doing (to guard against automation hardware failures) then automation has not
decreased the operator's workload but may have increased his training
requirements.
Preliminary results of the Advanced Technology Advisory Committee (ATAC) have
been used in the preparation of this option section. The product of
the ATAC committee will be a set of recommendations and automation
and robotics options for use by contractors in their phase B space station
definitions and preliminary designs. The final ATAC report will be issued in
April 1985. The ATAC report, among other things, will assess the impact of
various automation options concepts for use in space station. This
assessment, performed by SRI International, determines the level of automation
that would be technically feasible about i0 years after the initial
_-;_LCr._,_u PAGE BLANK I_OT FILMED
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operational capability (IOC) is established. In addition, their task requires
the identification of feasible levels of automation ?or IOC and design
features required at IOC ("hooks" and "scars") to enable the integration of
enhanced automation capabilities by future upgrades of hardware and software
units.
The following definitions have been abstracted from various NASA and other
documents:
Subsystem. First-level components of Space Station elements that can include,
for example, the ECLS Subsystem, the Communication Subsystem, the Power
Subsystem, the Propulsion Subsystem, etc.
Space Autonomy. The independence of the onboard subsystems from direct,
real-time control by the ground (crew or machines) ?or a specified period of
time.
Subsystem Autonomy. The independence of a subsystem from direct real-time
control by external man or machine (e.g., an ECLS automated subsystem with its
built in, fault-tolerant controller).
Automatic or Automated Process. A process that is controlled in an open- or
closed-loop manner to achieve a goal or to minimize (maximize) a cost function
specified For the process. The controller may be iterative and continuous
with time or it may enter a terminal state (halt) once its goal is attained.
Conventional or Algorithmic Automation. An automation approach whereby a
machine is programmed to respond to a predefined set of conditions with a
predefined set of actions. The actions may be conditional, by use
"IF-THEN-ELSE" statements, however, responses are governed completely by the
designer's ability to anticipate the situations that the machine will face.
Therefore, algorithmic autonomy works best for well understood situations.
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Artificial Intellisence (AI). A branch of computer science dedicated to the
design and implementation of computer programs which make human-like
decisions, and can be adaptive and become more proficient at making
decisions. AI systems interact with their operators in a "natural" way that
mimics intelligent behavior.
Expert System. A component of AI, an expert or knowledge-based system is one
that stores, processes, and utilizes a large data base of information about a
specific area of knowledge to solve problems or answer questions pertaining to
that area. The performance of the system is at the level of an experienced
designer, teacher, technician ..... who is specializing in this specific area
of knowledge. Current expert systems store their expertise in a data base
that has been derived from a human expert via an intermediate knowledge
engineer. These systems are not self-adaptive or self-learning, but do have
the ability to generate new concepts and relationships about knowledge already
in the data base. Expert systems are candidates for implementing automation
schemes.
Teleoperation ("Remote Operation"): Use of remotely controlled sensors and
actuators allowing a human to operate equipment even though the human presence
is removed from the work site. Refers to controlling the motion of a complex
piece of equipment such as a mechanical arm, rather than simply turning a
device on or off from a distance. Teleoperation requires that the human
operator be able to see the object being manipulated, either directly or by
visual sensors.
Telepresence ("Remote Presence"): The ability to transer a human's sensory
perceptions, e.g., visual, tactile, to a remote site for the purpose of
improved teleoperation performance. At the worksite, the manipulators have
the dexterity to allow the operator to perform normal human functions. At the
control station, the operator receives sufficient quantity and quality of
sensory feedback to provide a feeling of actual presence at the worksite.
Augmented Teleoperator: A teleoperator with sensing and computation
capability that can carry out portions of a desired operation without
requiring detailed operator control. The terms "teleautomation" and
"tele-robotics" have been used here.
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Robot: A generic term, connoting many of the following ideas: A mechanism
capable of manipulation of objects and/or movement having enough internal
control, sensing, and computer analysis so as to carry out a more or less
sophisticated task. The term usually connotes a certain degree of autonomy,
and an ability to react appropriately to changing conditions in its
environment. Robotics is a specialized discipline within the broader fields
of autonomy and automation.
2.2.2.1 Subsystem Autonomy
2.2.2.1.1 Description
There are at least two possible distribution options that can be used, each of
which can be considered to be of opposite extremes of a continuum of possible
options: centcalizated (minimum system hardware) and distributed (maximum
subsystem autonomy). The "minimum hardware" option (Figure I) groups all
critical subsystems and accommodates their fault-tolerant needs by assigning
them to replicated hardware elements. Noncritical subsystems are grouped and
assigned to hardware elements that need not be replicated. In the maximum
autonomy or "dedicated subsystem processing" approach (Figure 2), subsystem
functions are allocated to dedicated processors, and fault tolerance is
accommodated by replicating hardware elements. Processor types are selected
from the prioritized options on the basis of subsystem resource requirements
expanded with design margins, as above. This selection may require several
standard processors to be used, depending on the dispersion of the subsystem
resource requirements. Noncritical subsystems are grouped and assigned to one
or more of these standard processors.
2.2.2.1.2 Characterization
There are numerous advantages and disadvantages that can be cited for
centralized and distributed computer systems and these have been discussed in
many places (see, for example, Space Station Program Description Document,
Book No. 6, Appendix B, Systems Operations, Trade Study entitled "Centralized
Versus Distributed Computer Systems", p.p. B-II-lg7-B-II-212, 8-1-83). A
summary of the advantages and disadvantages of these approaches is given in
Table l.
210
SUBNE1
(REGIONAL/
GLOBAL
NETWORK)
MODULE I
MODULE 2
L
e
I
o
I
o
I I
SUBSYSTEH
PARTITION
MODULE 3
MULTI-PROCESSOR HIERARCHY
cx) SOFTWARE INTENSIVE SOLUTION
DO ANY COMPUTER CAN COMMUNICATE WITH ANY DEVICE
Do COMPUTERS HAVE MULTIPLE FUNCTIONS
PROCESSOR _._ EMBEDDED MICROPROCESSOR
OR LOCAL PROCESSOR
OR SENSOR/EFFECTO_
Q BIU
Figure I. Centralized Architecture (Example)
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2.2.2.2 Function Automation Options
2.2.2.2.1 Description
It is possible, in principle, to automate all or nearly ali SSDS functions,
the degree of automation being limited by considerations of cost, schedule,
value of human involvement, and other factors. Although a procedure may be
automated, good human engineering practice requires that man must have the
capability to issue commands individually in a manual mode, bypassing the
automatic procedure, if desired. Therefore, he must be provided knowledge of
what tasks should be done to be compatible with tasks in progress or
completed. When one or more steps might be bypassed, each step must be
monitored as it is performed and only bypassed by deliberate operator action.
Exceptions to this rule occur only when computations are so complex , action
is so precise, and the results of human error are so drastic that control must
be removed from man and relegated to the computer.
A summary list of the SSDS functions is shown in Figure 3. The SSDS must
provide SSDS resources for the implementation of each of these functions and
the type and extent of these resources will depend on the allocation and
degree-of-automation decisions (trade studies) associated with each function.
It should be noted that the DECISIONS column in Figure 3 is blank since only
the options are considered in this report; subsequent trade studies, selecting
from options outlined here, will provide entries for this column. This
paragraph addresses automation options and a subsequent paragraph discusses
autonomy options.
2.2.2.2.2 Characterization
Automation techniques/options include those defined earlier in this report:
1) conventional or algorithmic, 2) artificial intelligence approaches,
including the use of expert systems, 3) teleoperated and telepresence systems,
and 4) robotics. Options for the use of artificial intelligence in automating
functions are discussed in section 1.6 of the options report and all four of
the above automation technologies are assessed in the ATAC report mentioned
earlier.
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TOP LEVEL FUNCTION NAME
l.O MANAGE CUSTOMER/OPERATOR DELIVERED DATA
2.0
° Onboard Data Capture (Real-Time/Delayed)
o Ground Distribution
MANAGE CUSTOMER/OPERATOR SUPPLIED DATA
° Commands/Data, Address, User/Operator
Validation
° Payload Command Res./Constr. Chk.
° Provide Ancillary Data
° Payload Data Processing/Operations
° OMV/OTV Operations
3.0 SCHEDULE AND EXECUTE OPERATIONS
4.0
° Typical Day Payload Scheduling
° Short Term (2-7 Day) Schedule
° Prepare Time-Tagged Execution Sequence
° Execute Above Sequence
OPERATE CORE SYSTEMS
o G&N, Att., Cont., Traffic Control,
Tracking, Time/Freq. Management
o Power, Thermal Cont., Structures and
Mech. Support, ECLSS
° Support Flight Crew Activities
(Health, Safety, Habitability, EVA
Support, Operations & Procedure Support)
o Provide Customer Avionics Services
° Caution & Warning, System Status ....
° Diagnostics & Maintenance
5.0 MANAGE FACILITIES AND RESOURCES
° Onboard Facilities
° Ground Facilities (SSCC, SAT, ROC, DHC)
6.0 SIMULATE, INTEGRATE, AND TRAIN
7.0 SUPPORT SPACE STATION PROGRAM
DECISIONS
ALLOCATION AUTOMATION
Figure 3. Summary of SSDS Functions
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Each automation option requires crew and SSDS resources (hardware/software) to
an extent that depends on the degree-of-automation implemented by the
automation option selected for each SSDS function (via the automation trade
studies). 'The concept of degree of automation can be depicted graphically as
shown in Figure 4. In this figure the horizontal line can be interpreted as a
level or degree of automation with the left-most point corresponding to the
labor intensive extreme (maximal crew resources) and the right-most point
corresponding to the automated extreme (no crew resources).
The SSDS function set (Figure 4) is shown as being mapped into two regions and
a point on this line which are termed Manual (M), Interactive (I), and.
Automatic (R), respectively. Rnother region to the left of M is where
functions which require no SSDS resources (software/hardware) are mapped and
these functions are not considered in the SSDS sutdy. Rn example of a
non-SSDS function implementation would be the use of the U.S. Postal Service
for transporting data on magnetic tapes.
The left-most point in the M region corresponds to the first point of interest
.to the data system and represents the automation level requiring minimal SSDS
resources. Rs one proceeds from this point to the right increasing SSDS
resources are required but with a corresponding decrease in crew/operator
resources. At the automated extreme no crew/operator resources are required
and the function is completely automated with the use of SSDS resources.
In summary, the option for implementing functions are R, I, and M. Further
characterization of these options and the crew/operator/ machine allocation
responsibilities is shown in Figure 5.
2.2.2.3 Space Station Rutonomy (Ground/Space)
2.2.2.3.1 Description
The degrees of Space Station autonomy and the degree of subsystem autonomy are
separable issues. Space Station autonomy implies an onboard capability to
perform all essential functions, many of which have traditionally been done on
the ground, usually by large numbers of people. To do these functions onboard
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with few people requires a high degree of automation. The degree of autonomy
depends on what level of automation is achievable and affordable as discussed
earlier.
2.2.2.3.2 Characterization
The SSDS function to be allocated to space or ground were discussed earlier
and are summarized in Figure 3. Many factors affect this allocation
including: degree of automation achievable (non-automated ?unctions consume
valuable space crew time), cost of space resources (significantly higher than
ground resources), communication bandwidth and availability requirements, life
cycle cost, growth (once implemented on ground is it reasonable to
re-implement for space migration?), safety, unmanned consideration, mission
buildup (dual implementations for ground support during buildup), and so
forth. Other than cost, the key drivers affecting allocation of function to
onboard or ground are shown below:
i . Criticality - Allowable recovery time following failure of function
implementation hardware.
. Impact - Consequences of not meeting specified function criticality:
loss of life, hazard/damage to SS, mission equipment, loss of key
data ....
, Function Data Source and Function User (Crew/Customer) Physically
Co-Located- Consideration is to implement function where input data
is generated.
, Space/Ground Communication Link Availability - Includes components of
blind spot in TDRSS coverage, link MTBF and link MTTR.
, Function Autonomy - Group functions with significant inter-function
I/O rates and allocate as a group.
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, Response Time - Relates to transport delay encountered in
space/terrestrial communication links (i.e., roundtrip TDRSS/DOMSAT
delay "' 2 secs).
, Space/Ground Communication Link Bandwidth - Considerations due to
finite bandwidth allocated to SS.
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2.2.3 S_stem Growth
2.2.3.1 Description. One of the key requirements imposed on the SSDS is to
provide sufficient growth capability to support the future needs of the
program in a cost-effective manner. This includes growth in functional
capability, available internal resources, and the ability to handle increased
external interface demands. Nhile applicable to both ground and space
elements, the primary focus is on the more constrained environment of space
where improvements and new capabilities may be accommodated by
modification/replacement of existing modules or the addition of new ones. In
any case, it must be recognized that future data system needs over the
expected life-time of the space station cannot be accurately forecast and it
will be difficult to determine "how much" growth potential is adequate.
Therefore, SSDS architectural concepts need to consider multiple mechanisms
for accommodating growth.
The traditional viewpoint of the space station evolutionary process is that
phased development, new customers and improvement needs will result in data
system requirements for more increased functional capability and/or
resources. This section will describe the options for extending the SSDS
capability to meet these requirements. An alternative viewpoint from the
customer perspective, however, is that "growth" can be measured in terms of
increased information derived from mission data. This can, of course, have
•the same effect as the traditional viewpoint if the result is increased data
rates requiring additional $$DS functional/resource capabilities. The
"information content" of the mission data handled by the SSDS could also be
improved through additional onboard payload processing and/or data compression
without necessarily increasing data rates. This could be particularly
beneficial if applied to the relatively small number of high data rate
missions. It is not likely that such payload unique functions would be
included in the SSDS, however, they must be considered in a well-balanced,
SSDS evolutionary process as a viable alternative to SSDS expansion.
The system SSDSgrowth options in this category include the following:
- Added/Modified Software
- Resource Margin
- Technology Insertion
- Resource Addition
- Network Addition
2.2.3.2 Option Characterization. The following paragraphs briefly describe
the advantages, disadvantages and limitations associated with SSDS growth
options. A summary is provided in Table I.
a, Added/Modified Software. The programmable nature of software
suggests that the addition/modification of software is the "easiest"
way of enhancing functional capability. Historically, this has
resulted in two major problem areas. First, sufficient resource
margin is usually not provided and as the resource limitations are
invariably approached, attempts to optimize code or operate within
these constraints generally result in much higher development costs
and schedule extensions. Second, changes and enhancements to
existing software often introduce new problems unless extensively
controlled and rigorously tested/verified which will substantially
increase life-cycle costs. Both problem areas are further compounded
for large, complex, real-time applications such as the SSDS. These
cost impacts can potentially be mitigated by modern software
engineering techniques, modular design, and a "resource-rich"
environment.
b. Resource Margin. This approach implies the selection of an SSDS
"design point" that provides substantially more resource capability
than is initially required to meet performance requirements. This
"resource-rich" environment, when applied in a balanced manner (CPU,
memory, bus, etc.), could provide sufficient margin to accommodate
transient conditions incurred during initial buildup and until
operational stabilization is achieved. This approach would also
minimize the need to change the initial hardware configuration for
some period of time resulting in a more stable environment. The
extent to which the SSDS should be over designed will depend largely
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on physical constraints, funding profiles and a comparison of initial
v.s. projected technology capabilities (technology insertion). A
limiting factor may be the desire to minimize built-in technology
obsolescence. However, the SSDS resource that may be most difficult
to upgrade is the network interconnection structure. Careful
attention must therefore be given to initial network bandwidth margin
regardless of growth options adopted for other resources.
C, Technology Insertion. This option provides improvements in
performance to weight/volume/power ratios in that existing "black
box" can be replaced by higher performance, higher capacity
components with minimal impact to system hardware or software
interfaces. This approach requires strict adherence to a program of
standardization that is developed early and incorporated into the
architectural design of the SSDS. This program will address network
inter?ace standards, a standard HOL, and a set of standard ISA's for
computers. However, standards must be selected that promote
technology insertion, not inhibit it, i.e., adopted standards must be
on a clear evolution path supported by industry and/or DoO. If
radiation hardened components are required, then DoD standards must
be considered carefully. In brief, the standards selected must be
divorced from technology and supported by the entire technical
community.
d , Resource Addition. This approach is similar in nature to that of
Technology Insertion except that components are only added and these
additions need not be a technology upgrade. An example of this
option is the addition of more processors to handle new software
requirements. If properly planned for in the architecture design,
this approach can provide major improvements in functional and/or
resource capability. The impact to the existing HW/SW configuration
will depend on its functional interface with the rest of the system.
An attractive way to minimize the impact of added resources is to use
a network operating system (NOS) that provides some level of "virtual
resource" capability making changes relatively transparent to the
application software. This can be accomplished by either static or
dynamic functional allocation processes and appropriate changes to
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the NOS data base. This is typically done via "process construction"
and could support the reassignment of existing functions as well as
the allocation of new ones. Again, this requires a modular design
structure and interface standardization. The major limitation to
adding resources (other than physical constraints) is generally the
capability of the system interconnection structure. For example,
typical local area network structures are often limited by the number
of HW interconnections (HW addressing), distance between nodes and
the network bus bandwidth.
e. Network Addition. This approach allows for the addition of networks
to the SSDS as needed. One advantage of this technique is that new
networks can utilize new technology. As long as the capacity of the
existing networks is not exceeded, networks could be easily installed
in new modules and then connected to the existing networks via a
bridge or gateway. Minor software changes (e.g., table changes) in
the bridge or gateway would be required to address the nodes of the
new network. The ease with which a network could be added to an
existing module depends also on the accessibility of network
cabling. Networks in existing modules, however, could be easily
expanded if the wiring space has excess capacity to accommodate the
growth.
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OPTION
TABLE I
GROWTH OPT'IONS SUMMARY
ADVANTAGES DISADVANTAGES LIMITATIONS
o Add/ModiFy
Software
o No added HW cost
o No added weight,
volume, power demands
o No HW configuration
changes
o Limited by CPU/memory
capabilities
o SW development cost Factors
increase significantly as
resource limits are approached
o Extensive reverification and
configuration control required
o Resource
Margin
o No HW/SW change until
resource limits reached
o Probably lowest life
cycle cost
o Difficult to predict design
point
o High initial cost investment
o Added initial weight, volume,
power
o Promotes technology
obsolescence
o 'Technology
Insertion
o Improved performance
per weight/volume/
power
o Little impact on
existing SW if appro-
priate standards adopted
o Take advantage of tech-
nology not available at
IOC
o HW cost for space qualifi-
cation
o May be limited by other HW
components (i.e., bus band-
width, etc.)
o Resource
Addition
o High potential for
enhanced resource
capability
o Little impact on
existing SW except For
operating system
o Promotes autonomous
development, integration,
test and operation
o Limited by interconnection
bandwidth
o HW cost for space qualifica-
cation
o Added weight, power
o Network interaction
uncertainties
o Network
Addition
o Little impact on
existing networks and
software
o Significant capability
enhancement
o Can be developed and
operated autonomously
o May be limited by "bridge"
or "gateway" capability to
other networks
o Added cost, weight, volume,
power is significant
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2.2.5.1 PAYLOAD/SSDS INTERFACE OPTIONS
l.O INTRODUCTION
The purpose of this paper is to present options associated with the
Payload/SSDS interface.
Certainly some portion, if not all of the interface, would connect to one or
more Local Area Networks (LAN). It is assumed that each device will interface
with one or more LANs through a standardized Network Interface Unit (NIU).
The NIU's may differ in design from the type of devices that are connected to
the LAN; NIU's would thus differ for payloads as opposed, to say, printers and
other devices. Although payload interfaces will be standardized, there may be
different types of interfaces due to variation of payload parameters such as
data rate, required ancillary data, on board computer usage, data storage
requirements, etc.. This variation suggests the existence of a second device
referred to as the Customer Interface Unit (CIU), between the NIU and the
payload. This CIU would likely be a part of the SSDS as opposed to being a
unique customer design. The options described herein apply to devices such as
a CIU or an NIU.
2.0 OPTIONS
Options are divided into technology, design, and programmatic areas. A
summary of the options is included in a Table at the end of this section.
2.1 Technology Options
Technology options include intelligent Interface devices. Interface
Intelligence can range from passivity to a high degree of intelligent
declslon-maklng which interacts with other SSDS elements such as the Data
Management System (DMS). Two examples of intelligent declslon-maklng options
are:
_CE_iNG F_GE BLANK N_T"
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ao Output control as, for example, data rate based on link bandwidth
capacity, LAN overcapaclty, etc..
b. Intelligent fault diagnosis.
Output rates from the payload may be controlled at its Interface with the SSDS
In order to accommodate resource avallabtllty and allocations such as link and
LAN bandwldths. This may requlre bufferlng In the payload and/or control of
the payload observation Inltlatton. In elther case, this Interface
communicates with the payload and operates In at least one of two manners:
1) to allow payload output to be Ignored tf It cannot be accepted by the SSDS
or 2) to permit the payload to provtde tts own storage and playback at an
average rate conslstent wlth Its duty cycle as the output passes through the
Interface.
The Goddard Space Fllght Center (GSFC) Customer Requirements document
stipulates a requirement that the payload Interface support the customer by
providing some level of fault dtagnosls tn the event of payload failure. The
degree of fault dlagnosts support provlded by the Interface (NIU or CIU) can
be Implemented through a vartety of techniques. For example, on 1ndlcat10n
of failure the Interface could tnltlate a pre-establlshed set of stgnals to
the payload and transfer return signals dtrectly to the customer, who could
Interpret these return slgnals and Inlttate appropriate corrective actlon.
The Interface devlce could also contaln a programmable microprocessor that
would tntttate stgnals that were programmed by the customer with the returning
stgnals again passed to the customer or Interpreted by the Interface device.
The means of detecting failures also represent a set of options. For example,
the Interface devlce could maintain a contlnuous monitoring stgnal directly to
the payload, for which the absence of an echo would tndlcate a fatlure.
Alternatively, the Interface device could monitor the payload output and
assume a fatlure In the absence of thls output.
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2.2 Design Options
2.2.1 Command Management Support and Automated Command Verification
It is reasonable to assume that verlflcatlon of all commands transferred to a
payload would occur at the last step tn the SSDS data flow, i.e., at the
payload/SSOS interface. There are a variety of options for performing thls
command verlflcatlon. Options Include sequence counting and recognition of
specific commands. Customers who desire privacy may prefer that their command
activity not be acknowledged In the clear. This suggests that the interface
/
has programmable verification under customer control. The varied customer mix
further suggests that the interface command verification might be programmable
and, therefore, capable of being changed for specific customer requirements.
Command verification could be extended to include a variety of options
associated with command management. For example, the interface could be
designed to provide an inhibit function for restricted and constrained
commands. Given this inhibit, the interface could communicate with the DMS
(or any other Space Station subsystems) prtor to transferring these inhibited
commands. This communications could consist of evaluating the current Space
Station status tn order to determine whether the execution of a constrained
command was acceptable. Likewise, restricted commands could be verified for
execution within the DRS prior to transfer and execution. Thls capability
would be consistent with the desire to perform command validation at the last
point In the command stream.
2.2.2 Data Type Recognltlon and Routing
The payload output may have different rates depending on the data type. For
example, very high data rates, perhaps In excess of 50 Mbps, might be routed
directly to a communication and tracking interface as opposed to the LAN.
Similarly, payload engineering data might be transferred on a different path
prior to transmission. In such cases, the interface could select routing
based on recognition of data type. Further, the interface could be designed
wlth sufficient intelligence to select routing based on the network
conditions. Failed or temporarily degraded paths might be bypassed.
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2.2.3 Packet Construction
The GSFC Customer Requirements state that the payload will construct packets.
Packet construction will vary from payload to payload with such factors as the
use of secondary data (ancillary data) and the length of the packet. Options
associated with the packing of secondary data include l) allowlng the payload
to select preferred data from all possible ancillary data or 2) directing
preselected ancillary data to the payload by selection on the SSDS side of the
interface. In the latter case, this selection could be performed by the CIU
or NIU in coordination with the DMS. Another option would be to allow
variable length packets for any given payload; with this option, it might
become necessary to design the CIU or BIU to contain knowledge of packet
length in order to execute the proper protocol with the LAN. This flexibility
within that part of the packet used to support LAN communications transfer
would allow for LAN technology upgrades or communication system changes
without modifying existing or planned payloads to conform to previous
interface standards.
2.2.4 Crew Interface
The CIU or NIU could be designed to provide status information on payload
conditions to crew members. This status presentation could be standardized
for a different set of crew members. Among the options for providing this
status information are: physical location (on an interface itself or through
query to a remote terminal), packet status operating mode (on, off, standby,
failed, etc.), and current activity (queue status, power condition).
2.3 Programmatic Options
2.3.1 Development Responsibility
Any of several NASA organizations could be responsible for interface
development. Options include: l) development by a single NASA organization
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for all space LAN Interfaces Including payload Interfaces or 2) development by
several organlzattons of the NIU and the possible CIU. As the operation of
the payload Interface w111 be closely associated wtth the transfer of payload
data on the ground and to the customer, there are also optlons assoclated wlth
development coordlnatlon between space LAN Interfaces, ground LAN Interfaces,
and SSDS Interfaces to the ground customer. Consequently, there are
organizational decisions tn the development of these devices which transfer
payload data tn space or on the ground.
2.3.2 Interfacing Testing Responsibility
The payload Interface will require testing In the development stage and prlor
to operation. Agatn, opttons extst for this testing responslblllty for all
phases of Interface development as well as the different operational phases.
Thts responslbtllty could be centrallzed wlthln a stngle organlzatton or
distributed among several organizations as discussed tn the preceding sectlon.
2.3.3 Payload Certlflcatton
Opttons for certification of a payload for fltght readiness Include either
certlftcatlon at a central factllty (such as a simulation factllty), or, given
a long dtstance coninunlcatlons capabtllty, certification at any of the number
of remote sttes lncludlng the customer factlltles.
The extent of slmulatlon required to achieve certlflcatlon also presents a
variety of options. Certification may be achieved with a single test or a
series of tests that coincide with the payload buildup schedule. The test(s)
coulo De extremely stringent Including, for example, verification of all
command sequences Including evaluation of potential threats to the SSDS
Imposed by payload operatlons.
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Option Type
Technology
SUMMARY OF PAYLOAD/SSDS INTERFACE OPTIONS
Area Options Presented
Intelligent Interface
Devices
Control payload output based
on SSDS resource availability.
l) Control Payload Output Either ignore payload output or
buffer it.
2) Fault Diagnosis l) Pre-established signal levels
2) Microprocessor control
3) Continuous signal
4) Monitor output level
Design Command Management/
Command Verification
Data Type Recognition
and Routing
Packet Construction
Standardized Crew Interface
for Status Information
I) Sequence Counting
2) Command Recognition
3) Customer Controlled
Verification
4) Inhibit Constrained and
Restricted Commands
l) Breadth of Data Types and
Rates
2) Network Conditions
l) Ancillary Data Usage/Control
2) Packet Length
3) Upgrades Support
I) Physical location
2) Packet Status Operating Mode
3) Current Activity
Programmatic Interface Development
Interface Testing
Payload Certification
l) Single vs multiple NASA
organizations
2) Space LAN/ground LAN/ and
customer interface
I) Development Stage
2) Operations Stage
3) Centrallzed/Distrlbuted
I) Simulation Control Facility
2) Remote Sites
3) Extent of Certification
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2.2.5.2 DELETED
237
2.2.5.3 Mai'l.-.Machine Interface (Workstations)
The costs associated with supporting human life in space are very
high, and therefore it is vitally important to get the maximum
benefit from this human resource. To achieve this goal, the
man/machine interface must incorporate several diverse
state-of-the-art technologies into a single, coherent, effective
system.
The MMI design must consider techniques for workstation automat:i.on,
r'econfigurable display and control systems, caution and warnings, and
workstation configuration.
The Space Station RFP (C-4-2.2.5.3) calls for Multipurpose
Application Consoles (MPAC) to be a common design functioning as a
man/machine interface to the network operating system. The MPAC
shall provide command and control, monitoring, operations, and
training capabilities. Other required features include visibi].ity
into all subsystems, simultaneous viewing of displays, crew override
for subsystem operations, annunciation of failures consistent with
caution and warning philosophy, and portable capabilities to support
both EVA and IVA operations.
2.2,5.3.1 Workstation Automation
2.2.5.3.1.i DescriAt!£D
The amount of workstation automation provided in the space
station must be considered in conjunction with the role of the
crew in the operation, maintenance, and use of the stati.on.
These considerations _ill of course be driven by available
technology and the basic operational philosophy of the space
station. Rapid developments in microprocessor technology and
their applications have increased to the point where it is
possible to automate the majority of crew workst;atJ.on
funct:[ons. There are many quest:i.ons to be answered when
considering whether total system safety and performance is
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always enhanced by allocating workstation functions to automatic
devices rather than human operators. The question today is not
whether a function can be automated, but whether it should be,
due to various human factors issues.
Crew workstation automation will directly dictate the role of
the space station crew. The two options available involving
workstation automation and the space station crew are: will the
space station crew operate in a highly automated environment _:_nd
assume the role of system manager or will the environment be
less automated, dictating the role of the crew as operators.
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2.2.5.3.1.2 O_tion Characterization
a) OPERATOR PERFORMANCE CHARACTERISTICS SYSTEM MANAGER PERFORMANCE CHARACTERISTICS
1. Extended periods of valuable crew I,
time are consumed as system
operators.
Allows for reduced crew workload and
additional time for maximizing mission
productivity.
2. As operators, crew awareness 2.
tends to be focused on
workstation.
Failure detection must be designed
carefully to increase crew awareness.
3. Automatic redundancy provisions 3.
are not required.
Appropriate fai].-safe automatic
redundancy provisions must be
provided.
4. Manual takeover problems not a
major concern.
4. Design of manual takeover of system
must not be complex.
5. Crew job satisfaction, and 5.
prestige are not threatened.
Care must be taken not to impair
crew job satisfaction, se].f-con .....
concept and prestige.
6, Automation induced failures are 6.
of little concern.
Complex verification procedures
must be incorporated to eliminate
automation induced failures.
7. Crew error rate higher, resulting 7. Crew errors are reduced, thereby
in lower safety factor, enhancing system safety.
8. Extensive memorization and use
of cue cards required.
8. Reduces crews needed for memorization
and use of cue cards,
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a) OPERAIOR PERFORMANCE CHARACTERISTICS SYSTEM MANAGER PERFORMANCE CHARACTERISTICS
9. Lower overall performance levels, 9. Higher overall performance levels.
i0. Maintainability of manual skill
levels.
10, Possible loss or degradation of manual
skill levels.
11, Integrity of input data
discernable by operator.
Ii. Integrity of input data must be high.
12. Relatively straight forward 12
software and hardware
deve 1opment.
Extremely complex software and
hardware development.
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b) OPERATOR PROGRAMMATIC CHARACTERISTICS SYSTEM MANAGER PROGRAMMATIC CHARACTERISTICS
i. Cost will be moderate for operator
concept and manual workstation.
1. High cost will be associated with
the system manager concept and
workstation automation.
2. Manual workstations have been
developed and used; development
schedules will reflect same.
2. Automated workstations will be a
relatively new technology and
schedule constraints must reflect
same.
3. Technology is available and is
in a mature state.
3. Technology is available, although
more applications work on automated
systems needs to be done.
4. System evolution will consist
mainly of refining operating
procedures.
4. System will evolve from technology
advances such as artificial
intelligence.
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c) RISK ASSESSMENT
I, Option #1- Operator
This is a level 7 technology readiness level; Engineering model
tested in Space. Skylab and space shuttle are operator type systems,
, Option #2 - System Manager
This is a level 3 technology readiness level; Conceptual design
tested analytically or experimentally. Automated commercialairline
cockpit workstations have been developed and are currently used
experimentally.
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2.2.5.3.1.3 Projected Capabilities
a) Option #i - Operator
1987 - Operator technology is mature. Skylab, space
shuttle, and commercial airline cockpits are
operator type systems.
1995 - Operator technology will be mature with respect to
space station operation.
2000 - Strides in advanced operator technology with
respect to the space station will be made.
Operating procedures will be optimized and refined
to thesmallest detail.
b) Option #2 - System Manager
1987 - System manager technology will be formulated with
respect to the space station. Automated procedures
will be incorporated at the basic technology level.
1995 - System manager technology will be advanced through
growth and evolution by more automation being
incorporated into the crew workstations. Expert
systems will begin to emerge in system control.
2000 - Automation technology will have advanced to a star
wars type sophistication. Technologies such as
voice control and artificial intelligence will be
incorporated as an integral part of system
operation.
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c) Key Drivers
The key driver to the operator option will be experience
gained on the space station and experiments performed on
ground in crew workstation mockups,
Initially. key drivers to the system manager technology may
well be the area of commercial cockpit technology. Many of
the areas in commercial airlines cockpit operation will be
applicable to space station control. In order to reach the
sophistication desired for future space station operation,
technology areas such as voice recognition and artificial
intelligence must be advanced greatly.
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2.2.5,3.1.4 References
, Human Factors of Flight-Deck Automation - NASA/Industry
Workshop, Deborah A. Boehm-Davis, Renwick E. Curry,
Earl L. Wiener and R. Leon Harrison, January 1981.
2. Karl Chase, Staff Engineer, Sperry Flight Systems
247
2.2.5.3.2 Multifunction Display
2.2.5.3.2.1 Description
Man wants to see and hear as much as he can of the things that
concern him, and he becomes anxious when deprived of adequate
information about what is going on about him. Consequently, he
should be provided a11 information relevant to his job. A11
information need not be displayed all the time, but when
desired, he should be able to call up a subsystem situation
display which contains all system parameters and trends. For
the space station and its immense amount of sophisticated data,
the crew members will require an intelligent method to integrate
and absorb information. The multifunction display appears to be
the prime consideration for solving this problem.
There are two basic kinds of display: symbolic and pictorial.
In symbolic displays, the information presented has no pictorial
resemblence to the conditions represented. Pictorial displays
do have a pictorial, geometrical or schematic resemblence to the
things they represent. The question arises whether including
color in a multifunction visual display will help maximize
workload reduction, performance and safety. The two options to
be discussed here are the use of monochrome or full color
multifunction displays for the space station crew workstation.
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2.2.5.3.2.2 Option characterization
a) MONOCHROME PERFORMANCE CHARACTERISTICS COLOR PERFORMANCE CHARACTERISTICS
1. Information enhancement limited to
format manipulation only.
1. Color offers potential benefits by
providing an additional dimension
for color encoding high density
information,
2. Clutter can result from improper
format design.
2. Excessive use of color can interfere
with interpretation of displayed
information,
3. Human factors well established
for monochrome displays.
3. Need to develop a color human
factors data base from human
performance testing.
4. Monochrome performance degradation
slight in high ambient lighting.
4. Color performance degrades in high
ambient lighting.
5. Regulations well established for
monochrome displays.
5. Lack of regulations exist for
color displays.
6. Monochrome CRTs have higher
efficiency than color CRTs.
6. Color tubes have lower efficiency
than monochrome CRTs.
7. Monochrome CRTs have high resolution
capability.
7. Resolution on color tubes limited
both geometrically and
electronically.
8. Monochrome CRTs are highly reliable. 8. Color CRTs are less reliable then
monochrome CRTs.
g. Flat panel technology has developed
workable monochrome displays,
9. Flat panel technology does not
have a useable full color display as
yet.
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b) MONOCHROME CRT PROGRAMMATIC CHARACTERISTICS COLOR CRT PROGRAMMATIC CHARACTERISTICS
I. Cost is low for monochrome displays. 1. High cost is associated with
quality color displays.
2. Monochrome displays require only format
development and design. Scheduling
will not be constrained.
2. Color displays require format
development and design plus color
coded information and human
factors analysis. Scheduling will
be moderately extended.
3. Technology is available and in a mature
state. Flat panel monochrome displays
are rapidly becoming available.
3. Technology is mature for CRTs but
may not be available in flat panel
for the initial operating
configuration of the space station.
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C) RISK RSSESSMENT
I. Option #I - Monochrome
This is a level 6 technology readiness leuel; Prototype/Engineering
Model tested in relevant environment. The space shuttle has a
monochrome (IBM MCDS) multi?unction display system in use.
2. Option #2 - Color
This is a level 4 technology readiness level; Critical ?unction/
characteristic demonstration. Commercial airlines currently use full
color CRTs in their ?light management systems.
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2,2.5.3.2.3 Projected Capabilities
a) Option #1 - Monochrome
1987 - Monochrome technology is mature. Space shuttle
uses monochrome CRT. Flat panel monochrome display
technology has progressed to a point where
incorporation into the space station is feasible.
1995 - Monochrome flat panel technology has progressed to
the point where they can be definitely incorporated
into the space station. Monochrome formats for the
space station will be refined to their optimum.
2000 - No significant change from 1995 has taken place
except more efficient and "better" monochrome flat
panel technology will have been developed,
b) Option #2 - Color
lgB7 - Flat Panel Color CRT technology is not mature
enough to use on the initial operating
configuration of the space station. Human factors
with respect to color technology is becoming mature.
1995 - Full color flat panel technology is mature enough
to use on the space station. Human factors with
respect to color has been refined and in use,
2000 - The use of color in the space station multifunction
displays will be highly refined, The human factors
aspect will be well defined from experience gained
on the space station and simulator studies.
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c) Key Drivers
The key drivers to monochrome multifunction displays will
be the development oF ?lat panel technology.
The key drivers to color multifunction displays will be the
development o? ?lat panel technology and the human ?actors
data base ?or color use.
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2.2.5.3.2.4 References
I. "Color CRT Display for the Cockpit", Harry L. Waruszewski
2. Karl Chase, Staff Engineer, Sperry Flight Systems.
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2.2.5.3.3 Caution/Warning Techniques
2.2.5.3.3.1 Description
The space station advisory, caution, and warning system design
must incorporate the basic operational philosophy of the space
station as well as the conceptualized role of its crew members.
Processing will involve determining other-than-normal conditions
of the entire core space station systems.
Alerts must be prioritized in two forms. First the alerts must
be grouped into the critical categories of warning, caution, and
advisory alerts. Secondly, the alerts must be ranked in order
of importance so that when several alerts are activated
simultaneously the more urgent alerts suppress the less urgent
alerts. In order to prepare the crew for a problem before it
reaches a critical level, automatic trend analysis must also be
performed by the advisory, caution, and warning system.
In order to avoid crew member saturation and/or confusion, the
overabundance of caution, warning and advisory alerts must be
avoided. It is suggested that both visual and aural message.
outputs be incorporated into the system.
Two options exist when considering an advisory, caution, and
warning system design. The system may be a distributed type
system or a single integrated system.
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2.2.5.3,3.2 Option Characterization
a) DISTRIBUTED ADVISORY, CAUTION, AND
WARNING SYSTEM PERFORMANCE
CHARACTERISTICS
INTEGRATED ADVISORY, CAUTION, AND
WARNING SYSTEM PERFORMANCE
CHARACTERISTICS
1. Has tendency to proliferate work-
station with alerts.
i. Alerts are more easily consolidated.
2. Difficult task to correlate alert-
type applications and significance.
2. Central processor software can easily
correlate alert-types and their
significance.
3. Almost impossible to categorize
and prioritize alerts.
3. Central processor software improves
ability to categorize and prioritize
alerts.
4. Inhibiting alerts not directly
controllable.
4. Non-critical alerts may be inhibited
during a period of high workload.
5. Relatively straight-forward hardware
development.
5. More complex hardware development.
6. Relatively straight-forward software
development and integration.
6. Extremely complex software development
and integration.
7. Lower overall crew member performance
level due to proliferation and
non-categorization of alerts.
7. Higher overall crew member performance
level.
8. Correlation of alert and system
checklists not straight-forward.
8. Facilitates correlation of alert and
system checklists needed for checkout.
9. Alerts can be added on a modular
basis.
9. Integratedsystem hardware/software
must be modified to add, delete, or
alter alerts.
256
b) DISTRIBUTED ADVISORY, CAUTION, AND
WARNING SYSTEM PROGRAMMATIC
CHARACTERISTICS
INTEGRATED ADVISORY, CAUTION, AND
WARNING SYSTEM PROGRAMMATIC
CHARACTERISTICS
I. Cost will be moderately high for
distributed system due to hardware
and processing redundancy.
I. Although hardware may be reduced For
the integrated system, software and
systems development will create a
high cost.
2. Distributed advisory, caution, and
warning systems are not complex and
should not create schedule
constraints.
2. An integrated advisory, caution, and
warning system will require large
amounts of system and software
development time thereby increasing
schedule development time.
3. Technology is available and in
a mature state.
3. Technology is available, although much
applications, systems integration,
and software work will need to be
done.
4. System evolution will consist of
modular additions and alterations.
4. System evolution will consist of
expanding and revising integrated
system.
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C) RISK ASSESSMENT
i. Option #1 - Distributed Advisory, Caution, and Warning Systems.
This is a level 6 technology readiness level; Prototype/Engineering
Model Test in relevant environment. Skylab and space shuttle have
distributed caution and warning systems.
2. Option #2 - Integrated Advisory, Caution, and Warning Systems.
"This is a level 2 technology readiness level; conceptual design
formulated. Basic designs have been formulated for the commercial
airline industry although they have not been implemented and tested
in cockpit mockups as yet,
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2,2,5.3.3.3 Projected Capabilities
a, Option #1 - Distributed advisory, caution, and warning
system.
b.
1987 - Distributed advisory, caution, and warning systems
technology is mature. Skylab and Space Shuttle are
the basis ?or space station design decisions.
1995 - Distributed advisory, caution, and warning system
will have matured with respect to the space station
operational philosophy and crew members role.
System procedures and anamolies have been
satisfactorily been resolved.
2000 - Additional modular advisory, caution, and warning
systems will be added to enhance growth and
evolution. Existing systems will be refined based
on space station and ground simulator experience.
Option #2 - Integrated advisory, caution, and warning
system.
1987 - Integrated advisory, caution, and warning system
technology will be formulated with respect to the
space station. Basic technology will be ready to
incorporate into the space station fulfilling its
basic requirements.
1995 - Integrated advisory, caution, and warning
technology will have advanced significantly through
experience gained on the space station and on
ground simulation.
2000 - Technology will be advanced and refined to the
smallest detail. The system will have been
modified and expanded considerably.
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c) Key Drivers
Initially, the key drivers to the integrated advisory,
caution, and warning systems will be from the area of
future commercial cockpit experimentation. Experience will
also be gained onboard the space station and from future
crew workstation mockups. The main area of importance will
be in the area of caution and warning systems software and
applications.
The key drivers to the distributed advisory, caution, and
warning system will be the technology formulated by the
commercial airline industry and results obtained in the
Space Shuttle and Skylab. Voice synthesis will need to be
developed for these systems.
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2.2.5.3.3.4 References
Design Criteria for Aircraft Warning, Caution, and Advisory
Alerting Systems, J. E. Vietengruber, 1977.
2. Karl Chase, Staff Engineer, Sperry Flight Systems
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2.2,5.3.4 Workstation Configuration
2.2.5.3.4.1 Description
Although conventional cockpit technology has served us well in
the past, the advent of the space station has increased the
complexity and sophistication o? the information that will be
needed to properly control, operate and maintain this vehicle.
New approaches are needed to achieve higher levels of safety,
efficiency, and performance required for earth orbital control
and long term sustentation. Dramatic technological improvements
are creating the potential For vast improvements in spacecraft
crew workstations.
Because of the need for new and more sophisticated information
in the crew workstation, the space station crew members will
require an intelligent method to integrate and absorb
information. /he efficient use of central computation and
integrated multi-mode electronic displays is appropriate.
The first decision concerning the space station workstations
will be that of configuration. Two options exist for the space
station crew workstations, these are: a centralized crew
workstation, or distributed crew workstations through the space
station.
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2.2.5.3.4.2 Option Characterization
a) CENTRALIZED CREW WORKSTATION
PERFORMANCE CHARACTERISTICS
DISTRIBUTED CREW WORKSTATION
PERFORMANCE CHARACTERISTICS
1. Centralized work crew members to
populate one module to use work
station.
i. Distributed work crew members to
perform duties at different work
stations in different modules.
2. All display functions must be
incorporated into a centralized
display set.
2. Display functions may be split among
distributed crew station displays,
3. All cabling will interconnect to
centralized crew workstation,
3. Extra cables and interconnects must
be used to distribute information
to the distributed crew work.
4. The weight of a centralized crew
workstation will be less than the
sum total weight of the distributed
systems.
4. The sum weight total of the
distributed systems will exceed
that of one centralized system.
5. Centralized workstation will have a
high data rate.
5, Distributed workstation will reduce
data rate.
6. Computational power must be higher
for centralized workstation.
6. Computational power is lower for
distributed workstation.
7. Development of centralized
workstation complex.
7. Development of distributed
workstation not as complex as
centralized workstation.
B. Growth and evolution requires
modification of entire centralized
workstation.
8. Growth and evaluation may be done
piecemeal through additions of more
distributed workstation.
9. Controlling software extremely complex.
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g. Controlling software moderately
complex.
b) CENTRALIZEDCREW WORKSTATION
PROGRAMMATIC CHARACTERISTICS
i. Cost for centralized workstation
should moderately exceed that of a
distributed crew workstation. Mainly
due to complex hardware and software
development cost.
DISTRIBUTED CREW WORKSTATION
PROGRAMMATIC CHARACTERISTICS
1. Cost for a distributed workstation
should not exceed that of a
centralized workstation.
2. Schedule constraints for a centralized
workstation will moderately exceed
that of a distributed crew workstation.
This is again due to the complex
hardware, software, and integration.
2. Development scheduling for a
distributed workstation should not
exceed that of a centralized
workstation. But distributed
information processing department,
and development of different
configurations is needed for each
distributed station.
3. Technology for a centralized crew
station is currently being refined.
Mainly this is being done for
commercial airline cockpits.
3. Technology for distributed crew work
station has not been an area of
high priority.
4. System evolution will consist of
of modifications, deletions, and
additions to centralized processor.
4. System evolution and growth will
be enhanced by modular additions
of work stations as an evolutionary
process.
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C) RISK QSSESSMENT
i. Option #I - Centralized Crew Workstations
This is a level 4 technology readiness level; critical function/
characteristic demonstration. Centralized cockpits for commercial
airlines have been developed and demonstrated. Much of the work done
in human factors and ergonomics will be applicable to the space
station crew workstation.
2. Option #2 - Distributed Crew Workstations
This is a level I technology readiness level; bas'ic principles
observed and reported. Low priority has been given by industry to
the distributed workstation concept. 'The space station will be the
first area of applicability.
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2.2.5.3.4.3 Projected Capabilities
a) Option #i - Centralized Workstation
1987 - The centralized crew workstation concept will be
conceptually designed and analytically tested.
Much human factor data is gathered from commercial
airline cockpit design and experimentation has
begun in those area where commercial cockpit design
is not applicable.
1995 - A centralized crew workstation is operational in
the space station. The centralized workstation is
continually being experimentally tested onboard the
space station and in on ground simulators.
2000 - Centralized crew workstation human factors data
base is well refined, and incorporates
sophisticated automation.
b) Option #2 - Distributed Workstation
1987 - The distributed workstation concept has begun its
conceptual design. Much work is yet to be done in
the areas of information networking, human factors
and task partitioning.
1995 - A distributed crew workstation is operational in
the space station. Human factors data base is
being expanded through on board experiments and
ground simulation.
2000 - Distributed crew workstation data base is well
established. New distributed workstations have
been installed in module additions.
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c) Key Drivers
Initially, the key drivers for the centralized crew station
will be the humanfactors data base and technology gained
from the future commercial airline cockpit mockups and
simulations. In future years, on board space station
experience and ground simulator experience will provide the
majority of data needed to drive the centralized crew
station concepts. Artificial intelligence, voice
recognition-systems, and flat panel displays are the main
technology drivers.
The key drivers to the distributed crew station concept
will be the same as described for the centralized crew
station since the distributed system will be subsets of
centralized concept. An additional driving technology for
distributed crew stations will be in?ormation networking.
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2.2.5.q DELETED
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SPACE STATION DATA SYSTEM (SSDS)
SECURITY/PRIVACY OPTIONS
2.3 DATA SYSTEM SECURITY/PRIVACY (The procedures and controls
needed to protect and to limit access to the data system).
OVERVIEW COMMENTS: The Space Station Data System (SSDS) will
perform many vital functions and support many diverse users.
requirements discussed in this paper are:
Key
-i) A failsafe and secure SSDS to assure the health and
safety of the Space Station (SS) crew and of the Station itself.
Assured communications between the Station and the ground and
access to required data and apparatus control via the Data System
will be needed, especially in times of emergency.
2) The diverse security/privacy requirements for customer
data and commanding which will be needed to attract a broad
spectrum of Space Station users.
The primary requirement discussed in the NASA Goddard Space
Flight Center (GSFC) Customer Requirements for Standard Services
from the Space Station Information System (SSIS) document
(Reference l) is to implement data privacy. Data privacy implies
control of access to customer data (and related operations), but
no complete security guarantee. Customers desiring data and
information security must assume this responsibility, including
the responsibility for data or command encrypting and
decrypting. The SSDS will, however, support and be compatible
with customer encryption and decryption equipment.''Three broad
categories of data system security/privacy are discussed -
The first deals with SSDS access authorization (or denial). The
second deals with data and user authentication, i.e., assurance
that the data sender is who he says he is and that the data has
not been modified before receipt by the user. The third deals
with possible denial of service, i.e., assuring reliable and
available data system services when required.
Most data systems deal primarily with the first of these
categories. The last category, service availability and
integrity, is typically the least implemented aspect of data
system security. This paper focuses on the first category (data
and data system access restrictions and authorizations), but
authentication concerns and the assurance (or denial) of data
system services are also addressed.
Section 2.3.3 (operating system security) and Section 2.3.5 (data
encryption techniques) present specific information on
established techniques and systems. Since many data system
PT ECED QFA( E gOT
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security/privacy options are dependent on policy or programmatic
decisions, other sections are more discursive. These sections
allude to the types of security/privacy decisions which need to
be made, or present optional policies which need to be determined
before specific SSDS design decisions can be made. In many areas
it is premature to evaluate specific system design options until
higher level policy decisions have been made.
Within this context, the most relevant options are presented for
assuring l) data privacy, 2) the necessary SSDS security for crew
and Station safety, and 3) data system integrity.
References are listed at the end of the paper.
2.3.1 DATA PRIVACY APPLICABILITY POLICIES
2.3.1.1 Data Types
2.3.1.1.1 Description. Different categories of data (and
associated users) require differing levels or focuses of
privacy/security. Among the categories are: l)
scientific/technical data; 2) commercial proprietary data; 3)
ancillary/engineering data; 4) foreign user data; 5) scheduling
data; 6) command and control data; and 7) potential (post IOC?)
national security data. National security requirements will not
be discussed, since the military has not yet expressed formal
interest in use of the Space Station. It is important to design a
system compatible with and upgradeable to possible future
military requirements, however.
I) The scientific/technical Space Station user often will have
the least need for high levels of security/privacy.
First, much scientific data is not readily useable by others.
Often significant algorithmic data processing is required,
wherein many particulars of the experimental apparatus and
conditions, as well as detailed knowledge of the science, are
needed. This implies that few other scientists could even use
the data. Furthermore, the computational expense required to
digest and meaningfully extract information from the data is
often significant and not readily available.
Second, some Space Station experiments involve data rates of
hundreds of megabits/second. The data system will be
sufficiently taxed to simply capture, preprocess, minimally
archive, and distribute this amount of data, without implementing
encryption and decryption as well.
Finally, many scientists are unfamiliar with implementing
encryption protection. Since their data is generated for
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eventual distribution within the public domain, there is little
desire or precedent for data encryption. Data privacy and
supporting policies to permit the Principal Investigator to
analyze results first are necessary, however.
2) Commercial users will, however, require sufficient
privacy/security to assure themselves that no potential
competitor can obtain their data. The commercial user will
impose high demands on the SSDS with respect to
privacy/security. The SSDS design must meet their needs if the
Space Station program is to attract them.
The commercial user can provide ultimate data protection by
encryption (see Section 2.3.5). A primary design requirement
(Reference I, 5.4.4) of the SSDS is to provide standard
interface(s) to customer provided encryption equipment. Many
commercial customers may not want to implement their own
encryption, however, if they have adequate assurances of a
reasonable level of privacy protection within the SSDS.
3) Data privacy protection of the supporting Space Station
ancillary/engineering data may be more troublesome. Commercial
customers will often want data privacy with respect to their use
of SSDS core and standard user resources (power, computational
resources, vacuum facilities, heating sources, etc.) since
potentially useful information about their investigations might
be inferred from this type of data. Information may even be
inferred From the time sequence with which the various Space
Station resources were utilized. Other Space Station users,
however, may legitimately need to know the environmental
conditions within the Station at the time particular aspects of
their experiments are being or were performed. Furthermore,
there will be a tendency to want to make standard resource
utilization records generally available to all Space Station
users. Optional procedures to address the problem of
ancillary/engineering data dissemination are addressed in the
next subsection.
4) A potential area of concern regarding data privacy/security
are the requirements of foreign users. The Space Station program
has made a priority of soliciting foreign involvement and
commitment. Firm commitments with foreign governments are being
negotiated. The privacy requirements of foreign users are not
addressed in this paper. It has been assumed that they have no
more stringent requirements than that imposed by the U.S.
commercial customer desiring protection of his proprietary data
and his accompanying operations.
5) The protection of scheduling data is important both for
customer privacy and for Space Station system safety. The issues
here are closely related to those for commanding, since schedule
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data will eventually be translated into command data for system
resources, etc.
6) Command and control validation and authentication present
different areas of concern. The desire to implement transparency
of customer commanding can seriously conflict with the need for
Station safety. This issue is addressed in Section 2.3.5.
2.3.1.1.2 Option Characterization. Options to assure adequate
SSDS operational security and data privacy are the focus of the
rest of this paper. One option discussed here is privacy related
to ancillary/engineering data distribution.
One approach is to require selected subsets of the
ancillary/engineering data to be restricted to ali but authorized
users. This approach may prove unacceptable because of the
difficulties of determining whom should be authorized and for
what data subsets; it is also difficult to assure that authorized
users will secure the data they have so obtained. Decisions as
to which ancillary data might be restricted (not generally needed
by other Space Station users) are difficult.
An alternative approach is to inform commercial and other users
sufficiently in advance that ancillary/engineering data sets will
not be restricted. They can then choose to design their
apparatus to conceal the usage (or timeline of usage) of
particularly sensitive resources. For example, a commercial user
requiring large surges of power periodically can disguise his
experiment to request moderate power usage over a longer period
of time and store this energy (in capacitor banks, etc.) to
produce the needed power surges. The power request timeline can
be concealed in a similar manner. An accurate power request log
could thus be maintained by the SSDS and disseminated freely to
all users. Similarly, TDRSS downlink data can be filled to
always be at a 300 MBPS/sec rate. Not only might this help
conceal actual data generation characteristics,but may reduce
system reconfiguration procedures required for changing downlink
rates.
Personnel within the Space Station program, however, may still
need to know what the commercial customer is doing if, for
example, his power surges generate sufficient electromagnetic
disturbances to affect other users. Similarly, if stray
electromagnetic field measurements are provided as part of the
generally available ancillary data, then a customer has the
option to provide shielding to hide his operational use of
power. If a policy on what ancillary data (if not a11) will be
generally available is provided sufficiently in advance, the
commercial customer can usually adapt his experimental apparatus
or techniques to provide a high level of operational privacy.
This option may be more implementable as a general policy than an
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attempt to restrict access to subsets of ancillary data.
2.3.1.2 Data Rate Considerations.
2.3.1.2.1 Description. Space Station system users will generate
a wide range of data rates. High data rate users (above 10 Mbps
rate) will have different needs and constraints than moderate or
low data rate users. This suggests advantages for two or more
logically separate downlinks.
2.3.1.2.2 Option Characterization. The amount of data generated
may affect the types of privacy/security options available. User
data rates of lOOMbps, for example, may not be easily encrypted
without significant data compression.
One policy alternative is for the SSDS to provide an optional
standard encryption service. Some users may not want to provide
their own equipment, but would utilize its availability (at
modest cost), and the higher level of data access privacy which
encryption would support. The user can provide higher protection
himself since the security of the SSDS encryption/decryption
key(s) would presumably be less than that which an individual
user could implement. An optional SSDS encryption service might
be highly desirable for users generating minimal amounts of data,
and for whom security requirements are moderate. Encryption
techniques and options are presented in Section 2.3.5.
2.3.1.3 Network Location.
2.3.1.3.1 Description. There will be different data and command
privacy needs onboard versus on the ground, and among different
nodes in the SSDS network. Alternative policies of coordinating
the overall privacy/security requirements of the network versus
at each node are related to the decision whether to institute an
end-to-end security policy or have individual implementations at
different nodes within the network.
With encryption an end-to-end security/privacy implementation is
usually adequate since any intercepted data is meaningless at an
intermediate point (if it is encrypted at the source and
decrypted at the destination). Intermediate checks on the
maintenance of data integrity (no unauthorized modification,
etc.) need to be implemented at intermediate nodes even in this
case, however.
2.3.1.3.2 Option Characterization. Key options onboard, on the
ground, and among network nodes (or end-to-end) are delineated
below:
Onboard: Onboard customers or crew will have been preselected
and screened carefully with respect to integrity and
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perceptiveness to the need for data system privacy and security.
There is little likelihood of stowaways or infiltrators among
this group. There is always a possibility of one customer
attempting to listen to another customer's private conversations,
however.
The primary threats to onboard system security and privacy will
likely be within the command and communications system and/or due
to careless errors or subsystem Failures onboard. The options
For dealing with careless errors or component Failures involve
designing a ?ailproo? system with high system integrity and
redundancy. The options addressing these design issues are
discussed in Sections 2.3.3, 2.3.4, and 2.3.6.. The options For
safeguarding the communications links are discussed in Section
2.3.1.4 and 2.3.6.3.
Audio and video interception is another area of privacy/security
concern. Audio and video data will likely be digitized,
compressed, and multiplexed with other SSDS data. Techniques and
options to deal with the protection are not addressed in this
paper'.
Ground: In addition to the above onboard security/privacy
issues, threats from a wider spectrum of people - commercial
competitors, saboteurs, Foreign agents, hackers, etc. arise on
the ground. A wider spectrum of users may also concurrently
address the SSDS For data or services From ground nodes. A
higher level of system physical, operational, and privacy
protection therefore may need to be implemented within the ground
support system.
Erroneous and dangerous commands generated by saboteurs or
pranksters are much more likely to be initiated within the ground
network. Likewise, commercial competitors are more likely to
attempt to gain private information by attempting to Foil the
ground data network or the communications links. Another area of
concern is the prevention of data duplication (hardcopy, tapes,
etc.) on the ground. Options addressing some of these issues are
presented in the sections listed above for onboard, plus Sections
2.3.2.3, and 2.3.7.
Node versus End-to-End: A successful end-to-end security policy
requires system users to understand and have confidence in the
policy and its implementation. A user at an intermediate node
may not trust the security of procedures for data entering or
leaving his node. An optional implementation of system security
can be to assign this responsibility to personnel or subsystems
at each node. The advantage of this is a Feeling of greater data
handling security due to local control. Whether enhanced
security can be obtained with local control needs to be assessed
within the SSDS environment. End-to-end security/privacy
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implementation has the advantage of relieving intermediate users
of this responsibility, except for the particulars of how they
handle and safeguard data at their respective nodes.
Assurance that no interruption or data eavesdropping has occurred
during internode communications still remains a problem, unless
data is encrypted. Users concerned to this degree with overall
system security will need to provide their own encryption and
decryption equipment or processors. A high level of data system
security will not be guaranteed by NASA; data privacy and data
integrity will be preserved to the extent feasible and
practicable within the SSDS.
2.3.1.4 Communication Link Privacv Options
2.3.1.4.1 Description. Data and commands can be intercepted or
interfered with during transmission between different network
nodes. This topic encompasses the three basic security areas -
unauthorized access to the data (copying, eavesdropping, etc.),
unauthorized data modification, and potential denial of service
(interference with the communications process).
Discussion of these problem areas and optional approaches to
dealing with them are presented below:
2.3.1.4.2 Option Characterization.
Unauthorized Access: It is usually not feasible to prevent
interception of the airborne electromagnetic transmissions.
data content can be concealed via encryption, however.
The
For hardware or data bus transmissions, electromagnetic shielding
and/or monitoring of physical taps into the media can minimize
privacy breaches. Onboard data subsystems, in particular, may
want to incorporate this protection. Assuming TDRSS interception
can not be prevented, such shielding may not be as critical on
the ground, except subsequent to data decryption at a ground node
and transmission to other nodes.
Potential onboard tapping into data buses or hardwire connections
can be screened during prelaunch checkouts and by selectivity and
training of the onboard crew and mission specialists. The use of
optical data buses can also eliminate the potential information
loss due to physical tapping into the transmission medium.
Further investigation is needed to evaluate the relevance to the
Space Station program of the recent (September, 1984)
Presidential Directive Number 145 and its implications regarding
data encryption for protection of Space Station program
information. One SSDS option may be to preferentially encrypt
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only low or moderate data rate downlink data. The encryption
might then be performed either as a standard service (at optional
cost) or by the customer.
Unauthorized Modification: Data tampering or destruction may be
particularly serious if commands were modified and/or
inadvertently executed, with resultant damage to a payload or
jeopardy to crew safety. Similarly if a valid emergency command
procedure were destroyed.
Encryption should minimize data modification possibilities;
encrypted data can be modified, although the result will normally
be garbage. The recipient, after receiving and evaluating the
distorted message, can request retransmission. Procedures and
protocols to assure adequate and authenticated retransmission
therefore need to be formulated and integrated into the SSDS
design.
Denial of Service: The disruption of data transmission links can
occur periodically due to natural phenomena (intense electrical
storms, apparatus failures, etc.)
Four options dealing with interruption of communication link
availability or adequacy are:
1) emergency (or standard) alternative communication paths;
2) emergency substitute procedures to replace the service
temporarily disrupted;
3) sufficient onboard data buffering to cover the period of
disrupted service; or
4) acceptance of a temporary loss of data or service.
The key issue is to evaluate which crucial services or data are
likely to be impacted by a failure of TDRSS or other
communications links. Risk assessment of both the likelihood of
disruption of service and the likely service downtime need to be
performed. Reference 3 (pg. 1.2, paragraphs 1.3, 1.5) states
that a detailed risk assessment will be performed for use by the
Phase B Space Station contractors. A recent contract has been
awarded by Kennedy Space Flight Center to perfrom an indepth risk
and threat assessment for the Space Station program.
An important option is the implementation of alternative
communications routes and paths for all crucial SSDS services.
Customers likewise need to develop contingency plans for
temporary loss of communications with their payloads. Backup
stored onboard command sequences, perhaps leading to automatic
shutdown of their payload, are needed in the event that
"realtime" commanding from the ground becomes significantly
disrupted. Techniques for detecting communications disruption
also need to be refined.
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2.3.1.5 Summary of Options/Issues
Section Option/Issue Focus
Scope of Options/Issues
Addressed and to be Addressed
2.3
Overview
2.3,1
to
2.3.1,2
Categories of Security/
Privacy
Applicability of Privacy
to Data Types
Data Rate Privacy
Considerations
Data and Data System Access Denial
Data and Sender Authentication
Denial of Service
Scientific: probably
stringent requirements
Commercial: probably most
stringent requirements. Data
Encryption is customer option.
Encryption may be worthwhile
optional SSDS standard service.
Ancillary/Engineering:
Options: 1) restrict access of
selected subsets to certain
users; 2) no access restrictions
inform users sufficiently in
advance that they can mask usage
of critical resources.
Foreign: Not yet specified.
Probably no more stringent than
commercial.
Military: Not addressed. Design
SSDS to be compatible
upgrades to military-level
security.
High (above I0 MBps)
Moderate and Low (below 10 MBps)
High: Encryption may not be
feasible. Password protection
applicable.
Low/Moderate: Encryption feasible
May not be desired if SSDS
sufficiently private, Optional
SSDS encryption service may be
useful,
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2.3.1.3 Onboard Versus Ground
2.3.1.4
data
Network Location Privacy
Considerations
Communications Link
Privacy Options
End-to-End Security/Privacy Policy
vs. Intermediate Node
Implementation
Onboard: probably fewer security
threats due to selectivity of
crew
Ground: Broader spectrum of
possible security violators
End-to-End: simplifies security/
privacy control
Intermediate Nodes: May enhance
feeling of privacy
implementation due to local
control.
Encryption would minimize
communications eavesdropping
concerns.
Airborne transmissions: 1)conceal
data via encrytion
2) specialized receivers
Hardwire transmissions: i) EM
shielding
2) onboard crew selectivity
Presidential mandate regarding
encryption of downlink
needs study.
Denial of Service: 1) emergency
communication paths;
2) emergency procedures;
3) data buffering; and
4)-temporary loss of service
Risk assessments need to be
performed. Backup stored
command sequences an option.
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2.3.2 Data Systems Access Controls
This section discusses four categories of options to limit access to the
Space Station Data System. The first option is the use of passwords. The
second category are options to prevent modification of system data. The
third set of options are checks on 1) the physical device; 2) the facility
from which commands are issued; and 3) the personnel themselves. The
final option category deals with the selection and monitoring of data
system personnel.
2.3.2.1 Password Options
2.3.2.1.1 Description. Many types of passwords or codes can be used to
limit computer system access. Their purpose is to permit only authorized
persons access to the computer system, its data, or its services. The
computer system maintains an internal, protected directory of these
passwords. The system checks the passwords before authorizing access to
various services or data.
2.3.2.1.2 Option Characterization. Different types of passwords can be
implemented. For low security systems, passwords are usually simple and
easy to remember, such as the user's name, date of birth etc.. Although
easy to remember, they are also easy to guess by someone attempting to
break the system's security. More complicated passwords (numerical
sequences, sentences, etc.) are harder to guess, but are often written
down, thereby reducing their protection. A query system can also be
implemented, whereby a user has to answer particular questions about
himself. Password protection is a key concern when it represents the
primary security mechanism.
One option is the breadth and scope of password applicability. In
addition to requiring passwords for logging onto the system and accessing
services, passwords can subsequently restrict access to particular data
files. An additional control is to limit the number of system logon
attempts. People randomly guessing passwords will be automatically
rejected after a set number of logon attempts. A security officer should
be notified in this case.
Another option is whether the passwords at the onboard and ground SSDS
nodes will be the same or different. Greater password commonality results
in easier use, but reduced security. One can implement common passwords
For logon but distinct passwords for data file access.
The regularity of password updates is an important option. As SSDS
personnel and security requirements change, this regularity may be
affected. One option is to allow each user to change his passwords in
addition to periodic system-wide changes.
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An additional level of password protection can be achieved by encryption
of the passwords themselves. This might permit the user to control his
own passwords. The use of data encryption to enhance system security is
discussed further in Section 2.3.5.
2.3.2.2 Data
2.3.2.2.1 Description. In addition to general system access controls, the
SSDS needs to limit access to the data itself. Most computer systems
require some access limitation in reading and/or writing data. There are
usually different security or access levels to different data sets. In
addition to user data and programs, the computer system utility functions
need to be protected, i.e., a person invoking an editor program is not
able to modify its contents. Protections against a "Trojan Horse," where
an editor-type program actually performs secret data modifications or
access, also need to be implemented.
The Bell-LaPadula Security Model, discussed in Section 2.3.3, allows read
access only to objects at the same or lower security levels. One cannot
read a file classified at a higher security level. The so called star
property (Wproperty) of this model restricts write accessibility to lower
security levels. This prevents a higher security user from transferring
unauthorized information to a lower level. The operating system normally
verifies the required access controls and data transfer authorizations.
2.3.2.2.2 Option Cateqorization. Rmong the options are which users
require only write access protection versus those who require read access
restrictions as well. The password protection techniques may depend on
specific user requirements, and on the amount, type, and location of user
data. The ease of SSDS access needs to be traded off against security
requirements.
2.3.2.3 Device/Personnel Controls
2.3.2.3.1 Device Type Check Upon Logon
2.3.2.3.1.1 Description. Besides passwords, the system can check that a
"logon" is being entered on proper equipment. This can be valuable where
many network devices, some at remote locations, have accessibility to the
data system. The system can check that the particular hardware
characteristics of the logon device meet certain specifications.
2.3.2.3.2 Device/Physical Facility Checks
2.3.2.3.2.1 Description. In addition to the physical device, the system
can check the physical facility from which the logon
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attempt has been made. A signal or message can be sent back (callback) to
the device at the particular physical facility to verify its attempted
access. Most secure physical facilities also require personal magnetic
strip access cards, in conjunction with the requirement to key in a
personal identification number (PIN) I
Security procedures can also be implemented to prevent user departure from
a restricted location in the physical facility until all devices have been
signed off. Restrictions on which time periods during the day access is
authorized, can also be imposed.
2.3.2.3.3 Personnel Authentication Bevond Passwords
2.3.2.3.3.1 Description. In addition to physical device and facility
authentication, the system may check particular personnel characteristics.
2.3.2.3.3.2 Option Cateqorization. Four means by which personnel may be
differentiated and authenticated are fingerprint (or handprint)
discrimination, handwriting, voice, and video analysis.
Fingermatrix, Inc. (White Plains, NY) markets a biometric handprint
device. Reliability is good, although hand cuts have caused occasional
problems. Handwriting pattern analysis, rather than simply signature
verification, holds promise as an effective security measure. Voice
analysis relies upon each individual's speech. The unique digital
signature of characteristic patterns of voice overtones can be
authenticated with similar signatures already prerecorded within the
computer system. Similarly, a video picture of the person attempting to
access the system can be obtained and compared to previous video scan
information about the individual.
Although fingerprint and handwriting analyses are well developed and exist
within data systems today, voice and video discrimination are still
emerging fields. Voice discrimination, however, is likely to be
sufficiently developed for IOC SSDS consideration. Additional research is
needed in correlating speech signatures obtained at different occasions.
There must be assurance that the individual speaking is correct while
maintaining flexibility that variations in speech on different days (for
example, when one has a cold) will still be acceptable. Discrimination
between actual voice and secretly recorded vocal messages is also
necessary.
Computerized video discrimination is still being developed but promises to
provide a definitive authentication of the individual.
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2.3.2.3.4 Data Systems Staff Selection/Monitorinq Procedures
2.3.2.3,4,1 Description. Additional security can be obtained by careful
selection of and by periodic monitoring of the data system staff
Two-man policies, whereby no one individual has complete knowledge of
security measures can also prove useful.
2.3.2.3.4.2 Option Cateqorization. Periodic staff monitoring should
include systems programmers, operators, systems analysts, etc., as well as
selected Space Station users. The assigning of security and privacy as an
important priority within the Space Station program and the monitoring of
adherence to this policy should reduce security breakdowns.
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Section OptionlIssue Focus
Scope of Options/Issues
Addressed and to be Addressed
2.3.2.2
2.3.2.3
Data System Access Controls
Password Options
Data Acess Restrictions
Device/Personnel Controls
Simple: Person's name
Complicated: Sentences, etc.
Query System
Issues: Password control
Breadth of applicability
Commonality among SSDS
nodes
Update procedures
Password encryption
Read vs. write access
Differentiated security levels
Ease of access vs. security
tradeoff
Specific equipment check
Callback verification
Personal badges, ID numbers
Turn off equipment before leaving
Authorized time periods
Finger/hand prints
Handwriting analysis
Voice/video identification
Staff selection/training/
monitoring
Two-man concept
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2.3.3 OPERATING SYSTEM ACCESS RESTRICTIONS
2.3.3.1 Security Model Options
2.3.3.1.1 Description. Perhaps the key, SSDS security related design issue
is the degree of integrity and reliability of the operating system(s),
especially if data and command communications among processors of
different vendors are involved. Significant progress has been made in
recent years in developing secure communications processors.
Many commercial systems are being developed to protect client data with
high reliability and integrity. The Department of Defense is also
actively supporting research in this area. It is anticipated that
enhanced security and data protection mechanisms will continue to be
implemented in new vendor hardware and associated operating systems.
A helpful reference for establishing criteria for system security has been
published recently by the National Security Agency (NSA) within the
Department of Defense, entitled "Department of Defense Trusted Computer
System Evaluation Criteria", Computer Security Center (Fort Meade,
Maryland 20755), 15 August, 19B3, CSC-STD-OO1-B3. Although military-level
security is not presently required within the Space Station program, this
document defines a useful framework for discussing and evaluating a broad
range of security options. It provides a useful context for assessing
operating system security measures in particular.
In this NSA document various classes and subclasses of protection are
defined. The major classes are Minimal Protection (D), Discretionary
Protection (subclasses CI, C2), Mandatory Protection (subclasses B1, B2,
B3), and Verified Protection (subclasses A1, and beyond-At). The
differentiation in security protection among the four major subsets is
much larger than that within the subclasses.
This document specifies trusted computer system criteria in terms of 1)
security policy, 2) accountability, 3) system assurance (both operational
and life-cycle), and 4) documentation. Each security class or subclass
encompasses the criteria established for the next lower class or subclass,
plus adds additional requirements to be satisfied.
Recently, the U.S. Air Force has established requirements for a class B2
level of interactive workstation for Use at the NSTS Control Center at the
3ohnson Space Flight Center. NASA has also presented an assumption that
"the computer assets used onboard the SS and at ground support locations
will meet the class A1 requirements" (as defined in the NSA manual - see
Reference 3). These recent decisions imply that the NSA requirements are
an accepted NASA baseline for security definition.
Issues and options related to operating system security design are
presented below.
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2.S.3.1.2 Option Characterization. The primary issue is what overall
system security policy will be implemented. Specifically,
I) What security, privacy, and subsystem integrity policy will be
established at each node in the network? Options include the diversity or
similarity of security policy among $SDS nodes, as well as the extent of
implementation at each node. Will a standard A1 level of security be
required throughout, or only onboard, etc.?
2) For what types of data and users? Options here include having
different security policies ?or scientific versus commercial or command
data. In particular, the high data rate scientific users may not require
any encryption.
3) How extensively will the adequacy of security policy be verified?
This may depend on the options selected for question I above. If an Al
level o? security is imposed throughout the SS system, verification
procedures and assurances will be well specified.
4) How will updates to the vendor and SSDS operating system(s) be
managed? Options for configuration control of system updates, either by
SSDS personnel or according to vendor specifications, need to be
formulated. Differences in update procedures for onboard versus ground
also need to be evaluated and determined.
5) Will the NSA set of criteria or a different set become the SSDS
security/privacy benchmark? Although the recent NASA Kennedy Space Center
SS Security Requirements Plan (Reference 3) implies an affirmative
response to this question, such requirements might be modified for
subsystems or particular data types if warranted.
Whatever the security criteria, the levels of security required at each
network node, for each system database, and for the internode
communications links need to be determined. The NSA manual focuses on
individual processor security, especially of the operating system;
specific criteria dealing with the communications media are not explicit.
Security Models: A widely established security model is the Bell-LaPadula
model. In this model read access is allowed only to objects of a lower or
equal security level; write access is determined by the W-property (star
property), i.e., write access is allowed only to objects of greater or equal
security level.
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This model implies the implementation of a hierarchical set of security
access levels. In obtaining services from different levels of the
operating system, users will have varying restrictions imposed upon them.
The breadth of the SSDS hierarchy of access levels among the different
applications users also needs to be determined.
Different access levels to different parts of the operating system will be
needed to allow systems programmers to modify system software and to
permit various utility functions to be invoked. These users, however,
must be restricted from modifying the secure kernel o? the operating
system or from utilizing it to gain access to protected system or user
data. This implies a layered operating system design. Nhether existing
commercial operating systems can provide this protection and meet other
SSDS requirements, or whether the SSDS will need a specially modified
operating system is an important SSDS design decision.
Important areas to monitor are the breadth of security implementation in
vendor microprocessor and minicomputer systems, and the compatibility
among their security policies, especially i? different vendor systems are
candidates For SSDS networking. Possible performance degradation due to
excessive security-related checking andmonitoring will need to be assessed.
2.3.3.2 Secure Operating System Design Features.
2.3.3.2.1 Description. Three primary concepts related to operating system
security design are i) the security monitor concept; 2) kernel control;
and 3) trusted entities. Examples of existing secure communications and
operating systems are presented. Optional decision areas with respect to
the SSDS need to be investigated.
2.3.3,2.2 Option Characterization.
Examples of commercially available secure computer systems are recent
Honeywell processors. The Honeywell Multics system has been available
since 1982 and is rated as level B2 according to NSR criteria. This
system has eight rings within the operating system and as a standard
procedure employs encrypted passwords. The system only grants user access
on a need-to-know basis and has specific mechanisms to prevent Trojan
Horse or trap door types of security breaches. Many of the security
mechanisms are implemented within system hardware, thereby reducing the
opportunities for software modifications.
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Recently, Honeywell and the Department of Defense have upgraded the
multics processor to Level AI. This new Secure Communications Processor
(SCOMP) is described in Reference 5. Additional A1 level projects
currently under development include:
KVM/370, being developed by SDC
KSOS, by FACC and Logicon
Sacdin, by ITT and IM.BM
COS/NFE by Compion (DTI)
Gemini Computer Trusted Multiple Microcomputer
Base (Level 133 design)
PSOS, by FACC and Honeywell
RAP Guard, by CSC and Sytek
2.3.3.3 Privac V of Operating System Data.
2.3,3.3.1 Description. Access control to and protection of the operating
system (and its data) are basic to any computer security policy. In this
subsection additional options with respect to the privacy of operating
system data are explored. Included are accounting data (delineates the
scope of user resource utilizations), various performance data (often
contain information about the operations environment and user impacts upon
it), and system data on passwords, scheduling algorithms, etc. Access
control to data interchanged between the SSDS and the Technical Management
and Information System (TMIS) will need to be formulated as requirements
for TMIS become better defined.
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2.3.4 DATA BASE INTEGRITY/PRIVACY
2.3.4.1 Description. SSDS core and user data bases must be protected.
The core data bases will contain information about available Space Station
System resources and schedules; user access and priority codes to these
resources; evaluation criteria to determine the validity and safety of
user and System commands; etc. Each user data base, in addition to
possible proprietary data, may contain data files for which access is
required by the SSDS.
Maintaining the integrity of the SSDS data base(s) while allowing ongoing
updates as experiments progress will be necessary. Data base update control
will depend on the degree of data base centralization and on the breadth of
processes (or users) for whom modification access is authorized.
2.3.4.2 Option Characterization. Important SSDS data base design options
are:
1) the extent to which data base(s) are centralized or distributed.
Centralization may facilitate security implementation, but with a
likely tradeoff of reduced data accessibility;
2) the control paths and procedures available for accessing and modifying
the data base(s).
A single secure access and data control path should likewise facilitate
security, but may reduce data accessibility;
3) the breadth of processes (or users) authorized to perform data base
updates.
Multiple authorized software processes (and associated users)
complicate security implementation.
A distributed data base may have multiple physical access channels within
a multi-processor system. A centralized data base will usually have a
unique access path. A single core data base for critical services and
data with one secure physical and logical access path would facilitate
security/privacy implementation and support data base integrity.
Options in three areas - 1) data base file protection, 2) statistical
inference controls, and 3) data base backup methodologies will be
addressed within the above contexts.
Data Base File Protection: Among the optional areas for evaluation are:
291
1) What hierarchical set of passwords and for which portions of a
distributed (functionally or physically) data base are needed?
2) Which users can access which subsets of functions, services, or data?
3) Should physically separate data bases (or portions thereof) be
implemented to facilitate security/privacy?
Some data may have a natural allocation between space and ground. Other
data, such as commands, probably require centralized verification and
restricted accessibility to provide an adequate level of integrity and
security/privacy.
4) Which SSDS functions and services will be distributed and sometimes
duplicated within different nodes7
5) What degree of operating system security (as defined by NSA) will be
implemented at each SSDS node7
These decisions and the breadth of encryption utilization within the SSDS
will depend on
i) the degree of perceived threats to the SSDS (a Space Station System
threat assessment is in process (See reference 3));
2) the functional allocation decisions resulting from other tradeoff
studies;
3) the available vendor DBMS software support; and
4) the types of hardware/software subsystems eventually proposed within
the SSDS.
Security/privacy concerns and impacts on and by these decisions will
therefore require a stepwise and iterative approach.
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2.3.5 DATA ENCRYPTION TECHNIqUES/POLICIES
2.3.5,1 Scope of Applicability/Survey of Techniques
2.3.5.1.1 Description. Data encryption is a technique of concealing the
information content of a set of digital data by transforming it into a new
set by means of a precisely defined computational algorithm. The efficacy
of the resultant encryption security is based on the practical
impossibility, from a computational standpoint, of reversing the process
(called decryption) in a practical amount of time without knowledge of the
decryption "key". The encryption algorithm may utilize pairs or sets of
large prime numbers in performing a predetermined set of computational
steps. The reverse or decryption process requires knowledge of the prime
number keys and the algorithmic steps. Often the algorithm is not kept
secret; the security rests on the computational difficulty of deciphering
or guessing the "key" prime number components. The encryption process
renders the data set unintelligible to anyone not knowing the decryption
key. The ultimate efficacy of the encryption process usually rests on the
safeguarding of the algorithmic "keys".
There are two types of encryption algorithms commonly used. The first
uses the same "key" for encryption and decryption. This is referred to as
a private key encryption algorithm, since the "key" must be kept secret
throughout the process. The protection of keys and the dissemination of
information about key changes can be difficult to secure.
The second algorithm type uses different keys for encryption and
decryption. Only one of the keys in this case needs to be protected.
This approach has two advantages -
1) messages using a public encryption key can be transmitted that only the
receiver can interpret with his private decryption key; and
2) the authenticity of the sender can be verified since he can encrypt his
signature with a message using a private key, but any receiver can
decipher his signature using a public decryption key.
By this process, the sender's signature can be guaranteed (and he can be
held accountable for his data transmission), since everyone can verify his
accuracy using the public decryption key.
2.3.5.1.2 Option Characterization. The leading private key encryption
process is the Data Encryption Standard (DES) formulated by the National
Bureau of Standards (NBS) in 1977 (see Reference 6). The DES technique
uses a well documented algorithm and a 64 bit binary key (56 bits are used
by the algorithm and 8 bits for error detection). With 70 quadrillion
permutations of the 56 bits, deciphering the message using trial and error
techniques is tedious.
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The most widely disseminated public-key encryption method is that proposed
in 197B by Rivest, Shamir, and Adleman (the RSA technique) of M.I.T. The
authors of this technique claim that "the efficacy of their decryption may
be faster since multiprecision arithmetic operations are simpler to
implement than complicated bit manipulations." The DES scheme is probably
faster, however, if specialized hardware chips are used.
The Knapsack Approach:
Alternative public key encryption schemes based onthe "knapsack" approach
have been recently shown to be easily decipherable. The knapsack
cryptosystems are based on the difficulty of deciphering the sets of
integers used to add up to a given large integer. At the Crypto 'B4
meeting last summer in Santa Barbara, California, Ernest Brickell of
Sandia Laboratories presented results negating the security provided by
"iterated knapsacks."
Rmong the quotes relevant to encryption that were made at Crypto 'B4 were:
"I think the breaking of iterated knapsacks is quite surprising and
indicates a degree of insecurity that had not been suspected at all"
(Ralph Merkle, of ELXSI)
"You have to be extremely cautious when claiming that a cryptosystem is
strong. The history of cryptography is essentially a history of
failures. Lots of cryptosystems,, proved to be insecure, sometimes with
disastrous results." (Adi Shamir, Weizmann Institute)
"The most intriguing question is whether you can develop proof techniques
that will show the security of cryptosystems. If you could do this, it
would be the biggest breakthrough in cryptography because at last you
would be able to show that concrete cryptosystems just will not be broken
in the future unless there is a certain amount of time." (A. Shamir)
The above illustrate that most encryption algorithms are not failsafe, but
their security rests on the inability of anyone to decipher them to date
within a reasonable amount of time.
Bulk Encryption Devices:
Bulk encryption devices, many utilizing specialized hardware microchips,
are now available which can meet the needs of most Space Station users.
Many devices exist commercially that can encrypt in the MBPS range; these
devices utilize microchips which can keep up with data rates in this range
at no additional system overhead. Devices with capabilities in the lO0
MBPS range are coming into existence.
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Encryption, besides applications for highly proprietary commercial data
(and potential national security data), may be most applicable to
operating system (OS) protections and secure commanding.
With respect to OS protections, encryption can be applied to limit access
to command processes and critical system data, protect passwords and/or
data file names, conceal resource scheduling algorithms and data, etc.
With respect to secure commanding, restricted and constrained uplink
commands to the Space Station (or another SSPE) will require checking to
insure that they do not jeopardize the System safety or health. A dual
key encryption approach may be especially valuable if both the
authenticity of the sender and the integrity of the command content can be
simultaneously protected. Command acknowledgements (encrypted if
necessary), in addition to sender-receiver authentications, provide
additional security assurance before implementing restricted (or
constrained) commands.
Restricted commands will normally be evaluated and so categorized well
before any mission. Their security might be enhanced if they wer_ tightly
bound to the operating system, with its secure kernel maintaining the
privacy of the keys. Encryption might simplify necessary command checking
since it could provide a higher level of assurance that the command is
legitimate and accurate. The availability of rapid encryption/decryption
subsystems combined with highly secure keys could facilitate the desire
for both near real-time commands and commanding 'transparency.'
Although the present NASA perspective, as reflected in the GSFC Customer
Requirements document, is to give the responsibility for encrypting data
to the user, this philosophy may need reevaluation with respect to
restricted command handling. The tradeoffs between commanding
transparency versus command validation need to be resolved
satisfactorily. Space Station system safety must be assured while the
user maintains flexibility and commanding transparency.
The efficiency of the DES and RSA encryption algorithms, with respect to
security assurance, appears adequate at present. Attempts to foil these
protective schemes needs constant monitoring, however. More efficient
computational algorithms, and/or faster encryption microchips (e.g., NSA
developments) require continued investigation with respect to their
applicability to the ultra-high data rate experiments proposed.
The DES encryption technique appears easily implementable within the SSDS
based on current technology. One option is whether to incorporate DES as
the standard SSDS encryption technique, or have it as one of many. The
scope of applicability of encryption needs to be decided. This decision
will be impacted by
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I) general NASA policies;
2) risk analyses of the envisioned SSDS threats;
3) the evaluated security of vendor operating systems being considered; and
4) continued analyses of commercial and foreign proprietary concerns as
they evolve.
2.3.5.2 Options for Interfacinq Customer Encryption Equipment
2.3.5.2.1 Description. The "SSIS/SCS shall provide a standard interface
to customer supplied encryption and decryption equipment." (Reference 1,
5.4.4). The acceptance of an encryption standard, e.g. DES, within the
SSDS, might support this goal. The question to be resolved is whether a
single standard, such as DES, is judged to be adequate to satisfy the
necessary security requirements of the Space Station Program. If the SSDS
were to provide an optional encryption service, the selection of a single
standard such as DES might be desirable. One factor in evaluating the
adequacy of DES (or any other standard) is that for highly critical
procedures or data, double DES encryption could be performed. If the 56
DES bit field were judged inadequate protection, double encryption using
two distinct keys would likely be adequate.
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2.3.6 Physical Securitv Design Options. SSDS physical security involves
protection of the hardware, software, and internode communication links.
Adequate alarm notification is also needed whenever a security violation
is detected.
2.3.6.1 Hardware
2.3.6.1.1 Description. Four areas relevant to hardware protection are:
1) sabotage prevention; 2) reliability/fault tolerance; 3) power failures;
and 4) the spares management policy.
2.3.6.1.2 Option Characterization.
Sabotaqe: Unfortunately, sabotage is an ever present threat in modern
life. Rs stated in Reference 3, "In the design of computer access
controls, each user of the computer assets and the information data base
must consider all other users hostile" (Rssumption 3.3.3). Hopefully, the
personnel authentication options presented in section 2.3.2.3, as well as
other system checks, will minimize sabotage. Sabotage on a broad scale,
i.'e., bomb threats, is probably beyond the scope of the Space Station Data
System (or Space Station Program) to address fully. Personnel screening
and strict adherence to security policy will be necessary.
Reliability/Fault Tolerance: The SSDS must be a reliable and fault
tolerant system. Subsystem reliability/maintainability/availability
(R/M/R) is a key criterion in the computer subsystem selection.
Important SSDS options involve the 1) reliability and 2)
interchangeability of the system components within and amongst network
nodes. Critical onboard and ground systems will require backups, at least
functionally. Rt IOC, many functions will be performed on the ground
which will eventually migrate to particular Space Station elements.
Insofar as possible, compatibility and interchangeability among backup
hardware components amongst the different nodes are desirable. The
greater the compatibility and backup redundancy, the better the overall
system reliability and security. Rdditional emphasis on these topics is
discussed in other areas of the SSDS Options list.
Power Failures: Power failures, especially onboard, can threaten the
health and safety of the crew, onboard specialists, and/or critical
missions. Communications could be interrupted by power failures.
Rlternate power systems will be an integral part of the Space Station
element designs. The SSDS will also need access to these alternative
power sources in the case of failure. Some systems (UNIVAC mainframes,
etc.) have rotating flywheels to maintain power in case of a failure.
Qualified flight processors of this type may not be suitable, however, for
onboard consideration. Rlthough alternate power sources are not a primary
responsibility of the SSDS designers, the SSDS needs to be compatible with
the alternative power sources implemented elsewhere within the Space
Station program.
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Maintenance/Spares Manaqement: In addition to backups and alternate power
assurance, periodic online maintenance/monitoring of SSDS subsystems will
be necessary. Important options are: 1) the scope of the periodic
maintenance and 2) the types of indicators for needed maintenance. With
what regularity will periodic maintenance be implemented and for which
subsystems? Who will be responsible for interpreting malfunctions and
what alternative remedies will be provided? Will vendor supplied
maintenance diagnostics be adequate7 Many of these issues cannot be
answered until subsystem design decisions are made, but the importance of
maintenance and monitoring need to be emphasized.
An intelligent management policy for SSDS spare parts is necessary. Since
Shuttle flights to replenish onboard components will be weeks apart,
system components crucial to the Station health and safety either must be
provided in sufficient quantity onboard or alternative subsystems must
assume such critical operations. Backup components may prove impractical
for particularly heavy components such as power transformers, magnetic
tape units, etc. More limited backup systems (in the event of failure)
with reduced capability but providing basic functioning are options to be
considered.
The spares management policy must utilize effective configuration
management whereby up-to-date inventories of spare parts are available via
interactive (terminal) access to crew and ground personnel. Alternative
designs of the SSDS configuration management functions need to be
evaluated.
2.3.6.2 Software
2.3.6.2.1 Description Protection of SSDS software against either sabotage
or accidental harm is another important security issue.
2.3.6.2.2 Option Characterization. Options related to the security of
the operating system have been described in Section 2.3.3. Utility
programs and important core and user standard software services also need
regular backups.
All software backup and modification procedures need to be verified,
maintained, and proven effective against destruction. Crucial ancillary
or engineering data likewise need to be backed up. Options defining the
scope and mechanisms for protecting and updating software and the data
within the SSDS are addressed in other areas of the Options List.
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2.3.6.3 Communications Links
2.3.6.3.1 Description. An additional discussion of the availability and
performance of the SSDS communication links, addressed briefly in Section
2.3.1.4, is presented next.
2.3.6.3.2 Qption Cateqorization. protecting the security of the
communication links will require coordination between the Space Station
program and other institutional facilities within which the SSDS
operates. For example, the TDRSS network is a shared facility. Security
constraints desired by the Space Station program will need to be
coordinated with the representatives responsible for maintaining this
network. Similarly, the SSDS design must take into account that assuring
TDRSS network performance and providing its maintenance are not Space
Station program responsibilities. Options for coordinating with these
institutional representatives and for assuring adequacy of service need to
be addressed.
In addition to restricting access to the information transmitted among
these links one must also protect against possible data modification or
denial of service, as mentioned in Section 2.3.1.4.
To address possible data modification within the SSDS network, information
communicated between nodes can be encrypted. Some header information,
however, may need to remain in the clear to identify the destination of
the message, its sender, and whether (if a command) it is restricted,
constrained, or unrestricted. Acknowledgements from the receiver back to
the sender will be necessary; the receiver identification can also be
encrypted within the message. As an alternative, information identifying
the command as restricted, constrained, or unrestricted can be duplicated
within an encrypted portion of the command. In this manner the command
accuracy can be checked, but information in the clear can be used to
facilitate its transmission.
In addition to data modification, extraneous data generated from other
sources and simulated to look like actual network data or commands need to
be reliably identified and discarded. Including time generation
information within the encrypted portion of a message can discriminate it
from a retransmission of a copied older message.
The final area discussed deals with communication link availability and
possible denial of service. The health and safety of the Space Station
could be jeopardized if communications are impacted which involve
emergency procedures being transmitted from the ground, for example. One
SSDS design option is to provide alternative pathways for all vital
communications, i.e., an emergency, direct-_round-to-Space-Station
communication link in the event of TDRSS unavailability. Such an
alternative link can have reduced bandwidth if it only handles commands.
Similarly, alternate ground communication pathways are needed for
transmitting critical SSDS data among nodes.
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2.3.6.4 Alarm Responses
2.3.6.4.1 Description. Whenever a maintenance or a security violation
problem is encountered, optional SSD$ alarm responses and procedures are
possible.
2.3.6.4.2 Qption Characterization. One option is the extent of
centralization (physically or functionally) in dealing with alarms and
security problems. Detection of problems will occur throughout the
system; violations affecting Station safety and health, for example, will
need to be communicated to the Space Station Operations Control Center and
to the crew, and perhaps elsewhere.
Under what alarm conditions will there be automatic shut down of
subsystems or Functions, or automatic ?ailover? The scope of checking and
responding to security alarms can be very extensive, or minimal. Besides
health and safety related violations, to what extent should SSDS
security/privacy violations be noted? Should the SSDS automatically
respond to these situations or should it simply send a message to an
operations control center operator or to a crew member? The degree of
automated response could be limited to disseminating information about the
problem, and follow up actions could be manual. Operator evaluation of
alarms might reduce the need for large automated systems with significant
software development costs to address problems which may infrequently or
never occur, or which are not dangerous to the Station or crew.
302
Section
2.3.6
2.3.6.1
2.3.6.2
2.3.6.3
2.3.6.4
Option/Issue Focus
Physical Security Design
Hardware
Software
Communication Links
Alarm Responses
Scope of Options/Issues
Addressed and to be Addressed
I) Sabotage Control
2) Reliability/Fault Tolerance
Issues
Component Interchangeability
Emergency Backups
3) Power Failures
Alternative Systems
Emergency Procedures
4) Spares Management
Exact duplicates vs. alternatives
Configuration Management
Backup Procedures
Update Procedures
Protections
Coordination with Institutional
Facilities
Use of Encryption
Elimination of Extraneous Data
Emergency Procedures
Alternative Communication Links
Centralized vs. Distributed
Automatic shutdown criteria
Breadth of Monitoring
Automatic vs. Manual (Operator)
303
2.3.7 Network Monitorinq Policies. Described herein are techniques to
monitor data system transactions for the purpose of observing unusual
activity. In this manner, attempted breaches of security sometimes can be
discovered. Four areas will be addressed -
i) monitoring the types and number of accesses to the data system and its
associated data bases;
2) monitoring the amount and type of data transmissions across internode
communication links;
3) compiling statistics on CPU utilization; and
4) maintaining transaction logs.
2.3.7.1 Data Base/Data System Accesses
2.3.7.1.1 Description. Monitoring the accesses and the access pattern to
the data system and its data bases can often lead to information about
security breaches. Oftentimes an individual who attempts to gain
unauthorized access may not know the required passwords or procedures. He
may make repeated access attempts and/or use the computer itsei? to cycle
quickly through various passwords or data base file access codes. The
monitoring of access attempts and the alarming of a security officer when a
large number of accesses has occurred is an important security measure.
2.3.7.1.2 Option Characterization. A primary option is the breadth of data
base and system access for which monitoring shall be implemented. The extent
of logging normal accesses to the system and to each data base also needs to
be determined. For accesses which fall within the system security
guidelines, to what extent should data transfers and data modifications be
logged for potential analysis if necessary? The periodicity of reports to
the user of all attempts to access, transfer data from, or modify his data
files are important. For what threshold levels of excessive system access
should security alarms be initiated?
Access checks are normally implemented by means of tightly controlled
software within the operating system. Extensive access checks, however, can
potentially impact the performance and responsiveness of the operating
system.
2.3.7.2 Data Transmission Monitorinq
2.3.7.2.1 Description. Protecting the integrity of the communication links
has already been discussed in Sections 2.3.1.4 and 2.3.6.3. Communication
and transmission path security can be assisted by monitoring of transactions
across and between communication links. In the same manner that accesses to
the data system and data bases can identify questionable activities, remote
system access requires transmission across a communication link. The
monitoring of repeated, excessive transmissions can provide an additional
system alert. In this case the individual or individuals responsible for
multi-node network security must be alerted. The periodicity and types of
transactions monitored and logs reported need to be determined.
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2.3.7.3 CPU Usage.
2.3.7.3.1 Description. The monitoring of excessive CPU usage can also
pinpoint security breaches. For example, if an unauthorized user does gain
access to the system, he may use the computer resources to attempt to
decipher encrypted passwords. This decryption process may require
significant CPU usage. The monitoring and reporting of unusual CPU usage
can alert a security officer to this situation.
2.3.7.3.2 Option Characterization. The extent and regularity to which
excessive CPU usage is flagged and to whom this information is £o be sent
are SSDS design options. The monitoring and reporting of normal (or
slightly above normal) CPU utilization may impose unnecessary operating
system overhead. The limits beyond which excessive CPU usage should be
flagged and the breadth of system processes monitored are additional
options. The availability of vendor supplied monitor and performance
assessment tools may impact the scope of such implementation.
2.3.7.4 Transaction Logs/Archival
2.3.7.4.1 Description. The transaction pattern among different users and
different network nodes, i.e., which user processes and user identifications
communicate, can provide an important record in analyzing security
breaches. The monitoring and recording of all such transactions, however,
is impractical. Immediate alarms should be initiated, however, if illegal
transactions are detected, ie., if data were sent from a higher to a lower
security level, etc.
2.3.7.4.2 Option Characterization. Important options are i) the extent of
transaction logging, 2) the length of time such logs are maintained, and 3)
for whom hard copies should be periodically produced. The need to check for
irregularities in transactions other than those already implemented within
the system security model may be minimal if an A-1 level of system security
is implemented.
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2.4 TIME MANAGEMENT
Time is the most common basis for initiating actions and correlating events in
all aspects of the Space Station, not just in the data system. The SSDS will
have a direct involvement in three major categories: time reference; time
distribution; and time tagging of data. A number of specific problems arise
in each category. Most of these problems have been addressed and solved on
previous NASA programs, while some are introduced or made worse by special
requirements of the Space Station.
2.4.1 Time Reference
Local time sources throughout the SSDS must be related to a primary standard.
The purposes are to provide a common reference time for scheduling future
events, initiating current events, and correlating past events both within the
SSDS and throughout the entire Space Station community. The ground systems in
NASA have proven techniques to reference local time sources to a standard such
as WWV. Since the movement of the Space Station prevents the same ready
access through the onboard system, another reference source must be provided.
2.4.1.1 Onboard Reference Source
2.4,1.1.1 Description
The three options for the onboard time reference are an onboard master timing
unit, the global positioning system, and the onboard computer oscillators.
The need for a time reference during buildup may influence the choice and is
discussed separately.
2.4.1.1.2 Option Characterization
eRE.CEDING PAGE BLANK 601" F|L_ED
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2.4.1.1.2,1 Master Timing Unit
An atomic clock with a low drift rate may be used as the onboard master timing
unit (MTU). This is an established technology with drift rates on the order
of i part per billion over 24 hours, which is B6.4 microseconds per day or 2.6
milliseconds per month (reference 1, section 2.4.1.1.4.). Both the ground and
onboard systems interact with the MTU. The ground has the responsibility to
monitor the magnitude of the MTU offset from a primary source such as WWV, and
to command updates as needed. Any such updates must be only For small amounts
(see 2.4.3.1 for reasons), on the order of 1 to 5 milliseconds. The general
ground procedure to determine the amount of offset is to monitor a very
precise point at which the telemetry system reads time through a direct
connection to the MTU, such as the start of a master frame every 2 seconds.
The delays are known from this point through the MTU, through signal
propagation to the ground station, through early ground recording, and to a
point at which the ground system reads its own time reference. The difference
between the onboard time and the ground time, after allowing For the known
delays, is the offset needed For a time update command to the onboard system.
The same general procedure would be used for the Space Station, although exact
details will depend on the Final equipment. The end result is that an MTU
onboard the Space Station can be used as a time reference with only minimal
ground support for updates about once per week. The technology and techniques
are already established. The unique problem of initializing the MTU is
discussed in section 2.4.1.3.
2,4.1.1.2.2 Global Positioning System
The global positioning system (GPS, reference 2 of section 2.4.1.1.4) is
likely to be the navigation reference For the Space Station. GPS includes a
time source in the receiver onboard the Space Station that provides time
accuracy better than 1 microsecond. The option therefore exists to use GPS
For both the navigation reference and the time reference.
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The GPS provides a time reference that does not depend on NASA ground support,
a desirable Feature for autonomy of the Space Station. The problems of
initialization and correction of clock drift are a GPS responsibility, so that
the NASA can assume a very accurate and driftfree clock.
2.4.1.1.2.3 Computer Oscillator
The local oscillator of a computer can be used as an onboard time reference.
This method is used internal to each computer for control of its own
functions, such as a flight control computation i0 times per second or a once
per second thermocouple sample. In order to prevent all of the computers from
drifting relative to each other, one can be selected as the time reference to
which all other computers equalize their times (see 2.4.2).
This method is not practical for any but emergency situations. The problem is
that the oscillators are crystals, not atomic clocks, and have drift rates
that are unacceptable for long term references. Controlled thermal and
voltage conditions can keep the drift rate below lO parts per million, or
about o.g seconds per day. The ground would need to be very active in
providing frequent small updates to prevent the error from building up to the
extent that an update would noticeably affect the system operation (see
2.4.3.1). Even at an update rate of once per orbit (about 5400 seconds for
low earth orbits) and a drift rate of 1 part per million, the individual
updates would be 5.4 milliseconds each.
This technique is not recommended as the primary onboard reference, but should
be considered as the next-to-last faultdown step from failures of the
preferred sources. The last step is for all computers to use their own local
oscillators without equalizing to a single computer due to a major failure,
causing all computers to drift independently either faster or slower. In
either case, resetting all times to match the reference after repairs is
likely to be a significant perturbation to the routine operation of the
network.
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2.4.1.1.2.4 Buildup
The decision of which onboard time reference source to install must consider
the buildup o? the Space Station. The reference configuration builds the
structure over a series of 7 flights. The earliest flights may not have a GPS
processor and antennas installed, so that option might not be applicable to
the early phases. The alternative may be an MTU on the early flights, with a
later switch to GPS, but this option requires more development effort than
choosing either the GPS or an MTU as the permanent source. The alternative of
using just the internal computer oscillators may also be acceptable. The
resultant time drift will result in attitude errors relative to the desired
local vertical or gravity gradient attitude, and the frequent ground updates
will perturb some functions at the update. However, this time accuracy may be
adequate for later docking.for installation of the GPS or MTU equipment.
2,4.1.1.3 Projected Capabilities
The GPS and MTU reference sources of today are adequate for Space Station in
1987 and beyond.
2.4.1.1.4 References
i) Master Timing Unit, document MC456-0051, by Rockwell International.
2) Global Positioning System, papers published in Navigation, 1980, by The
Institute of Navigation.
2.4.1.2 Ground Reference Source
The ground is expected to use WWV as its time reference to prevent drift of
the ground processing clocks from a standard time. Synchronization techniques
that have been developed and used for NASA centers for other programs should
be transferable to the Space Station program.
2.4.1,3 Initialization
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2.4.1.3.1 Description
Both the time reference source and the computers will require initialization
to the correct time. The details depend somewhat on the onboard reference and
on the state of the onboard reference. The most involved case has an MTU as
the reference source, with neither the MTU nor processors having a valid
time. This situation is normal at first power on of the system, which may
occur before launch into orbit or after arrival on orbit. A GPS reference
source may eliminate the steps which initializes the time reference. If the
computer oscillator is the reference source, then the steps terminate after
the computer is initialized.
2.4.1.3.2 Option Characterization
An MTU update is assumed to be based on an implementation that says "When your
clock reads ABC, the actual time is XYZ." The time ABC is the coincident time,
and the time XYZ is the replacement value to be used. The MTU is also assumed
to accept a reset command which sets the MTU to a predefined value, such as
midnight of January first. The alternative that says "The time right now is
XYZ" is not very satisfactory, since uncertain delays between the computer
issuing the update and the arrival at the MTU would degrade the accuracy of
the initialization. Another satisfactory alternative is an implementation
which tells the MTU to "adjust the current time by amount XYZ" (either forward
or backward), with only minor changes to the general procedure.
When the first computer in the network is turned on, part of the
initialization will read (at least, attempt to read) the MTU. If the MTU is
not accessible or the value fails some tests for reasonableness (e.g., seconds
are from 0 to 5g, hours are from I to 12 or 24) the computer can set its
internal time to some convenient arbitrary time, such as midnight on January
first (time 0 of day I). An operator can then command the computer to
synchronize the MTU time to the computer time, which might be implemented by
resetting the MTU to time O, computing the next coincident time from this
known reset state, and sending the coincident time and related replacement
time to the MTU. The computer and MTU will be synchronized, but not at the
correct time, after the coincident time is reached, and should remain together
through the normal time distribution (see 2.4.2).
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At this point the computer and MTU are together, either from an initial
reasonable reading being accepted from the MTU or from the above procedure.
No further action is required if the time is acceptably accurate, as would
occur for any computer turned on after the MTU was initialized or For a time
source such as GPS which is not initialized by the Space Station.
If there is no MTU or if the MTU must be set to an initial time ( an operator
decision), the operator will command an incremental time update by the error
in the MTU value. The implementation would use the incremental time update
procedure used for operator commands of small updates (a few milliseconds) at
infrequent intervals during normal operations. The computer would determine
the appropriate coincident time and related replacement time value, issue the
command to the MTU, and also adjust its own internal time at the coincident
time to continue to match the MTU. For reasons given in section 2.4.3.1, the
large initial update should also cause the computer to recycle as though the
computer had just been turned on.
Both the computer and MTU are initialized and synchronized at the end of this
procedure. Time distribution (see 2.4.2) will keep the two together, barring
some kind of failure. Later computers will pick up the correct time from the
MTU as they are turned on. If the MTU fails and a replacement has to be
initialized, the "set MTU equal to computer time" command will make the MTU
match the computer, after which the operator can command an incremental time
update to remove any time offset from oscillator drift while the MTU was off.
2.4.1.3.3 Projected Capabilities
Specific details may change during the development of the Space Station, with
options to trade automation versus operator intervention at some places. At
this point in the project, the procedure is well enough understood and proven
on other projects that no further initialization options or trades are needed
for the current architecture study.
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2.4.1.3.4 References
Space Shuttle Program Orbiter Project, Computer Program Development
Specification, Volume 1, Book 7, STS System Level Requirements, Software.
NASA %SC document SS-P-0002-170. Sections 4.6.2.4 and 5.9.2 describe time
management.
2.4.2 Time Distribution
Time distribution is concerned with propagating the time from the reference
source (MTU, GPS, or one of the processors) through the entire network of
processors, devices, and interface devices (IDs). The object is to maintain
an acceptably small offset from the reference at each point. The required
accuracy is 1 millisecond (reference of section 2.4.2.1.4). Time distribution
contributions to this error of less than 100 microseconds should be attainable
with the hardware/software approach described below.
A basic problem is that the reference source is not directly accessible to
every user in the network. The only direct connection is to the ID attached
to the reference source, and possibly to a few special subsystems such as
telemetry to the ground. All other users must access time indirectly, but
without unpredictable delays through the data network and processors. The
general approach to time distribution is to provide many secondary time
reference sources by a three step procedure. First, the ID attached to the
reference source will be equalized to match the reference source. Second,
this ID will transmit its time value to all of the other IDs in its local area
network, including any bridges or gateways to other onboard networks, which
allows these nodes to equalize their times to match the received data. Third,
each device or processor attached to an ID can access time from that ID in
order to equalize the processor's time to the ID. Some degradation is
expected as the time goes through successive levels of remoteness from the
reference source, but the hardware and software option described in the next
three sections should provide excellent time accuracy relative to the time
reference.
2.4.2.1 Reference Source to Its ID
315
2.4.2.1.1 Description
The first step of time distribution is to get time from the reference source
to the attached ID. A basic assumption is that the NIU has some processing
capability and includes a clock o? about one microsecond quantization which
can be both read and written. One procedure is used if the time reference
source has a register which can be accessed directly by the ID (the GPS or an
MTU). Another procedure is required ?or high accuracy if the source is a
computer without direct access to the time register by an ID.
2.4.2.1.2 Option Characterization
If the time reference source is the GPS or an MTU, the ID will be able to give
a "read current time" command to that unit and get an immediate response. The
ID will read its own internal time as closely as possible to the point of this
command. The difference between the value from the ID and the value from the
reference source can be adjusted by any fixed delays, and the result used to
correct the ID internal timer. For safety, a limit test should be used to
protect against failures.
If the time reference source is a computer, this procedure may have an
unacceptable accuracy. The problem is that the command to "read current time"
may have unpredictable and large delays within the computer, notably if the
computer is currently busy with some other task and does not immediately
respond to the command. The command will probably be implemented as a high
priority interrupt to the computer. The response will be for the computer to
read its own internal time, to adjust for known delays in accepting the
interrupt, and to send the result to the ID. An alternative at this point is
to leave the data in memory to be read by the ID using the direct memory
access (DMA) protocol. The limitation on accuracy is the unknown random
delays in the computer.
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A more accurate transfer of time from the computer to the ID requires a clock
register which can be written into by the computer and read by the ID. The
computer would periodically write the low order part of its timer into this
register to prevent any noticeable drift, and the register would continue to
count from whatever value was loaded. The ID could read this value
periodically to update its own internal clock. The register should probably
be a part of the ID and be driven by the ID oscillator, in order to keep
non-standard hardware (from the viewpoint of the processor) outside of the
processors. A 16 bit register at one microsecond quantization is adequate for
this function. (See also 2.4.2.3 for another use of this register.)
2.4.2.1.3 Projected Capabilities
Time can be matched between the time reference source and the ID to within a
few microseconds by designing the interface to allow direct access to the
clock in the reference source by the ID. This accuracy, available with
existing technologies, is adequate for the Space Station project.
2.4.2.1.4 References
Customer Requirements for Standard Services from the Space Station Information
System (SSIS), GSFC, 9-17-84.
2.4.2.2 To IDs in Onboard LRN
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2.4.2.2,1 Description
The second step of time distribution is to transmit time from the ID attached
at the reference source to the other IDs, bridges, and gateways on the same
local area network. The general concept is for the source ID to read its
time, create a ID-to-ID data packet, and transmit this packet to the other
IDs. Each ID which receives this packet would read its own internal time,
difference this value with the time in the packet, and apply the difference as
a correction to its own internal time. The difficulty is that several delays
are involved in this procedure. While some of the delays are known and can be
included in the adjustment, some residual unpredictable delays are likely to
be above an acceptable level. The two largest uncertainties are likely to be
gaining access to the transmission-media after reading time at the sending
end, and responding to the receipt of the message in order to read time at the
receiving end.
2.4.2.2.2 Option Characterization
Special hardware support in the ID is needed to avoid these delays. Instead
of having the processor in the ID read its clock, the ID data transmission
hardware should read the clock at the actual start of transmission and store
this clock value in the message. Then, the receipt of the last bit of the
message should cause the hardware in the receiving ID to read its own internal
clock and save this clock as a part of the message buffer. Each of these
clock values is at a precisely defined point during the message transmission.
The time to transmit the message is known from the transmission rate and
delays through any intervening nodes (significant for a token ring, at
least). The difference is therefore well defined, and can be used to equalize
the clock in the receiving ID to the clock in the transmitting ID.
Note that the above technique for time tagging messages arriving at a ID is
very useful for tracking messages through the network during development of
the network, for performance measurements during checkout and verification,
and for problem analysis of an operational network. The technique would be
recommended even if not required for accurate time distribution.
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2.4.2.2.3 Projected Capabilities
Time can be distributed between IDs in a LAN with an error much less than 1
millisecond by designing the message transmission hardware to timetag each
message at the actual sending and receiving points. These capabilities are
available today, and satisfy Space Station requirements over the life of the
program.
2,4.2.2.4 References
None.
2.4.2.3 To Processors or Devices in LAN
2.4.2.3.1 Description
The third step of time distribution is to get time from the ID to the attached
processor or device. This transfer is controlled by the processor, not the
ID, to avoid any problems which might result if the ID updated the processor's
time at an uncontrolled point during computations.
2.4.2.3.2 Option Characterization
A simple option for the processor to get the time from the ID is for the
processor to send a "read time" request to the ID through the same mechanism
used to perform normal input/output requests. The ID would respond by reading
its own internal clock and returning the value to the processor. This method
has the disadvantage that the exact ID processing time is likely to be
unpredictable because the ID may be busy with some other activity at the point
of the request from the processor.
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A second option is to provide a direct path from the processor to the hardware
clock in the ID, with the intent of avoiding these unpredictable delays. The
processor would read both its own clock and the ID clock as close together as
possible, compensate for any known delays, and then adjust the processor's
clock for the difference between the two values. This method has very good
accuracy. A direct path is likely to be available between the ID and the
processor to allow the processor to sense the status of the ID, so that this
direct path to the ID's clock should be very little extra hardware. The
direct path has the advantage o? simple time management software in the
processor. The method is useable if the ID has at least three programmable
clocks. (One clock is equalized to the reference source, which jumps at each
update. A second clock is independent of the updates, as needed for measuring
intervals. The third clock generates interrupts to initiate scheduled events
within the processor.)
If only two clocks are available (one for interrupts, one for other uses),
then two of these function must be combined. R proven method (Space Shuttle)
is to combine a free-running hardware clock with a software clock. Each
adjustment to time is implemented by adding the change to the software part of
the combination without affecting the hardware part. The sum of the two parts
is therefore equalized to the reference. By avoiding any jumps in the
hardware clock at time adjustments, this method lets the hardware clock be
used for measuring short intervals without unwanted perturbations. For
example, assume one wished to determine the time from the start to the end of
a procedure by reading the hardware clock at the start and end. This kind of
measurement should not include adjustments which might have been made to the
clock during the interval to account for equalization updates, leap seconds,
or other discontinuities. The problem is that the combined parts are not
directly available to the attached processor as desired, since the processor
will not be able to directly access the software part of the clock.
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The third option requires only two clocks in the ID, at the expense of some
added complexity in both the processor and ID software. All changes to time
are added into the software part of the clock, as above, while the hardware
part is unaffected by changes. The hardware part can be read directly by the
attached processor, and the processor can also ask for the complete time from
the ID. The procedure at time equalization of the processor is then as
follows. First, the processor reads its own internal time and the ID hardware
register as close together as possible. Next, the processor requests the ID
to send to the processor the ID time together with the hardware clock value
that is part of that time. The processor can combine these four pieces of
data (processor time and related ID clock, ID time and related ID clock), with
any known delays in reading related sets, to obtain the difference between the
processor and ID clocks. The difference is used to adjust the processor's
clock to match the ID.
The first option may be acceptable, but the accuracy of time in the processor
then has an undesirable dependence on unpredictable delays in the ID. The
second and third options provide high independence between the ID and the
processor, while giving very good time accuracy. The choice between the
second and third options is based on the number of programmable clocks within
the ID.
2.4.2.3.3 Projected Capabilities
Time in the processor can be matched within a few microseconds of the time in
the ID by designing the interface to allow the processor to have direct access
to the clock in the ID. This capability, using existing technology, is
adequate for the Space Station.
2.4.2.3.4 References
None.
2.4.3 Time Tagging
Time tagging is the generic name For associating an event with the time of
occurrence of that event. The time may be in the past ("Reboost occurred at
g:03 A.M."), at the present ("The time is 1:48 P.M."), or in the Future ("Call
at 3:30 P.M."). Several major problems of time management are related to time
tags such as the above, with various applications requiring different kinds of
times. The problem areas are discontinuities in time, accuracy of time tags,
and formats of time tags. The reference configuration (section 2.4.3.1.4)
requires the network operating system (NOS) to timetag all subsystem
messages.
2.4.3.1 Discontinuities
2.4.3.1.1 Oescriptfon
The Fundamental visible time used on the Space Station will be Greenwich Mean
Time (GMT), measured in seconds From midnight on 3anuary First. This system
avoids Frequent discontinuities to which people are accustomed (seconds and
minutes jumping From 5g back to zero, hours jumping From 12 (or 23) back to i
(or O), daylight saving time, time zones). All of these discontinuities
create difficulties in programming real-time tasks. However, GMT itself still
has several discontinuities. In order of decreasing magnitude, these are the
year-end rollover (From day 365), the leap year (a variation o? the year-end
rollover), and the leap second. In addition, the equalization of each IO and
processor to the reference will create small (microseconds or milliseconds)
local discontinuities at the update cycle, typically once per second.
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The SSIS, of which the SSDS is a subset, must consider year-end rollover and
leap seconds throughout the design, since these effects are very difficult and
expensive to add afterward. The leap second has been especially difficult to
handle. Reference 1 of section 2.4.3.1.4 tried to add processing to Space
Shuttle ground and onboard systems to accommodate a flight across a June/July
leap second boundary. The conclusion was that the only practical way to
transition all systems across the leap second was to turn off all processors
(both onboard and on the ground at 3SC) and reinitialize in flight! The
technique currently adopted has JSC suppress locally any leap second for the
duration of a mission, and to compensate all range tracking data for the one
second offset that results. Even ignoring the confusion of having two
different sets of data for the same time tag (or two different time tags for
the same data), this method is clearly not acceptable over the flight duration
of the Space Station.
A basic problem of time management is that some applications cannot tolerate
the discontinuities which are necessary to other applications. Some examples
will illustrate the needs, at various levels of tolerance.
2.4.3.1.2 Option Characteristics
2.4.3.1.2.1 Fine Timing
Assume that some application has the need to delay a very short period of
time, such as 200 microseconds. This need might occur in sending a pulse to
some external device by a sequence which turns a signal on, waits 200 to 300
microseconds, and then turns the signal off. Even these short delays should
be programmed by reading a hardware clock, computing the clock value at the
end of the delay period, and issuing the signal until the clock value exceeds
the computed end value. If a time equalization update of 150 microseconds
were to occur during this delay, and the update was effected by changing the
hardware clock used to time the delay, then the signal would be maintained for
an incorrect amount of time. The software should not implement the obvious
alternative of delay loops based on instruction execution time, even for such
short intervals. To do so makes the software dependent on the speed of a
particular processor, and requires that the software be modified to run on a
newer processor for a technology upgrade.
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2.4.3.1.2.2 Timeout Tolerances
The previous example may be unrealistic, because such short delays are nearly
always embedded in the operating system and executed with interrupts disabled,
preventing the equalization update during the delay. However, a slightly
larger discontinuity can affect many applications. Assume that an application
has asked for some data from an external device and will wait up to I second
before declaring an error and initiating some recovery action. This delay is
typical of the desired response to crew requests at a workstation. Most data
acquisition which does not directly involve a person will have timeouts that
are much less than 1 second. If a leap second were to occur during this
interval, and affect the timer being used for the timeout, then an error may
be reported because no actual time has elapsed (i second timeout minus 1
second leap second adjustment).
2.4.3.1.2.3 Calculations
Assume that some application needs to determine the rate of change of a
measurement by sampling a sensor every two seconds, and then dividing the
difference in sensor values by the difference in sensor time tags. If a leap
second were to occur between two readings and be included in the time tags,
then the computed result would be too high or too low, depending on the sign
of the update (either 1 second or 3 seconds, but not the real value of 2
second s).
Comparison of ground tracking to onboard navigation has been a difficult
problem across a leap second. Because of numerous examples like the above,
spread over many applications, the onboard software is compelled to use a time
that has no discontinuities (other than the equalization updates to prevent
long term drift). Yet, the ground tracking system is synchronized to GMT and
must accept the leap second update. At an orbital rate of 5 miles per second
in low earth orbit, the sudden apparent jump due to the time discontinuity may
trigger a navigation update to the onboard system which creates a real error!
This situation will also exist with GPS.
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2.4.3.1.2.4 Periodic Processing
Many applications have a need for high rate periodic processing. Flight
control is a typical application, with a possible requirement to execute ten
times per second at precisely spaced intervals of O.I seconds. Periodic
processing is initiated by the operating system when time exceeds the next
scheduled time of execution for a process. This next scheduled time is
computed, either by the application or by the operating system, by adding the
repetition interval (O.l seconds in this example) to the current time of
execution, and inserting this value in order in a list of timed events for the
processor. The time until the item at the top of this list is loaded into a
clock to generate an interrupt at the required time. The processor is then
free to execute application programs until the interrupt occurs. B leap
second has a drastic effect on high rate periodic processes, if the leap
second is included in the computation of the time until the interrupt. The
effect will be either that the processor immediately tries to execute IO
cycles all at once (a multiple cycle overrun) if time appeared to jump
forward, or does not process any cycles at all for a full second (which might,
for instance, leave control jets firing much too long). Neither situation is
desirable, and the analysis to prove that the effects are benign can be very
expensive.
A slightly different periodic processing example requires the inclusion of the
discontinuity at a leap second. Assume that some monitor function is intended
to execute once per minute at 5 seconds after the minute occurs. Now the
periodic processing is tied to an external clock, unlike the above paragraph.
If the leap second is ignored in this case, then the many leap seconds during
the life of the Space Station would cause the processing to drift far _way
from the 5-seconds-after point as seen by an outside observer. The primary
point is that both of these apparently similar users have different real
requirements that should be accommodated.
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2.4.3.1,2.5 Earth-based Observations
Most of the earlier examples show that discontinuities are undesirable. But
the discontinuities were actually introduced to satisfy the needs of other
applications. The basis of the need is the slowing rate of rotation of the
earth. Without the adjustment of the leap second, the Greenwich meridian
would drift relative to solar noon, so that the sun would not be directly
overhead at 12:00 noon GMT. The slowing effect also influences stellar
observations. Users who need earth-based observations require the jump of the
leap second to keep a close correspondence between the solar noon and 12:OO
noo_ clock time.
2.4.3.1.2.6 Summary of Discontinuities
The above examples concentrate on the problems caused by a leap second,
because that has proved to be the most difficult case. The small jumps due to
equalization to a time reference are generally of interest only to the lower
levels of the operating system for precision timing of very short intervals.
These cases can be handled either by deferring the adjustment until after the
interval, or providing a clock which is unaffected by the adjustments. The
very large discontinuities at year-end rollover (including leap year) are so
large as to be readily detected and treated. The usual treatment is to keep a
time (ephemeris time) within the system that "just keeps going" and never
resets or jumps for year-end rollover or leap seconds. The frequent
equalization adjustments to prevent long term drift relative to a reference
source are of little interest to most users above the operating system level.
Ephemeris time is used for scheduling high rate periodic processes and For
time tags which enter into computations such as navigation or sensor rates of
change.
2.4.3.1.2,7 Options for Handling Discontinuities
The basic time used within the network should be an ephemeris time that has no
discontinuities. This is necessary to support the many functions that need a
continuously increasing time. One second of ephemeris time always equals one
second of International Atomic Time (TAI).
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The reference epoch for this ephemeris time should be 3anuary first of either
Ig50 (Earth Mean Equator ig50, EME-50) or the year of launch of the Space
Station. The former is an international standard reference. The latter has
the advantage of exactly matching GMT until the first discontinuity. Either
reference can hold time in a 64-bit computer word quantized to I microsecond
over hundreds of years, either as a long integer or as 8/56 floating point (8
bits of exponent and 56 bits of fraction).
Conversions between this ephemeris time and several widely used times should
be provided by the operating system as a common service needed by many users.
The particular time systems will evolve as Space Station requirements mature.
As a minimum, the conversion to Universal Coordinated Time (UTC) and GMT are
required, both of which include leap seconds. Conversions for manual display
will be needed, and are candidates for common operating system services.
These would typically be conversion from the internal form o?.GMT to days,
hours, minutes, seconds and possibly fractions of a second. Section 2.4.3.3
discusses other potential standard formats for communication uses.
2.4.3.1.3 Projected Capabilities
Adequate time tag capabilities exist today. The objective of this sections is
to emphasize that the data system must be designed from the start with the
recognition that at least two fundamental time bases are required. The
"visible" system will be GMT, simply because that is the most widely used time
in the world. However, the inherent discontinuities cause intolerable
problems for many applications. Therefore, the "internal" system will be a
continuous time base, probably EME-50 because of its wide use. The software
system should make both available to all applications, and provide the
translation between the two.
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2.4.3.1.4 References
z)
2)
Series of memoranda, FS52/G. L. Richeson to FS52/Head, Trajectory Logic &
Processing Section, ESC, early Ig82. Subject is leap seconds that occur
while a Space Shuttle flight is in a mission, and multiple Shuttles with
mixed times before and after a leap second. Quote: "It was presented that
both Onboard and MOC (Mission Operations Center at JSC) would have to be
brought down and be reinitialized if the leap second has to be
incorporated inflight."
Space Station Reference Configuration Description, JSC-1gg89, August 1984.
2.4.3.2 Accuracy
A user of time generally has two concerns about the measured value. The first
is the accuracy, which defines how far away the measured value is from some
reference source. The time distribution methods of section 2.4.2 which use
special hardware to precisely timetag the start and end of input/output
message transfers should be able to propagate the reference time throughout
all IDs to an accuracy better than 100 microseconds. Those methods which
involve the ID software in message timetags will be less accurate because of
unpredictable delays in processing, perhaps allowing errors of i to 5
milliseconds. As an estimate of the effects of accuracy, in low earth orbit
in a local vertical or gravity gradient attitude, l millisecond contributes a
dowrange error of about 25 feet and an angular error of about 0.25
arc-seconds.
The second concern is quantization, or how fine time may be resolved. One
second is the usual quantization for manual interaction, but this level is not
adequate for internal computer purposes. Many functions within a processor
take place in less than 1 millisecond. There is also an interaction with the
time accuracy if the quantization is too coarse. For example, if time is
quantized to l second, then the above accuracy of i00 microseconds cannot even
be approached. The IDs and processors should have the ability to read and
update their internal times at a l microsecond level in order to avoid the
expense of analyzing how coarse time can be and still be useable to every
application and to the operating systems.
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The above discussion is for accuracy and quantization of "absolute" time.
Some applications have a need for much better values than can be met by
distribution of time over a network. These applications must either have a
direct connection to the reference source or have an internal source. Two
examples are typical. Very early time accuracy requirements (about 1971)
showed a need for 0.1 microsecond accuracy in data time tags in one subsystem
on Space Shuttle. The MTU has a precision oscillator (1 part per billion),
but a time quantization of 125 microseconds, which clearly does not meet the
apparent need. However, the actual requirements were for very precise
interval measurements, with no concern about GMT, which could be attained by
using either the MTU or an internal oscillator as a frequency source combined
with a counter to generate the needed interval measurement. The second
example is the GPS, which requires time accuracies near one nanosecond to
measure speed-of-light delays. Even a 1 microsecond accuracy is inadequate
here, since light would move I000 feet in that time, while the intended
position error is much less. GPS supplies its own precision atomic clock.
2.4.3.3 Standard Formats
2.4.3.3.1 Description
The wide variety of formats used for time causes serious problems in space
missions. One user may desire time in hours, minutes and seconds in BCD (a
internal machine format, binary-coded decimal). Rnother may want time in
seconds and fractional seconds in the EME-50 reference. Still another may
require time in integer microseconds, notably for internal computer timing.
International atomic time (TAI) does not include leap seconds, while C_MT or
UTC do include this effect. The conversion between formats requires both
program development effort and computer execution time.
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2.4.3.3.2 Option Characterization
The NASA data systems standards program addresses standard time formats as a
method to manage the number of variations, notably for data communications
(reference of section 2.4.3.2.4). The second is defined as the TAI second,
with an option for UTC. The epoch may be either EME-50 or an unspecified
epoch. The fundamental unit is integer seconds and fractional seconds. /he
integer may have one to four octets (8 bits, commonly called a byte) of
capacity, and the fraction may have one to three octets. The maximum format
can therefore handle times up to 135 years at a quantization of about 60
nanoseconds, covering any Space Station data system needs. Each time word
carries its own descriptor so that the user can determine the format during
processing, with no need for prior agreements.
2.4.3.3.3 Projected Capabilities
Time standards adequate for Space Station communication and internal uses will
evolve by 1987. The two fundamental bases will probably be International
Atomic Time (TAI) and Universal Coordinated Time (UTC), both for the EME-50
epoch as time zero. TAI provides the continuous time needed by many users,
and UTC provides leap second adjustments. CAMT is readily extracted from UTC
by ignoring multiples of i day.
2.4.3.3.4 References
The New Standard Spacecraft Timecode, by Edward B. Connell, NASA GSFC,
(undated, probably mid-1983).
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2.5 COMMUNICATIONS
331
2.5.1 Space Communications
The organization of the Space Station/SSOS communications traffic,
both external and internal, is influenced by architectural, format,
protocol, and scheduling factors in addition to existing equipment
characteristics. Considering these factors a preliminary list of
options have been developed. These options have been arbitrarily
partitioned into transmission characteristics and architectural
options.
2.5.1.1 External Architectural Options
The following list of options have been generated considering the
factors enumerated above and the current technology level and that
projected for the 1990's.
I. l, 2, 3, 4 ball TDRSS configurations.
2. TDRSS augmented by enhancements or TDAS.
3. TDRSS augmented by a commercial satellite utilizing a
combination of TDRSS and ACTS technology.
4. TDRSS augmented by direct downlink to the OSN.
5. All users required to provide for their requirements in excess
of TORSS capacity.
6. TDRSS capacity increased by advanced modulation techniques.
These options are characterized in Table 2.5.1-I.
2.5.1.2 Internal Architectural Options
The internal data flow has been partitioned into audio/video and
data channels. The reason for this type of partition is due to the
unique characteristics and the volume of video data. An additional
constraint is that both audio and video have analog transmission
options which are not generally available for data transmission.
This does not eliminate a digital option for audio and video. In
addition to the factors enumerated above the factors of bus
loading, overhead penalty, and data criticality must be considered.
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The following options have been generated:
I. All data transmitted on parallel on board SSOS busses
utilizing a packetized format.
2. Parallel data buses with different characteristics.
o Core data bus utilizing a packetized format for low rate
transmission.
o User data bus using virtual connections for high
rate/bulk data transmission.
o Direct memory access data bus for bulk transfer of stored
data or bulk uploads.
3. Another option would combine data, voice, video, in a digital
format on the same bus structure; however, the very high rates
which would be required would require some major technology
improvements.
These options are characterized in Table 2.5.1-2.
2.5.1.3 Oownlink Transmission Options
Utilizingthe factors enumerated above in concert with the known
characteristics of the data to be transmitted the following options
have been generated. These options generally offer choices between
various format, protocol, and scheduling alternatives.
l. Time Multiplex Schemes
a. Dedicated time slots for high rate or bulk data (virtual
connection) with the remaining allocated time for low
rate packetized data.
b. Dynamic allocation for high rate or bulk data with the
remaining time allocated for low rate packetized data.
c. A totally packetized and multiplexed scheme.
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. Channel Allocation Scheme No. 1
o S-band channel reserved for core data
o Ku-band I channel reserved for high rate or bulk data.
o Ku-band Q channel reserved for other experimental data.
. Channel Allocation Scheme No. 2
o S-band channel reserved for core data
o Ku-band dynamically allocated.
4. Channel Allocation Scheme No. 3
o Ku-band for all transmission
o S-band reserved to smooth peak loads.
These options are characterized in Table 2.5.1-3.
2.5.l .4 Uplink Transmission Options
The characteristics, volume, and relative criticality of uplinked
communications traffic is now well defined. Thus considering these
limitations and utilizing the general factors enumerated above the
following preliminary option list has been generated.
l. Channel Allocation Scheme No. l
o All core commands/uploads on S-band.
o All user commands/uploads video on Ku-band.
o Channel Allocation Scheme No. 2
o All uplink on Ku-band
o S-band for overflow
The effect of program uploads on channel occupancy may suggest an
adaptive channel allocation for these upload periods. These
options are characterized in Table 2,5.1-4.
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Table 2.5.1-I
EXTERNAL ARCHITECTURAL CHARACTERISTICS
l • l, 2, 3, 4 BALL CONFIGURATION
Advantages
- Increased system capacity
- Increased availability to SSPE's
Disadvantages
- Increased management complexity
- Necessity for additional ground terminals
- Necessity for increased terrestrial capacity
o TDRSS AUGMENTED BY ENHANCEMENT OR TDAS
Advantages
- Increased system capacity
- Increased available to SSDE's
- Possible inter-satellite networking
Disadvantages
- Increased management complexity
- Necessity for additional ground terminals or ground terminal
modification
- Necessity for increased terrestrial capacity
- Physical, mechanical, electrical limitations on present
configuration
. TDRSS AUGMENTED BY A COMMERCIAL SATELLITE UTILIZING A COMBINATION OF
TORSS AND ACTS TECHNOLOGY
Advantages
- Increased availability to SSOE's
- Increased system capacity
- Geographical distribution of ground terminals relieving
congestion of terrestrial links
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Disadvantages
- Less reliance on long haul terrestrial network and reduced
delivery delay
- Increased management complexity
- Necessity for additional ground terminals
- Support for dual relay satellite systems
- Technology still being investigated.
o TDRSS AUGMENTED BY DIRECT DOWNLINK TO DSN
Advantages
- Increased capacity
- Utilization of existing ground stations
- Dual communications paths for safety and reliability
- Worldwide geographical distribution of ground terminals
Disadvantages
- Limited link capacity
- Limited connect time
. ALL USERS REQUIRED TO PROVIDE FOR THEIR REQUIREMENTS IN EXCESS OF TDRSS
CAPACITY
Advantages
- Limit communication support to well defined facilities
- Encourage user consideration of alternatives to massive raw data
dump
Disadvantages
- Shift communications responsibility to users
. TDRSS CAPACITY INCREASED BY ADVANCED MODULATION TECHNIQUES
Advantages
- Increased capacity
- Stable TDRSS space and ground segments
Disadvantages
- Requires redesign of transponder modulators and/or support of dual
modulation capability
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Table 2.5.1-2
INTERNAL ARCHITECTURAL CHARACTERISTICS
l • All data transmitted on parallel SSDS buses utilizing packetized format.
Advantages
- Standardized formats and protocols
Disadvantages
- High overhead penalty
- Transmission subject to unscheduled interruption from higher
priority traffic
- Transmission network subject to being loaded down by a few high
volume users
- Poor utilization of traffic capacity
• Parallel Data Buses with Different Characteristics
Advantages
- Segregation of traffic
- Increased utilization of bus traffic capacity
- Reduced overhead penalties
- Increase access to low priority - low volume users
Disadvantages
- Non-standardized formats and protocols
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Table 2.5.1-3
DOWNLINK TRAFFIC CHARACTERISTICS
I . Time Multiplexed Schemes
a. Dedicated
Advantages
- Tailored to data characteristics
- Simple data handling procedures
- Well defined data boundaries
Disadvantages
- Possible poor utilization of channel capacity
- Poor flexibility for contingencies or growth
b. Dynamic
Advantages
- Efficient utilization of channel capacity
- Inherent flexibility for contingencies or growth
Disadvantages
- Complex data handling procedures
C. A Totality
Advantages
- Standardized protocols and formats
Disadvantages
- High overhead penalty
. Channel Allocation #1
Advantages
- Well defined data boundaries
- Simple data handling procedures
Disadvantages
- Possible poor channel capacity utilization
- Poor flexibility for contingency or growth
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o Channel Allocation #2
Advantages
- Well defined data boundaries
- Data handling procedures are moderately complex
- Moderate to good channel capacity utilization
- Inherent Flexibility for contingencies or growth
Disadvantages
. Channel Allocation #3
Advantages
- Inherent flexibility
- Good channel capacity utilization
Disadvantages
- Complex data handling procedures
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Table 2.5.1-4
UPLINK TRANSMISSION CHARACTERISTICS
. Channel Allocation Scheme #4
Advantages
- Well defined data boundaries
- Moderate data handling complexity
- Inherent flexibility for contingencies or growth
Disadvantages
. Channel Allocation Scheme #2
Advantages
- Inherent flexibility
- Good channel capacity utilization
Disadvantages
- Complex data handling procedures
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2.5.2 WIDE AREA COP_UNICATION/PROCESSING OPTIONS
2.5.2.1 OVERVIEW
This paper describes the options for Wide Area Communications/Processing.
Wide area communications is that part of the Space Station Information System
(SSIS) that includes the communication and processing of Space Station data
that occurs from its reception on the earth as, for example, at White Sands
through its delivery at the customer locations. This subject, in effect,
represents a global network involving both terrestrial and space links. It
will include several nodes (Space Station Program Elements):
o Primary Earth Terminals (initial contact with Space Station);
o Space Station Operations Control Center (SSOCC);
o Polar Oriting Platform Control Centers (POPCC); .
o Co-Orbiting Platform Control Centers (COPCC);
o Payload Operational Control Center(s) (POCC);
o Orbiting Maneuverable Vehicle (OMV) Control Center;
o Orbiting Transfer Vehicle (OTV) Control Center;
o Regional Data Centers (RDC);
o Data Handling Centers (DHC); and
o Customer facilities.
Some of these nodes, such as the RDC's and POCC's, may perform the same
functions. The allocation of functions identified in Task I is in many cases
a trade-off between space SSPE's and these ground nodes, as well as between
ground nodes.
This network will carry diverse traffic with many different quality level
requirements supporting many different customers. It will evolve in size,
capacity, level of service, and technology throughout the lifetime of the
Space Station Program. This network will accommodate specific customer
messages with data rates ranging from hundreds to millions of bits per
second. It may use packet, message and/or circuit switching while using
terrestrial point-to-point links and/or satellite broadcast modes. There will
be from one to three separate data streams (Space Station, COP and POP) from
space to earth, each of which will contain multiplexed data, elements of which
will have different end destinations, quality, privacy, delivery and
timeliness requirements. Superimposed on this variety is the requirement that
the constitution of each data stream will change as the missions change. The
cost of reconfiguration of the network is this a paramount criterion.
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This data flow is characterized as originating from one to three space data
sources and delivered to a multitude of destinations. Conversely, in the
uplink direction, commands, data, video and audio signals will originate in
multiple points on the globe and arrive at the Space Station usually in
multiplexed streams. Consequently, the wide area network will be complex and
characterized by many options.
A number of stringent and unique requirements are imposed on this network.
'These include: operational transparency, customer knowledge of data status,
incorporation of ancillary data in the customer data stream, privacy and
security, real time response, up to 300 Mbps on some links, data integrity not
to be less than lO-9 bit error rate on some links. Some of these
requirements are contradictory and must be balanced. For example, customer
knowledge of data status and network privacy can be contradictory as well as
the requirements For real time response with high data rates, that will, of
necessity, impose storage and therefore delays.
2.5.2.2 OPTIONS
This section contains a brief description of a variety of options that exist
for this network design. Some options will be programmatic, as for example,
the location and authority associated with decisions on data flow paths and
priorities. Most options will be technical in nature.
2.5.2.2.1 NETWORK CONFIGURQTIONS
One of the primary set of options that will impact the final implemention of
the wide area communications is the choice of network configuration. This set
of options include:
o a number of primary earth reception stations;
0 access from the primary earth reception stations to the wide area
network;
0 connectivity between primary earth stations and other regional sites
(nodes);
o the number of regional sites (nodes);
o the allocation of functions between nodes; and
o customer access to the network.
For the purposes of this document, a primary reception station is defined as a
terminal that first receives data from the Space Station.
One proposed configuration has two earth reception stations, referred to as
NASA Ground Terminals (NGTs). They consist of the antennae, reception
equipment, data capture equipment, multiplexers and formatting equipment For
retransmission to such nodes as 3SC or GSFC.
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At IOC it is planned to have at least two single access TDRS channels
available, which will require two primary reception stations to receive data
simultaneously from each of the two operational TDRS spacecraft. With respect
to data processing and subsequent transmission on the network, two options
exist for this configuration; one primary earth station can transfer a11
received data directly to the other by means of a fiber optic link or,
alternately, all processing and preparation for transmission can be performed
at both stations. In the latter case, each station could independently
transfer data to the network. Each station could have Space Station, COP and
POP data segments to place on the network at any given time. Depending on the
network design, this will require knowledge of the data destination of each
segment. One means of providing this knowledge is to imbed the destination in
each data element on the Space Station. In this case, the telemetry protocol
must contain space for the data destination.
Furthermore, in the growth versions of the space station, additional primary
reception stations could be implemented as was indicated by the TDAS studies
which identified five reception stations. This type of configuration offers
several options for controlling data ?low through the Wide Area Network. One
would involve highly complex scheduling such that the network would maintain
knowledge of which regional reception station should receive which data and at
what time each station would be visible to the Space Station from a TDRS
satellite. 'This knowledge could be maintained in the Space Station Data
Management System which would then control traffic to each earth reception
station or, ultimately, by a Network Control Center. Another option would
have the ultimate destination imbedded in the data stream and transferred as
appropriate thru the destination. Direct space-to-ground links other than TDRS
should they be employed, will impact the Wide Area Communications topology.
Links that would include Space Station to a technologically improved
geostationary spacecraft (such as ACTS) to ground. Such links would bring the
customer closer to the payload to provide for direct interactive control. The
connectivity between the primary earth stations and the RDC's represents
various topological options. This topology will include customers located at
various destinations on the planet - a global network. Thus, some primary
earth stations could be located outside the United States. Similarly, RDC's
and POCC's could be located outside of the United States.
Connectivity options include: providing communication links between each
primary earth station and all POCC's and RDC's or providing such links to only
certain dedicated POCC's and RDC's. In the latter case, the space station
would have to sort data in terms of the primary earth station location, a
design option which seems desirable for RDC's and/or POCC's are located in
foreign areas such as Europe. A trade-off between space station data handling
complexity and transmission costs is implied. A major parameter of this
trade-off is the traffic volume to each RDC.
2.5.2.2.2 MULTIPLEXING/DEMULTIPLEXING/PROCESSING LOCATION
Both forward and return data streams will require demultiplexing,
multiplexing, and processing prior to and after receipt by/from the customer.
The location of these processes has several options and consequently cost and
timeliness impacts on the data system performance.
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The data stream(s) received from the Space Station will consist of multiple
data channels with different levels of data security/privacy, quality
requirements and destinations. This stream(s) must be processed. Some of the
associated options are:
0 separation by customer identification at the initial point of
reception from space at a data handling center, at a single regional
data center (such as GSFC), or at multiple regional data centers (or
combinations of each); and
0 likewise Level 0 processing at a single location or multiple
locations;
It should be noted that in addition to demultiplexing/multiplexing and Level 0
processing, typically each node should check ?or errors
and add some form of error detection prior to transmission to the next node.
Depending on the final configuration, each node may also be required to read a
header in order to direct the specific data stream to the proper location.
The network may be designed as a message or a packet switching network. In
this case, some level of demultiplexing will be necessary at the initial point
of reception in order to recognize the packets or messages to allow switching
to occur. Demultiplexing could be performed at the primary earth station and
at a regional data center prior to delivery to the customer. Message and/or
packet switching networks will require that each packet or block be
reformatted to accommodate switching as required by the network. Thus, the
protocol (standardization) and network design are interdependent.
Similarly, the Level 0 processing could be performed at either a single
location such as the initial ground station (and thereby routed to some
customers directly) or performed at a single final destination prior to
customer delivery (or, again, a mixture of these nodes).
Customer data locations will definitely affect the topology of the
communications network if total cost is taken into consideration.
2.5.2.2.3 TRANSMISSION MEDIA
Various network transmission media may be employed, such as radio frequency,
fiber optics, microwave, or standard hard-wired. In this context radio
frequency refers to terrestrial-to- DOMSAT-to- terrestrial links. A separate
White Paper, section, Transmission Media, discusses the technical options for
transmitting data. This section emphasizes transmission options based on
types of service with less emphasis on technology potential. The choice of
media type will depend upon data traffic, current technology, cost, security
requirements, and standardization constraints. For example, fiber optics may
replace DOMSAT links for certain data rates and certain links. Some
transmission media options are:
o frequency of transmission;
o media type;
o the choice of commercial services; and
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O the choice between commercial services and NASA networks; NASA can
currently handle high data rate traffic from White Sands over
two 50 Mb/s transponders to other NASA nodes such as 3SC, GSFC and KSC. These
transponders make use of leased commercial links. Another network referred to
as the NASA Integrated System Data Network (NISDN) is being implemented which
services fourteen nodes with a total capacity between all nodes of 15 Mb/s.
NISDN can be expanded to double the 15 Mb/s simply by frequency of transponder
hopping. Further expansion may be achieved by using 60 Mb/s transponders, a
technology that will shortly exist; this capacity may be doubled also by
frequency or transponder hopping. By the mid to late 19gO's, the 60 Mb/s will
likely be increased by at least a factor of two.
As stated previously the NISDN network will initially be designed to carry
traffic to 14 nodes; theoretically, each of these nodes, could be used to
distribute customer data on customer specific links.
NASA is developing another system for administrative data traffic, known as
the Program Support Communication Network (PSCN), that will also service
fourteen nodes, one of which is White Sands. This network, is capable of
supporting video and voice teleconferencing, the former at frame rates
compressed to 1.544 Mb/s. The use of this PSCN network for some Space Station
traffic represents another option.
Most of this traffic will likely be over leased commercial lines. As such,
the technology employed in these links will be determined by the commercial
carriers and not the SSIS. The transmission over satellite links would
include options such as single channel per carrier versus Time Division
Multiple Access (TDMA). Currently, the choice between lease lines is
determined by competitive government procurement procedures. In effect, the
choice and type of network links employed are determined by available
commercial links based on cost and technology.
Fiber optics is increasingly becoming competitive with satellites as a mode of
long-range data transmission. Currently, several companies are actively
expanding fiber optic networks across the United States and internationally by
means of undersea optical cables. For instance, AT&T recently stated that it
will spend at least $2 billion over the next two years in deploying a 21,000
mile network of fiber optic cabling. Other companies, such as MCI and
Southern Pacific, are also actively installing long-range fiber optic
networks. Over 25 separate companies are in the process of implementing
long-haul fiber optic links throughout the United States. International
long-haul fiber optic links are also being developed for international
traffic: a 7,200 nautical mile cable from California to Japan is being
developed by a consortium of 22 companies including AT&T. This cable will be
capable of transmitting 37,800 simultaneous conversations.
Advantages of fiber optics relative to conventional RF transmission include:
isolation (minimum grounding, shock and lightning interference), EMI free
transmission (minimum interference, cross- talk, electro-.magnetic radiation
enhanced security), significant signal bandwidth (currently operating at 400
Mb/s with near term growth expected to 1.2 Gb/s) and lower cost. Current
cabling costs range from $.50 per conductor meter up to $1.00 per conductor
meter; a cost which is projected to decline significantly. Other costs are:
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individual splices at $20 - $40, with mass splices reduced to $5 to $i0 each,
individual connectors range from $20 to $I00 each. Installation cost,
however, would represen_ the largest cost factor in a fiber optic channel.
Given the relative sensitivity of cost data to the competing carriers, no
attempt has been made in this study to determine an actual cost per bandwidth
mile for long-haul fiber optic communication. However, in comparison, a
typical DOMSAT link consisting of 14 earth stations and a transponder
bandwidth of 32 Mbps would lease for approximately $220 thousand per month
excluding installation and termination cost. Nevertheless, existing cost for
both service types will likely be reduced as prices to the users due to an
over capacity that will likely result from current installation activity.
Given that fiber optic links may be employed in wide area communication
networks,several technology options exist which include:
o wavelength - 0.85 microns to 1.6 microns;
o transmitter - injector laser diode (ILD) versus light emitting diode
(LEO);
o receiver - PIN versus avalanche photo diode (APD); and
o fiber - single mode versus multimode;
The current technology trend is toward the longer wavelengths (i.6 microns)
using multimode transmissions. Bit error rates of 10 -g over long haul
distances are being achieved with repeater distances of approximately 200
kilometers. In addition, by use o? wavelength, division multiplexing (WDM) up
to ten channels of different wavelengths may be conducted in a single fiber.
High data rates (in excess of 150 Mbps will employ long wavelength LED's (1100
to 1600 microns).
2.5.2,2.4 NETWORK CONTROL CENTER CONFIGURATION
The NASCOM network data transmission is scheduled by the Network Control
Center (NCC) and reconfigured by NASCOM circuit switching. The Space Station
data loads and data handling requirements will require an NCC upgrade with
multiple associated options, among which are:
o degree of control centralization;
o degree of diagnostic centralization;
o if decentralized, location of control nodes;
o failure recovery techniques;
o control priorities;
o degree of automatic recon?iguration;
o type of status presentation; and
o types o? data base design;
The network could be designed so that a central control center monitors all
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data flow paths and processing, including control and all data redirection.
The centralized control center must maintain real time status and must have
decision autonomy in consonance with the timing of all operations. To a large
extent these operations can be predetermined - scheduled - but unexpected
failures or mission changes will require real time control. High data rates
will tax any implementation of a centralized control center.
An option is for decentralized control with routing determined at remote
gateway locations based on current gateway traffic and link data queues.
Decentralized control must have distributed loading throughout the system;
other options include the amount of control "reach" at each of these nodes
(the amount of network knowledge at any given node).
Diagnostics may also be centralized or decentralized. In the former case, all
status and control commands would be centralized at a control center.
Conversely, the diagnostics could be located at remote portions of the network
and recovery effected remotely. Failure recovery offers other options ranging
in degree from fully automatic to fully human controlled. An example of the
latter would be the case where the bit error rate (BER) is monitored on all
links at a central facility. An operator upon seeing degradation beyond
acceptable limits would reconfigure the links. An option is to have automatic
line reconfiguration.
Given catastrophic failure or even some specified level of degradation, the
network must remain in an operatonal state. Data recovery could be
prioritized; first in/first out (FIFO), by customer priority level, or by
network efficiency priority level. An example of the latter case would be to
initiate recovery at the node with the greatest backup queue.
Various options are associated with the type and locations of network
operational displays. All displays may be centralized at a single console
characteristic of central facility control. Other options are to locate
displays at Regional Data Centers or at any node which requires multinode
control and status information. Since customers require knowledge of the
operational status, in particular the status of the data as it flows through
the system, distributed control and status might be an imposed network
requirement. In addition to the location of this information, there are many
options associated with the level and quality of display. The level of
display can range from reasonably simple statistics to elaborate graphics that
provide pictorial summaries of operational status. Further, the type of
display may vary from location to location depending on the degree of
operational control that can be exercised at any particular station.
The network control center will utilize one or more data bases which will
indicate current schedule, operational status, projected network use, failure
history, etc. Read and write access to these data bases would be based on a
"need to know." Thus, there exists options relative to data base access.
Other options associated with network control centers include: the frequency
of polling gateways for configuration and diagnostic status; the techniques
for presenting alarms to operators; the strategy for preparing alarm reports
(electronic or paper); the strategy for network planning; and the availability
of utilities for analyzing network downtimes. The type and scope of
pre-operation and operational simulations of network evolution represent
another set of options.
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2.5.2.2.5 STANDARDIZATION
Section 3,1 describes the standardization options for the SSDS. The options
are intimately intertwined with the design of the Wide Area Communications
Network and are, therefore, applicable to the same. The important standards
that will affect the Wide Area Communications are the LAN and communications
protocol. No doubt, some form of packets will be used to transport data
between SSPE's. These packets will require some standardized protocol. The
extent that these packets must be converted during transport to and from space
will clearly impact the processing requirements of the Wide Area
Communications. Further, data transport within the Wide Area Communication
Network will require protocol to allow for error-free transmission from node
to node. Different ISO headers for each wide or local area subnetwork may be
needed as i11ustrated in Figure 2.5.2-I. The topology is such that some modes
includes customer facilities while others include NASA facilities then
different protocols might be employed if for no other reason than to
accommodate a general desire for commercial standard interface to customers.
The existing NASCOM block is highly inefficient for data transport as was
discussed in the Standard's paper. In order to accommodate a circuit
switching or packet switching network, it may be necessary to employ protocols
that a11ow for automatic traffic redirection at any given mode. It is clear
that the network topology and the protocols and standards used for
communications are intimately related.
Relative to the ISO standards, the important layers that will impact the
network design are the transport, network and link layers. The definition of
any standards for these layers will significantly effect the network
characteristics. The choice of standards for these layers, while
interdependent with topology requirements, will determine the proper
requirements required in the network.
The transport layer selected basically specifies the data protocol for
end-to-end communications. No adequate telemetry protocol presently exists
for customer payload-to-payload control processing that provides for the data
transfer either from one mission (experiment) to many customers or for many
missions multiplexed into a single data stream to many customers. The choice
of a transport protocol will substantially establish the form of the
end-to-end data system and certainly the Wide Area Communications Network.
The network layer provides for the protocol to support network-port to
network-port data transfers, e.g., from onboard BIU interface to any simi].ar
such interfaces (whether in space or on the ground). Again, this protocol,
several of which exist, must be imbedded in the transport layer protocol to
provide for efficient data stripping and manipulation with minimum overhead
and machine complexity. In some designs, this network layer may be selected
to be a LAN compatible protocol, and as such, may differ from the space
segment protocol and may even differ within the Wide Area Communication
network in order to accommodate different LAN's including customer facilities.
Similarly, the data link layer protocol should be imbedded in the overall
standard protocol in a manner that minimizes overhead within a maximum error
free transmission. Given the anticipated high data rate and variation in data
rates, the choice protocol may differ for the data associated with the
different data rates.
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2.5.2.2.6 PRIVACY AND SECURITY LEVEL
Section 2.3, Privacy and Security, discusses various SSDS options. Most of
these options will have little or no bearing on the Wide Area Communications
Network. One exception would occur if one or more customers desired separate
communication links with this separation occurring as soon as possible upon
receipt of data on the ground. If data security is required throughout the
network, in particular at each node, then significant design requirements will
be imposed on the network. At this writing, there has been no specific
direction to indicate the extent or type of security protection that must be
implemented in the network design.
2.5.2.2.7 PERFORMANCE ANALYSIS
Section 2.6, Performance Analysis, also discusses various SSDS options.
Several of the options reported in this section will have considerable impact
on the Wide Area Communication network. Among these are:
0 the techniques and extent of fault detection and associated data
collection,
o the extent of overhead associated with data collection,
o the degree of automation of fault detection, and
o real time versus off line network performance monitoring.
The overhead associated with fault detection may require that all loads be
interconnected by a separate network. The traffic on this network would be
dependent on the degree of automation; the more fully automated, the less the
traffic.
2.5.2.2.8 OTHER CONTROL CENTERS
In the overview section of this paper, other nodes such as OMV Control Center,
OTV Control Center, Payload Operational Control Center, Polar Orbiting
Platform Control Center, Co-orbiting Platform Control Centers, and Space
Station Operational Control Center were listed. The design of these control
centers represents a variety of options some of which are:
o the location of these control centers;
o the responsibility of the Payload Operational Control Centers (POCC);
o the extent of data transfers between centers: and
o functional allocation between control centers.
Each control center will require some space station status information which
normally resides at the SSOCC. Consequently, the location of each of these
control centers as, for example, the OMV control center will determine the
communication links are required between these two nodes. Inorder to support
the real-time command requirements it may be necessary to provide multiple
communication links between a11 control centers that have the ability to
support real-time access to data bases containing engineering data related to
the SSPE associated with that control center. Clearly there are many options
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associated with the design of this subnetwork. For example, does any customer
have the authority to access any related engineering data base at any control
center whether that customer is located at a regional data center or at that
customers' own facilities, further, access to data bases from several users
always involves an orderly access protocol, and in many cases, a priority
structure. Furthermore, the Platform Payload Control Centers may be
distributed within the NASA organization as for example having a dedicated
medical platform controlled from JSC and a dedicated materials platform
located at MSFC while a dedicated science and astrophysics control center is
located at GSFC. In such a location and control plan, communication links
would be necessary to support each set of experiments. In the overall Wide
Area Communication Network, it is conceivable that customers would be
connected to the network without going through a POCC or through an RDC. In
the event of unusual events such as an emergency or sudden unexpected change
of mode, the customers must be advised of any circumstances that might affect
their payloads; this factor implies the need for some core engineering data to
be available at the POCC's and possibly even at some RDC's. Again, the
general responsibilities of the POCC's could definitely have an impact on the
communication links and data types transferred through the network.
2.5,2.2.9 COMMAND MANAGEMENT
The command management options are closely related to the Operational Control
Center options. The location and distribution of the control centers will
effect the various command management options, Among options to be considered
are:
o Should command management have a central control point;
o If centralized, where will this be located; and
o Location of restriction and constraint checks.
Many, if not most, of the constraint commands will require companion
engineering commands to adequately insure the space station status. In these
cases, engineering commands must be generated from the SSOCC and the
processing and checking for constraint commands must be coordinated with that
facility. It would appear that the final check on any constraints (and some
restricted) commands must take place either at the SSOCC or in the space
station itself. These options have bearing on the Wide Area Communications
network design as constraint checking will require an evaluation of available
resources not only in the Space Station but at all ground facilities
associated with a data flow resulting from these commands. Such constraint
checks must be made up to initiation of the command(s) and, therefore, require
a real time subnetwork.
2.5,2,2.10 SWITCHING OPTIONS
This network will be required to transport several data types: high speed and
low speed data, voice, video and commands. As stated previously, this network
will have many destinations and sources. Given the variety of data
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types and the complex topology, several switching or routing options exist.
These include:
o scheduled routing,
o static directory routing,
o dynamic directory routing,
o distributed adaptive routing, and
o mixture of the above.
Scheduled routing refers to a system where all circuits are established in
accordance with a schedule. Obvious problems with this type of routing over a
large network with diverse data types result in unexpected failures of
degradations occur that require rerouting. A closely related technique for
routing uses a pre-defined table indicating data paths to various
destinations. This technique is referred to as static directory routing.
Such routing tables are updated by manual intervention only.
By contrast, directory routing may be accomplished by automatic updates
determined by network conditions or data type.
Adaptive routing would be distributed to nodes where routing decisions are
based on such factors as error conditions and queue length.
The Wide Area Communication Network may be composed of a combination of these
routing techniques based possibly on data rate. Nevertheless, the choice of
routing technique would poorly impact the network design.
Other options associated with this network design include the implementation
of message of packet switching on portions or all parts of the network.
2.5.2.2.11 CUSTOMER INTERFACES
2.5.2.2.11.1 Programmatic
Customer interfaces include programmatic options. Examples of such options
involve initial customer familiarization with the Space Station program
contract negotiations, and customer accounting and billing. Customer
familiarization includes many options: seminars, news releases, articles,
mailing service, public address and articles by NASA personnel, as well as a
public by accessible electronic query information data base. It is likely
that all of these options will be used in the course of the Space Station
Program. Each customer will negotiate a contract with NASA stipulating the
services to be provided, the associated prices and a set of requirements on
both parties required to fulfill this contract.
During the mission, such contracts may require renegotiation depending on the
progress of the mission and other factors such as customer needs for
additional services. There are many options for the structure of such
contracts: fixed fee, fix fee dependent on the level and quality of service
provided, reimbursable funds between government agencies, prices based on NASA
costs such as the original STS contract arrangements, etc. Certainly the
determination of which party pays for the link from a regional Data Center to
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the customer facilities and under what conditions represents a set of
options. Costs, tracking and billing offer many options. Billing can be
performed on a near real-time basis (as the services are being provided) or,
optionally, the entire cost can be based on a mission service independent of
the specific functions that occur during the course of the mission. The
former approach will place the burden on NASA to develop more thorough cost
accounting, although it allows greater flexibility to the customer in
adjusting real time operations to a given budget.
2.5.2.2.11.2 Physical
Physical interfacescan be categorized as: physical type, i.e., radio
frequency or hardwire, and service type, i.e., archives, data reception and
command transmission, etc. Hardware physical interfaces typically will be
either copper or fiberglass. Radio frequency interfaces could include DOMSAT
links among Regional Data Centers, a central ground facility, directly from
the Space Station or from a Space Station-to-geostationary
satellite-to-customer link. Each of these would have different physical
options: r.f. interfaces associated with carrier frequencies; modulation type;
encoding; antenna type; etc. Hardwired interfaces will likely be standardized
with few options.
Other options associated with customer interfaces relate to data base access.
To assure customer privacy, selected customer data will require access
control. On the other hand, some customers will prefer free interchange of
data among interested parties. Consequently, there will be different levels of
data base access and therefore associated options. Other options include the
design of these data bases or in such factors as whether they are centralized
or distributed. Further, will some customers have the use of common
subroutines.
Options associated with service interfaces include access to different data
bases (such as the long-term payload archives, which will be pre-negotiated
between the customer and NASA), and access to the engineering data set, which
may require a different physical connection depending on the data system
design.
2.5.2.2.12 NETWORK MANAGEMENT
Network management refers to the programmatic management of the network. This
management could be centralized at a single location in NASA or distributed
among various NASA organizations with specific responsilities associated with
network functions. Options associated with network management essentially
represent the division of responsibility within the NASA organization.
354
2.5.3 Local Area Networks
2.5.3.1 Description
A local area network (LAN) is an information transport system for information
transfer between devices located geographically close. LANs generally provide
high-bandwidth communication over inexpensive transmission media at a cost
which is very low compared to the costs associated with traditional data
communication networks. Multiple LANs may be interconnected by
gateways/bridges providing an interconnecting vehicle for a. wide variety of
communications devices within an establishment.
Local area networks basically consist of transmission media, network interface
units (NIUs), and the Network Operating System (NOS). Options for the
transmission medium, NIU and NOS are considered in more detail in sections
1.7.1.1, 1.7.1.2, and 2.1.3 respectively.
The characteristics of a local area network are transmission medium,
transmission technique, topology and media access method. The transmission
medium of a LAN is the element of the network which carries the physical
signals between nodes or stations. Currently practical transmission media are
twisted pair copper wire, coaxial cable and fiber optics, among others. The
physical signal can be applied to the transmission medium in one of two ways.
In baseband signaling, the signal is applied directly to the medium as a
series of digital voltage pulses. The other transmission technique, known as
broadband signaling, employs the use of modulation to take advantage of the
wider bandwidths available at higher frequencies. The manner in which the
transmission medium interconnects the nodes of the network is defined as the
LAN topology. Basic topologies are star, bus, ring and mesh. The LAN's
media access method is the technique by which the nodes gain the right to
transmit information onto the medium. The medium access can be either
controlled access, such as token-passing and polling, or demand access, such
as Carrier Sense Multiple Access (CSMA).
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This paper addresses the types of technologies used to implement LAN's and
compares various LAN implementations from a number of sources.
In general, the discussion on local area networks that follows applies to all
orbital elements of the Space Station Program:
The Space Station
Co-orbiting Platform (COP)
Polar Orbiting Platform (POP)
2.5.3.2 Option Characterization
THe technological parameters that define a local area network are:
w
Transmission Medium
Transmission Technique
Topology
Media Access Method
Network Interface Unit (NIU)
Each of these parameters are described below. They should be considered in
terms of.
Cost. The cost of the network varies with the above parameters selected. The
initial wiring, connection, maintenance, and reconfiguration costs should all
be considered.
Growth/Technology Insertion Potential. The wiring distance and number of
connectors varies depending on the topology selected. Some network
configurations facilitate reconfiguration and growth while others do not.
357
Performance and Delay Characteristics. The access protocol has a great effect
on network performance. The topology can also have a significant impact on
the delay characteristics of the network.
Environmental Characteristics. The tolerance to radiation and suitability for
implementation in space need to be considered.
Standardization/Commonality. Standards for some network configurations have
been developed.
Physical Characteristics. The weight, volume and power required have a
significant impact on the decision for an onbaord LAN.
Reliability. Single points of failure are more common for some topologies
than others. Differences also exist in the reliability of hardware and
software for a given topology and protocol.
Ease of Multiplexing. The multiplexing of voice, video and data on more than
one channel can be done more easily and at a lower cost for some topologies
and media than others.
Risk. The risk associated with the development and production of the LAN
varies with the media topology, transmission method, media access method and
NIU services provided. The LAN should be evaluated according to NASA's eight
levels of technological readiness.
o Transmission Medium
Most LAN's now in use or being designed, use bit-serial transmission over
coaxial cable or twisted-pair copper wire. However, the use of fiber optic
media in LAN systems is increasing and will continue to do so in the coming
years.
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Unshielded twisted-pair copper wire medium is used extensively for normal
analog voice communications. However, the impact of environmental noise is
not as detrimental to analog voice signals as it is to normal digital LAN
traffic. A higher-quality twisted-pair medium has a higher characteristic
impedance and is shielded to reduce eletromagnetic interference, thus
providing a reliable transmission medium for digital LAN systems operating at
data rates between 1 to iO Mbps.
Currently, coaxial cable is the most widely used medium for local area
networking. Since coax is a shielded medium by definition, it is largely
immune to electrical noise and carries data at higher rates over longer
distances than can twisted pair. There are two general types o? coaxial
cable, named for the transmission technique that they support. Baseband
coaxial cable carries one signal at a time, usually at rates from 1 to IO
Mbps, which can be time-division-multiplexed. Broadband coaxial cable can
carry many signals at a time through frequency-division-multiplexing.
Although data rates on any one frequency band (channel) are lower than those
available with baseband coax (l to 5 Mbps), the availability o? up to 20 or 30
channels on a single cable greatly increases the amount of data that the
medium can carry.
Fiber optic cable is the newest medium in the LAN market. Transmission of
signals for a small number of Kilometers (but significantly longer than
possible using twisted pair or coax) at bit rates up to 50 Mbps is feasible
using fiber optics. Another advantage of optical fiber is that the effect of
electromagnetic interference on the fiber is negligible. At the moment,
however, it is the most expensive medium available, but as its use becomes
more widespread in telephone applications, it should become less expensive.
Table 1 compares the transmission media available for local area networking.
See 1.7.1.1 for more detailed information.
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o Transmission Technique
The bits of information that are transferred within the LRN are applied to the
transmission medium in one of two basic methods known as baseband and
broadband signaling. A baseband LRN is one that uses digital signaling;
digital signals are inserted on the medium as voltage pulses, without
modulation. The entire frequency spectrum of the medium is used to form the
signal, hence frequency-division-multiplexing cannot be implemented. Unlike
analog signals, digital signals cannot easily be propagated through the
splitters and joiners required for a tree topology (a variation of the bus
topology).
Broadband implies the use of analog signaling. Frequency-division-mul-
tiplexing is possible: the frequency spectrum of the cable can be divided
into channels or sections of the bandwidth. Separate channels can support
data traffic, video, and radio signals. Broadband is inherently a
unidirectional transmission (i.e., signals applied to the medium propagate
only in one direction), since it is not feasible to build amplifiers that will
pass signals of one frequency in both directions. Full connectivity is
achieved by using pairs o? channels designated for bidirectional
communications. Broadband can be incorporated into both bus and tree
topologies, in addition to other topologies discussed below.
o Topology
The topology of a network determines the manner in which the stations (nodes)
of the network are interconnected. There are many ways to interconnect nodes
depending on the communications requirements, reliability, medium, and
redundancy of the network. The four basic topologies are the star, bus, ring
and mesh (see Figure 2). Variations and combinations of these basic
topologies can yield useful improvements in performance and should also be
evaluated.
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The Star Topology
In a star network, nodes are connected to a central star node through which
all internode tra??ic must pass. The star node may be passive, as in many
fiber optic stars, or active, as in most PBX's. A passive star splits the
data signal, transmitting it equally to all nodes. An active star acts as a
switch, setting up a direct connection between the transmitting node and the
destination node.
Throughput is dependent on the network access protocol (discussed below). In
an active star, the message processing time (spent at the star node) depends
on the number of nodes, message length, processor speed, and message tra??ic
statistics. The throughput rate For a given message is the reciprocal of the
sum o? processing time and i/0 buf?ering times.
Typical media access methods for the star topology are polling and token
passing. (Media access methods are described in detail in section 2.5.3.2.4.)
As long as the star node is capable of connecting to additional nodes, network
changes are easily implemented. Wiring lengths, however, can be much longer
than other topologies since each node needs a separate path to the star node.
Fiber optic passive stars are growing in importance, but they are usually
limited to 16-64 nodes because the input power is divided equally among the
other nodes. Due to marketing considerations, most active stars are limited
to 1024 nodes. Most active stars, such as those in the PBX systems, use the
twisted pair transmission medium. Because o? the increasing need for PBX's,
this technology is very developed, but support is primarily for relatively low
data rates up to about 56 Kbps per circuit, with many circuits supported at
the same time.
363
Fiber optic stars have been developed that work at approximately the same rate
as point to point links (i.e., 50 Mbps and higher). Passive stars have the
advantage of reliability. They are usually built as a fused biconical taper,
which is simply a piece of fused glass with no electronic or moving parts.
Star networks have the general drawback of relying on the star node for all
communications. Failure of this node brings down the entire network. On the
other hand, the outlying nodes can fail with minimal impact to the rest of the
network.
The Ring Topology
The basic ring topology is logically circular consisting of nodes connected to
only two other nodes (Figure 2). The control of the network can be
centralized in one node or distributed to all nodes. Data is transmitted
unidirectionally around the ring. There are many possible medium access
methods for the ring topology. The most common are token access,
slotted-ring, register insertion, and polling (described in detail in section
2.5.3.2.4). Depending upon the protocol used, the message may be removed by
the destination node or by the source node once it has travelled completely
around the ring.
The performance of ring networks depends on the message transmission mechanism
at the node. Some require an entire message address field to be buffered
before retransmitting the message, which could cause long delays under heavy
traffic. Others just examine one bit at a time and are able to send the
message along with only one bit of delay. Once a message enters the ring,
transmission time is usually not affected by traffic load. Where the number
of nodes is relatively small and the distances travelled are short, the ring
topology offers the best performance in high data rate applications (Reference
3). Rates of over 10 Mbps/s have been achieved with the token ring.
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The most obvious problem with a ring topology is that Failure of any node can
potentially bring the whole network down. This problem has been solved,
however, by various techniques such as device self-testing and
self-elimination from the network. The elements of a node that could affect
the network can also be made redundant and self-shorting.
Note also that a duality exists between the ring and the star or bus. In the
ring, if a transmitter Fails "off", the node would not be able to regenerate
the data and the entire ringwould Fail. In the star or bus with Carrier
Sense Multiple Access with Collision Detection (CSMA/CD) if a transmitter
fails "on", so that it always transmit data to the network, catastrophic
failure also results.
Multiplexing different types of data on the ring is rather difficult because
of the type of interface required, but it can be done. However, multiplexing
analog video or voice could be uneconomical on a ring compared to other
topologies.
Rings with various access protocols have been built in laboratories, and
several have become successful commercial products.
The Star-Wired-Ring
The advantages of the star and ring topologies have been combined in a hybrid
topology, the star-wired ring. This topology is physically similar to the
star, but operates as a ring with unidirectional, point to point data
transmission. (See Figure 3) Each node is attached to the wiring concentrator
via a network interface unit. The wiring concentrator connects the nodes in a
ring configuration, but maintains the capability of isolating an inactive or
Faulty station from the ring, thereby providing the Fault isolation which the
basic ring topology lacks.
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As with the star topology, wiring lengths can be much longer than with other
topologies. Network changes can be easily implemented with this topology as
long as the connection capacity of the wiring concentrator is not exceeded.
This configuration with the token passing media access method is the subject
of the IEEE 802.5 standard and research at IBM.
_The Bus Topology
In the bus topology, all the nodes connect to a single transmission medium.
Frequency and time division multiplexing can be used with a bus topology.
There are a variety of media access methods applicable to the bus including
polling, token access, and CSMA/CD. Control can be centralized or
distributed. A tree is an extended bus in which only one transmission path
exists between two nodes (see Figure 3).
Bus performance depends on bus bandwidth, access protocol, number of nodes and
the user traffic. The access protocol has the greatest effect on bandwidth
utilization, with increased utilization usually requiring more complex
protocols. CSMA/CD, for example, is a very simple protocol, but does not
allow for very heavy bus utilization (Reference 3).
Typical data rates achieved by the bus are up to 50 Mbps over distances of 1
km.
One of the biggest advantages of the bus is that it easily allows for adding
for eliminating nodes. Wiring is also minimized, but implementation with
optical fiber is difficult. Coaxial cable is used most often because it is
easy to tap inexpensively and with low losses. Several bus schemes have been
implemented in commercial products. Most transient errors in a bus have the
same effect as a collision, so the network can be very stable because a
garbled message will just be retransmitted without long-term degradation of
the network.
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The Mesh Topology
In the mesh topology, there is more than one transmission path between any two
nodes. The more "connected" the mesh is, the higher the number of redundant
paths between nodes. The obvious advantages of the mesh topology is its
ability to withstand a link or node loss without downfall of the network and
to carry more traffic since more than one link can be carrying information at
a time. The disadvantage of the mesh topology is the complex routing
decisions which nodes have to make. Wiring complexity also grows more rapidly
for mesh topologies than for other topologies. Adding a new node to the
network involves connecting it to at least two other nodes, but if the
additional node substantially increases the traffic, additional links may be
required in parallel with those that are overburdened. The performance of the
mesh depends on the exact topology and capacity of the links and on the
routing algorithm used at the nodes.
Because of the routing computation complexity at the nodes, few local area
networks are built around the mesh topology, but parts of LANs can use the
mesh topology in order to increase redundancy in areas where high availability
is required. Sensors, for example, can be connected to the processing
elements of a LAN through a mesh network because they may be connected across
long distances or through precarious regions. The mesh could then provide
reliable and highly available interconnection.
In a totally connected mesh, each pair of nodes would be connected with a
dedicated full-duplex point-to-point link. This is one of the most fault
tolerant ways to connect computers, but the cost of wiring makes it
prohibitive when more than a Few nodes are required. It is also difficult to
recon?igure.
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o Media Access Method
The manner in which devices gain access to the medium is determined by the
network protocol. The media access protocol and the network topology are
interrelated; not every topology allows the use of every media access
protocol.
Access to the medium may be either controlled or demand access. With demand
access techniques such as CSMA/CD, a node attempts to gain access whenever it
has a message to send. With controlled access such as token passing or
polling a predetermined method is used to award access. The media access
protocol options considered here are:
- Token Passing
- Slotted Ring
- Register Insertion
- Polling
- Laning Poll
- CSMA/CD
The performance, reliability, and complexity vary with each protocol.
Token Passing
The token passing control scheme is applicable to the star bus, and ring
topologies. In token passing, unique bit patterns called tokens are passed
from one node to another. A node which has a message to transmit waits until
it receives the "free" token. Upon receiving the free token, the node may
transmit the message. When its transmission is complete, the source node
transmits a "free" token so that other nodes may access the medium.
Token passing offers the advantage of regulated traffic on the network and the
option of message priorities, making it suitable for data, voice, and realtime
applications (Reference 7). A disadvantage of the token ring is token
maintenance. The token may be lost, or a "busy" token may erroneously
circulate around the ring. One solution for this problem is the designation
of one node as the token monitor. The monitor could issue a new token if it
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detects that the token was lost. It would also detect a continuously
circulating "busy" token on a ring and correct this problem by setting the
token to the "free" bit sequence.
Slotted Ring
This protocol is analogous to a passing train with empty and full cars. In the
slotted ring, fixed length data slots continuously propagate around the ring.
A bit in each slot indicates whether the slot is full or empty. A node with a
message to transmit waits until an empty slot arrives, sets it full, and
inserts the message into the slot. Each node monitors the ring for data
addressed to it. In some slotted rings, the destination node can set response
bits indicating any errors and message reception. The source node removes the
data and sets the indicator bit "empty" freeing the slot. This node is now
free to transmit another message.
An advantage of the slotted ring is that the nodes have minimal interaction
with the ring. The slotted ring, however, is wasteful of bandwidth in terms
of overhead. R slotted ring system, the Cambridge Ring, was developed by
Cambridge University, and is now being commercially developed.
Register Insertion
With the register insertion control scheme, each node inserts the messages to
be transmitted into a shift register. When the ring becomes idle, the
contents o? the shift register are inserted onto the ring. The next node then
accepts the data on the ring into its shift register (buffer). If the message
is addressed to another node, it is reinserted onto the ring. The destination
node either removes the message or copies it while retransmitting it. If the
message is retransmitted, the source node removes the message.
The register insertion protocol allows a higher ring utilization than any of
the other methods. Priorities may also be used with this protocol. A major
disadvantage of register insertion, however, is the possibility of an error in
the address field which could cause the packet to circulate indefinitely. An
example of the register insertion protocol implementation is the IBM Series 1
Ring which operates at 2 Mbps.
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Polling
In the polling access method, one node acts as master of the ring or bus.
This master node initiates all data transfers by polling the nodes on the
network. If a node has data to transmit, it may do so when it is polled by
the master node. A lot of overhead is utilized by the polling process,
especially if there are many inactive nodes on the network. Another
disadvantage of this protocol is its inability to tolerate faults.
Laning Poll
The Laning Poll media access protocol, which is applicable only to the logical
bus, has been specified by the Charles Stark Draper Laboratory in their
Advanced Information Processing System (AIPS) proof of concept configuration.
With the Laning Po11 protocol, nodes compete for access to the medium through
a polling process. A node with a message to transmit begins the competition
by inserting a "1" onto the medium. Each node wishing to transmit a message
inserts its priority onto the medium one bit at a time starting with the most
significant bit. The transmission medium acts as a logical "OR". Nodes are
eliminated from the competition when their priority bit is a "0" and the
result of the "OR" is a "1". The bit by bit comparison of priorities
continues until ali nodes have been eliminated except the node with the
highest priority. This node may then transmit its message.
The SubACS program, a distributed network for nuclear submarines, uses a
similar protocol for accessing a redundant, high bandwidth fiber optic
bus.
Carrier Sense Multiple Access with Collision Detection (CSMA/CD)
CSMA/CD includes the following concepts:
CS is carrier sense which allows a node to transmit only if the channel if
free, that is, if no other nodes are transmitting at that time.
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MA stands for multiple access; any node needing to transmit may do so. If no
acknowledge is received within a certain time, the message i_ retransmitted.
CD is collision detection and allows a node to detect conflicting use of the
channel by two nodes. Because of propagation delays, two nodes can sense that
the channel is free and both can begin to transmit. When the collision is
detected, each node stops transmitting, waits a random amount of time, and
then tries to transmit again. This is the basic CSMA/CD protocol as
implemented by Ethernet on a coaxial cable bus.
Several variations of CSMA/CD have been presented in the last few years in an
attempt to minimize the drawbacks of this protocol. CSMA/CD provides
excellent delay characteristics at loading levels below about 15%. I? traffic
density increases much more than this, most of the channel bandwidth is used
in carrying colliding messages, and delays begin to increase far faster than
the offered loading level. Another problem with CSMA/CD is that it does not
allow certain messages, or nodes to have priority over others. This may be a
problem For realtime environment applications where a guaranteed maximum delay
is required.
The IEEE 802.9 standard describes the operation of a CSMAICD bus.
On CSMB/CD/DR (Deterministic Retransmissions), different stations have
different time windows over which their retransmissions can occur. These time
windows are changed sufficiently often, so that all stations are given fair
treatment over a long time span compared to the rate of change of the time
windows. The effect is to significantly reduce collisions because very few
stations retransmit on the same time window at a given time. This scheme
eliminates the problem of low throughput at high loads.
To allow for prioritization of messages, a variation of the above protocol is
needed. Instead of time windows being selected "fairly", they can be made to
be application dependent. Certain high priority messages would be allowed to
select shorter back-off times than other messages. This protocol, CSMA/CD.-DP
(dynamic priorities), is implemented on a chip set developed by Advanced Micro
Systems.
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Another variation of CSMA/CD, CSMA/CD/TS is (CSMA/CD with time slots) a more
deterministic method of media access. The network operates as a CSMA/CD
network until a collision occurs. Then, the network operates in a time slot
mode. After each node has had the opportunity to send one message, the
network switches back to the CSMA/CD mode o? operation. This type of protocol
is being implemented by Sperry in FODS (Fiber Optic Demonstration System).
CSMA has also been implemented with collision avoidance (CSMA/CA). With
CSMA/CA, a synchronization packet is sent to all nodes. Any node wishing to
transmit requests a transmission slot by placing a one bit in the
synchronization packet. Each node has a predefined bit location in the
packet. All nodes are notified by the packet which nodes wish to transmit.
The nodes then transmit in the sequence indicated by the synchronization
packet. (Ref 18)
o Network Interface Unit
The NIU enables user devices to be connected to a local area network by
providing conversion of user data rate and communications protocols to that of
the LAN system and vice versa. By functioning as a gateway, the NIU can
provide interconnection of LAN systems that use different protocols, whereas
by functioning as a bridge, the NIU can interconnect LAN systems with similar
protocols.
The design of most LAN systems is based on the reference model for open
systems interconnection proposed by the International Standards Organization
(ISO), shown in Figure 4. The model is not a standard for building equipment
but provides a framework that allows data communications standards to be
developed in an orderly and comprehensive manner.
Where network services physically reside within a LAN varies greatly from one
product to another. The placement of network intelligence can be generally
classified into one of several levels:
The end-user device performs all station functions and drives the
transmission medium; the LAN provides Level 1 services only.
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The end-user device connects to a NIU that provides Level i and Level
2 services and a small amount of buffering.
The NIU provides end-to-end Level 3 reliability services, plus
increased provision for bu?fering.
The NIU provides source-to-_estination Level 4 services such as
error-free virtual point-to-point channels that deliver messages in
the order in which they are sent.
The NIU provides Level 5 session management service_, plus recovery
from broken Level 4 connections.
The NIU is a micro- or minicomputer that provides Level 6
interconnection functions.
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7 APPLICATIONS
LAYER
PRESENTATION
LAYER
SESSION
LAYER
'TRANSPORT
LAYER
NETWORK
LAYER
DATA LINK
LAYER
PHYSICAL
LAYER
O
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
o
0
Serves the end user application process
Performs data transformations
Data translation
Formatting
Establishes connection, or session,
between two presentation layers
Manages the dialog
Provides circuit fault recovery
Segmentation of message
Flow control
Ensures acceptable error levels
Arranges message into packets
Routing
Congestion control
Formats data into data frames
Processes acknowledgement frames
Error handling
The mechanical, electrical, and procedural
interfacing to the media
FIGURE 4. Open Systems Interconnection Reference Model
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Whenever a function resides in the end-user device, it is considered to be
outside of the LAN. The user is usually responsible for developing and
maintaining this software, although some LAN suppliers have begun to provide
high-level software for certain applications.
For a further discussion on NIU's, refer to section 1.7.1.2.
Options
The options for the Space Station onboard LAN are a subset of the various
combinations of the parameter options described above.
Due to the nature of the star topology (active), as well as the slotted ring,
polling and the register insertion media access methods, they are not
considered as an option. These techniques do not meet the requirements of
reliability/availability and performance of the Space Station LAN. The major
disadvantages of each are reiterated below.
Active Star -
Slotted Ring -
Not fault tolerant
long wiring lengths
high overhead
Polling high overhead
low fault tolerance
Register Insertion - purge mechanism
STB
The onboard LAN options are:
Token Ring
o ANSI X3T9.5 FDDI
Token Bus
o IEEE 802.4
CSMA/CD Bus
o FODS
Laning Poll Bus
o SubACs
o AIPS
Others
o Langley Mesh
o SAE/AE - 9B
Table 2 provides a brief description of these networks. The Langley Mesh and
SAE/AE-gB networks are not fully defined and, therefore, not included in the
table.
2.5.2.2.1 Token Ring
The media access method for the token ring is token passing. In a token ring
unique patterns called tokens are passed from node to node around the ring. A
node which has a message to transmit waits until it receives the "free" token,
then changes the token to the "busy" bit pattern and transmits the message
behind the "busy" token. Each node monitors the ring for data addressed to
it. The destination node copies the data as it goes by and appends some bits
to the end of the messages to indicate any errors and messages reception.
When the message complete its trip around the ring, the source node removes
the message from the ring and transmits a "free" token so that other stations
may access the ring.
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o ANSI Token Ring
The ANSI X3Tg.5 Fiber Distributed Data Interface (FDDI) local area network is
a 100 Mbps token passing ring with 4B/SB coding and a maximum packet length of
4500 bytes.
Free tokens are inserted directly behind the message. Therefore, multiple
messages may exist on the ring, but there may be only one free token on the
ring at any given time. This increases efficiency if the packets are small
relative to the ring latency.
Priorities are allowed as are synchronous and asynchronous messages. When the
ring load is low, both asynchronous and synchronous messages can be -
transmitted. If the load is high, only synchronous messages can be
transmitted (i.e., synchronous messages have a higher priority).
The standard provides counter rotating rings for redundancy. The ring will
continue to operate with one failure, and may operate with two or more
depending on where they occur.
2:5.3,2,2 Token Bus
The operation of the token bus is similar to that of the token ring. A unique
bit pattern (token) is passed from node to node on the bus. A node may only
transmit a message when it has possession of the token. When the transmission
is complete, the node inserts a "free" token onto the bus. The major
difference between the token bus and the token ring is that the nodes in the
token bus must insert into the token field the address of the node which
should receive the token next, the nodes thus forming a logical ring. Thus,
each node must know the address of the nodes preceding and following it in
logical sequence. This requires more overhead than the token ring in order to
accommodate the address in the token field. The token bus is also not as
efficient as the token ring under heavy loads, and under light loads has a
longer delay (see Reference 3).
The token bus is the subject of the IEEE 802,4 standard.
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2.5.3.2.3 CSMA/CD BUS
The CSMA/CD media access method does not appear to be suitable for Space
Station application because of its non-deterministic nature. However, a
variation of the standard CSMA/CD protocol, FODS, a CSMA/CD/TS LAN,
compensates for this effect.
o Fiber Optic Distributed System (FODS)
The FODS LAN being developed by Sperry under the direction of NASA Goddard
Space Flight Center uses CSMA/CD/TS (CSMA/CD with time slots) media access
method. With this method, there are two modes of operation: the CSMA/CD mode
and the time slot mode.
When in CSMA/CD mode, a node with a message to transmit listens to the bus
traffic. When the bus becomes idle, the node begins its transmission. If a
collision occurs, the transmissions are halted and the BIUs switch to the
controlled access mode. In this mode, there is no contention For the bus;
each BIU is assigned a unique time slot (according to its address) of fixed
width to begin transmitting. At the start of transmission, the countdown
through the time slots is suspended. At the end of the transmission the
countdown is resumed. Each BIU has one opportunity to transmit (one time slot
each) in a controlled access cycle. When one cycle is complete, the BIU's
switch to the random access mode.
At the beginning of the random access mode, each BIU with a message to send
waits a random delay before transmitting in order to avoid collisions from
accumulated messages. The bus then operates as a CSMA/CD bus.
Presently, the NIU design encompasses the physical and data link layers
(ISO/OSI). The network layer and perhaps higher layers may be incorporated in
the NIU in the future. In the demonstration system, the NIUs dissipate
approximately 35 watts. After technology improvements, the goal is lO watts
dissipation per NIU.
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The network consists of variable length fiber optic links interconnected by a
passive star coupler. A maximumof 32 nodes (some of which maybe bridges)
attach to each star coupler. The demonstration system will operate at 1OO
Mbpsbaseband. This will later be increased to 300 Mbps.
2.5.3.2.4 Laning Poll Bus
o SubRCs LAN
The Submarine Advanced Combat System (SubACs) utilized the Distributed System
Data Bus (DSDB) communications network developed by IBM. This distributed
system was designed to be highly reconfigurable and fault tolerant. The
probability of a successful packet transfer is gg%. Throughout the system,
inter- and intra- cabinet, the same network protocol is implemented. The
media may be either fiber optics or twisted shielded pair with no effect on
the basic protocol of the bus. Fiber is used for the intra-cabinet buses, and
wire is generally used within the cabinets. For example, the array bus and
data processor bus (see Figure 5) are redundant B Mbyte fiber buses. Twenty
port passive stars interconnect the BIU's/bridges.
The DSDB handles both real-time periodic data and asynchronous data. The
bandwidth is allocated to processes using dynamic rate monotonic priority
scheduling in which periodic data has a higher priority than asynchronous
data. DSDB also features packet switching and concurrent message handling.
Access to the media is obtained through priority contention which is similar
to the Laning poll method (RIPS by the Charles Stark Draper Laboratory).
Devices which have a message to transmit insert the priority of their message
simultaneously onto the medium one bit at a time starting with the most
significant bit. The priorities are logically 'OR'ed by the fiber optic
medium. If a device which transmitted a '0' priority bit received a '@' back,
it is out of the contention. The bit by bit comparison continues until all
devices have been eliminated except the device with the highest priority. In
case of a tie between two messages with the same priority, the address of the
device is appended to the priority ?or the bit by bit comparison.
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The SubACS bus interface unit (BIIU) and network operating system (NOS) can be
briefly characterized as a modular, intelligent unit for message distribution
in a local area network. The BIU is the hardware component in which the NOS
software executes, lhe BIU/NOS include functions through layer 5 of the
ISO/OSI reference model.
lhe following discussion is for the BIU and N()S as they exist in late 1984.
The network and its capabilities have planned upgrades that will affect some
of the details, but not the overall concept of operation.
The primary purpose of the BIU is to interface any of several processors or
devices to the distributed system data bus (DSDB) so that those components can
communicate in performing their functions. The BIU has a modular design both
at the interface to the transmission medium and at the interface to a
processor or device. A core set of modules and functions is used for a11
BIUs. The BIU can be personalized to connect to any of several Navy standard
processor/device interfaces by the inclusion of the appropriate standard card
and NOS software. A different medium or data transfer rate can be used by
including the appropriate interface card, such as one to talk over a fiber
optics link or another to talk over a wire line. SubACS does not include
gateways, because the network was designed to have compatible protocols
throughout they system and therefore needs no conversion functions supplied by
a gateway.
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A bridge is a special case of BIU which has been personalized with two media
cards and the related NOS software in order to interface the transmission
media of two networks. The bridge is used to selectively receive messages on
one port For retransmission on the other port. SubACS includes both wire/Fiber
and Fiber/Fiber bridges between local area networks.
The NOS which executes in the BIU performs network failure management
functions, in addition to normal message transmission and reception. At
initiation of a connection between two portsl the NOS locates a path to
establish as the virtual circuit, based on parameters of the new messages, and
the Failure status and loading of the parts of the network. At a failure, the
NOS/BIU isolates the problem, reestablishes the virtual circuit, and continues
operation automatically. Programs are moved to alternate machines at failure
of a processor, if a suitable replacement is available. Failures are reported
to the operator.
The BIU acts as a store and forward unit, first selectively receiving a
message into a buffer in the BIU from the medium or attached device, then
Forwarding the message when the channel is available to its final
destination. When functioning as a bridge, the NOS has the knowledge of which
messages are to be ignored, and which are to be forwarded through to the other
port after reception. The information about which processes and devices are
active at each port is maintained dynamically as processes are activated or
deactivated and as hardware is turned on or off or fails.
The BIU/NOS maintains a common time within the network by periodic
equalization of local times to common reference. This time is used for
various logs, allowing identification of the order of events across the
network for problem analysis and evaluation of such performance parameters as
time delays of messages.
The SubACs System uses standard software, wherever possible, and standard
hardware. This provides For easy reconfigurability and simplified system
integration. The redundant busses provide Fault tolerance. Enhanced
versions of the SubACs Architecture are planned For Future development.
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o AIPS
The Advanced Information Processing System (AIPS) designed by the Charles
Stark Draper Laboratory (CSDL) is a fault tolerant processor complex which
communicates using an Input/Output Network (I/O), an Intercomputer (IC)
Network and a mass memory bus. Devices are connected to the networks via
network interfaces. The I/O and IC interfaces are interconnected by switching
devices (nodes) as depicted in the proof of concept configuration shown in
Figure 6. The nodes and interfaces are described below.
The nodes are interconnected in a mesh configuration. However, the network
operateslogically as a bus. Under normal operations, the network
configuration remains static. The advantage of the mesh interconnections is
the ability to tolerate faults. Nhen a fault occurs, the network is
reconfigured to bypass the Fault. The reconfiguration commands are sent to
the nodes by the network manager.
Each node in the proof-of-concept configuration has five input/output ports.
Three independent nodes provide redundancy. The node performs the following
functions.
o
o
o
o
o
o
o
Receives data
Checks for protocol conformity and transmission errors
Regenerate signal
Transmits data
Enables/disables port transmitters as commanded
Circuit switching for fault recovery
Responds to error and status requests
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FIGURE 6 AIPS PROOF CONFIGURATION
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The IC network is a cross-connected set of nodes which uses circuit switching
for recovery from node-to-node links faults. Attached processors transmit on
only one of the triply redundant IC buses, yet listen to all three.
contention of the media is resolved using the Laning Poll technique. The IC
network interface performs the following functions:
Receives data
Checks for protocol conformity and transmission errors
Performs a bit by bit comparison of the three data signals from the
triply redundant network
Converts Serial/Parallel Data
Decodes addresses
Transmits data and enforces a transmission length limitation
Enables/disables functioning of the inter?ace
Contends for the network using the Laning Poll technique
The II0 network is a cross-connected set of nodes which uses circuit switching
for recovery from node-to-node link faults. It is a simplex network in which
only one I/O processor is enabled to receive or transmit during an I/O
exchange. Access to the media is gained through the Laning Poll technique.
The I/O interface performs the following functions.
o
0
0
0
0
0
Received data
Checks for protocol conformity and transmission errors
Converts Serial/Paral].el
Transmits data and enforces a transmission length limitation
Enables/disables functioning of the interface
Contends for the network using the Laning Poll technique
The AIPS also includes a triplex multiplex bus which provides communication
between the mass memory and the general purpose computers (GPC). The
interface to this bus, the mass memory bus interface, performs essentially the
same functions as the IC network interface except address decoding, which is
not necessary.
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in order to perform these functions, the interfaces and nodes shouid contain
the physical, data link, and the network layers of the ISO/OSI model.
2.5.3.2.5 Others
There are other systems which should be further investigated for possible
application to the Space Station Program. these include SAE/RE-98 LAN and the
Langley Mesh.
o Langley Mesh
The mesh topology currently being investigated at the Langley research center
has been selected as a possible candidate to fulfill the reliability and
fault-tolerance requirements of future space systems such as Space Station.
Each node is connected to two adjacent nodes and to two more nodes further up
and further back as shown in the figure below.
In other versions, even more connectivity is.provided by adding links to the
n+3 and n-3 nodes. The network could be laid in a linear fashion or looped
back as a ring.
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Currently investigations are under way to determine an access protocol and
routing algorithm that would yield high performance. The present Langley
emulator includes 7 nodes, each comprised of six 68000 processors for link
control, node control, and interface management. Routing algorithm selection
must be done with care because the overhead may reduce performance
significantly. The purpose of the hardware emulator is to investigate among
other things, the best routing algorithms.
Some of the problems with this topology for Space Station are:
I) Very early research stage so exact performance cannot be determined
2) Not a standard
3) Would be relatively higher cost because of more expensive node electronics
4) Does not necessarily meet FO/FS/R requirements, for example, when two
adjacent nodes fail
An advantage is:
Should be more fault-tolerant than most other topologies considered
Another consideration is that performance will be highly dependent on the
routing algorithm chosen
As the Langley research group further defines this network some of its
disadvantages may be overcome, so their efforts will continue to be monitored.
SAE/AE-gB The Society of Automotive Engineers (SAE) is currently
working on a standard For a high speed local area network. The standard,
SAE/AE-gB, will provide a high degree of fault tolerance and
compatibility with military requirements. The standard will focus
primarily on the physical and data link layers (ISO/OSI) and may be
applicable to the network layer.
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Some of the requirements for the SAE/AE-gB LAN are as follows.
o The Benchmark Information Rate
- If 64 nodes each have 16 word messages to send, all nodes shall
move their messages in less than 1200 usec.
If 16 nodes (out of 128) have 16 word messages to send, they
shall all be sent in less than 300 usec.
o It shall support serial data transfer.
It shall handle a periodic as well as periodic data transfers and
support priorities.
It shall support up to 128 nodes and a nodal separation of at least
300 meters.
O It shall provide for distributed control and possibly have a
centralized mode available.
The topology and media access method have not yet been determined.
Characterization of Commercial LAN's
The Table that follows list a number of LAN alternatives from various
commercial manufacturers. Following is an explanation of the entries used in
the comparison matrices.
Topology: Possible network topologies (as previously discussed) are star,
bus, ring and mesh.
Media Access Method: Current IEEE protocol standards are CSMA/CD, Token-Bus
and Token Ring.
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Transmission Technique: Possible network transmission techniques are baseband
and broadband. In baseband transmission, the transmission medium carries one
signal (always digital) at a time. In broadband transmission, the medium
carries many signals (always analog) at a time, with each signal occupying a
different frequency band on the medium.
Transmission Medium. This entry lists the possible transmission medium used
for the LAN's principle data path (channel). Possible media are baseband
(Ethernet) coaxial cable, broadband (CATV) cable and fiber optic cable.
Principle hardware components: This entry lists those hardware components
supplied by the manufacturer essential to the LAN. Possible components are:
Network Interface Unit: Provides media access and user interface
functions.
Bridge: NIU that provides interconnection of multiple LAN's using
identical protocols.
Gateway: NIU that provides interconnection of multiple LAN's using
dissimilar protocols.
Headend: In broadband systems, signals are inherently unidirectional
(i.e., they propagate in only one direction). Therefore, two data paths
(channels) are needed to achieve full connectivity. The channels are
joined at a point on the network known as the headend. All NIU's transmit
on one channel toward the headend (inbound or reverse direction). Signals
received at the headend are then propagated (and possibly amplified and/or
frequency shifted) along a second channel away from the headend (outbound
or forward direction). All stations transmit on the reverse-direction
channel and receive on the forward-direction channel (see Figure 5).
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Network Control Center. This device usually attaches to the network
through an NIU and consists of a keyboard/screen interface and a
microcomputer. It supports key operations, administration, and
maintenance functions. All NCC functions can fail into one of three
categories, configuration functions, monitoring functions, and fault
isolation.
Operating System. Operating systems for networks are generally classified as
either Network Operating Systems or as Distributed Operating Systems. In NOS,
each host connected to the LAN runs its own (non-network) operating system.
The networking is controlled by user programs that run on the various hosts.
In DOS, the individual host operating systems are discarded and a single
homogeneous operating systems is implemented for the entire network.
Data Encryption: Encryption can prevent unauthorized utilization and
disclosure of network resources. A number of schemes for encryption exist,
one of them being the National Bureau of Standards Data Encryption Standard
(DES). The data encryption can be end-to-end or link oriented. End-to-end
encryption is handled as a presentation layer function. In link-level
encryption, all data plus all the headers except the layer 2 header are
encrypted at the data link layer.
End-to-End Error Rate: This is the number of erroneous bits transmitted
between end users.
Redundancy: The additional number of extra LAN components (resources) to
provide tolerance of faults. If a component fails, then an equivalent
component picks up the slack. Some systems use an approach in which the
identical components function in parallel. Other systems activate the
redundant components only upon a failure.
2.5.3.3 Projected Capabilities
TBS
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2.6 Network Performance Assessment
Thls sectlon describes the options for monltorlng the performance of the SSDS
network including:
0 Technlques for collectlng and analyzlng network activity on both a
long-term and peak perlod basis.
o Use of specialized tools for testlng trunk and gateway performance.
0 Alarm mechanlsms for reportlng unusual events such as degraded user
response, gateway fallures, or poor trunk blt error rates (BER's).
0 Monitoring of service quallty for Externally supplied communications
links.
o Modellng tools for predlctlng network static and dynamic performance.
It Is anticipated that the SSDS w111 use a combination of centralized and
decentralized tools to assess network performance. Major requirements drivers
in the SSDS network performance assessment subsystems are the needs for:
0 Comprehensive reporting of performance information to a location where
network activities can be coordinated, and network diagnostic information
can be interpreted by expert personnel.
0 Automated systems which facilitate the analysis of network traffic and
performance statistics for long-term plannlng.
0 The avallablllty of modellng and slmulatlon tools whlch allow the
optlmlzatlon of network performance wlth mlnlmal waste of bandwldth and
good user response characteristics.
0 Data collection and fault detection mechanisms sufficiently detailed to
allow Immedlate detection of system faults and early warning of incipient
problems.
0 Minimal use of manpower for routine activities such as monitoring gateway
performance or llnk status.
Quick reporting of network malfunctions with sufficient information to
localize the nature of the problem.
o Minimal overhead in data collection or effect on network performance.
Major relevant questions associated with network performance monitoring
options are:
o How centrallzed should the performance monitoring function be?
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Should a single facility be responsible for the monitoring of space
segment LAN's, space-ground links, and the ground data distribution system?
o If not, how should these functions be partitioned and coordinated to
-maintain full cognizance of overall network performance?
o Should some sort of standardlzatlon be applled to network performance
reporting? (e.g., hardware monitors or diagnostic interfaces)
o What types of tools should be developed to model and analyze data?
o What services for monitoring thls data should be provided to network
operators and users?
2.6.1 Hardware Configuration Options
The major set of hardware optlons In network testing and monltorlng are those
associated wlth the physical dlstrlbutlon of the hardware and Its
Interconnectlon. Effectively thls system should be considered a subnetwork
and be conflgured according to Its own speclflc requirements, wlth the same
options associated wlth the design of a fault-tolerant network. Many current
networks, Includlng NASCOM, tend to deemphaslze this superstructure resulting
In significant manning requirements at network nodes. These manpower
requirements can be significantly reduced through appropriate monitoring
system design, and choices associated wlth such automation is an important set
of options.
Since rapid location of network performance degradation and malfunctions is a
major function of monitoring hardware, its organization is usually
hierarchical In modern networks, with monitoring equipment located at each
gateway feeding Into progresslvely hlgher levels of network organization.
Whether thls organization should be used for the SSDS monitoring system; the
relative depth of hierarchy, and the level of monitoring intelligence at each
node are significant choices. In particular, the structure and the complexity
of the SSDS control and diagnostic facilities are functions of these choices.
The level of detail at which services are monitored is also a significant
choice. Should network performance and quality be monitored only for major
trunks and gateways? Is It feasible to provide comprehensive end-to-end
monitoring of llnk quality for individual low-rate data llnk users (e.g., a
1200 baud volce-quallty llnk)? At what level of network service detail should
monitoring occur?
Use of a comprehenslve hardware monltorlng system throughout the SSDS implies
the standardlzat10n of Interfaces for performance monltorlng and dlagnostlc
equlpment. Typlcal standards assoclated wlth such Interfaces In modern
communications system are RS-232C, IEEE 488, CAMAC, and STD. All have
relatively low-level ISO physical layer descrlptlons wlth each vendor
provldlng Its own standards for requesting test sequences or performance
data, Consistently applled hlgh-1eve1 Interfaces (e,g,, formats for reporting
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trunk BER's or unusual events such as the fallure or relnltlallzatlon of a
gateway) do not seem to exist. Should NASA develop Its own set of standards
or should it cooperate wlth an organization such as ANSI or ISO to develop a
standard?
Another optlon ls the degree of lnte111gence for monltorlng and diagnosis at
each gateway. A trend in network design is the use of microprocessors at each
network node to concentrate gateway statistics and perform local dlagnostlcs.
Locatlng logic and associated data buffering at each gateway has many
advantages:
o Delays assoclated with dlagnostlc polllng are minimized.
Significantly more complex diagnostics can be integrated with routine
system monitoring functions since only local bandwidth is used for
diagnostic activities.
More comprehenslve hlstorlcal Informatlon on Intermlttent system problems
can be collected.
Loopback testing can be done on a local basis, slmpllfylng the location of
malfunctions.
o Equipment can be conflgured for speclflc local subnetwork diagnostic
requirements and problems.
o Local personnel can have access to diagnostic capab111tles.
o Network control center structure Is slmpllfled.
o Addltlonal functlons such as break-ln detection and thermal control are
easily integrated.
Negative aspects are:
o The increased cost associated with providing duplicate monitoring and
diagnostic equipment at many sites.
Possible undetected node failure when diagnostic and gateway equipment
simultaneously malfunction (e.g., power failure).
The means of Interconnectlon of performance and dlagnostlc equipment has
several associated options. The main concern is the possibility of
simultaneous failure of network and diagnostic links. The options are:
Use of standard network channels--Diagnostlc information is communicated
along the same channels as network traffic, either through subchannels or
data headers. The main advantage of this approach is that is requires
mlnlmal resources. For systems wlth mlnlmal alternative data channels
(e.g., space-ground llnk) it may be the only feasible approach.
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o Use of parallel channels--Addltlonal dedicated diagnostic lines are
allocated In the network structure. An example of this mechanism are the
diagnostic channels associated with AT&T Dataphone modem networks.
o Use of physically separate channels--Diagnostlc information is
communicated in a manner which is fully separate from network channels.
An example of thls are satellite communications networks which use
ground-based links for status polling and diagnosis.
2.6.2 Loopback Testing and Calibrated Signal Techniques
Most of the anticipated testing and performance monitoring associated with the
SSOS Is likely to use digital techniques. Such techniques may be based on the
detection of faults through the monitoring of error detectlon/correctlon
activities at gateways, l.e. through checks of polynomial encoding or simple
block count checks. However, once problems are detected localization Is
generally done through loopback techniques, l.e. to test the performance of a
remote llne a loopback circuit Is set up, a pseudo random pattern Is
transmitted, the received signal Is compared, and associated BER's are
determined.
Options for the SSDS In thls area include:
o Whether speclal dlgltal loopback equipment designed to handle data rates
higher than the current commercially available equipment should be
developed.
o To what extent the SSDS network should be designed to support loopback
testing? How should the space segment be accommodated?
o What sorts of associated analog equipment for measurements such as line
loss, signal to noise ratio, modulation level, and waveform distortion
measurements in hlgh-bandwldth lines must be developed?
o What level of automation should be associated wlth loopback testing?
Should the testing be operator-medlated of fully automated?
2.6.3 Real-Time versus Offllne
Monitoring of network performance may be done on a real-tlme or offllne
basis. Provision of real-tlme monitoring services is strongly affected by how
data Is collected. Types of real-tlme monitoring capabilities which may be of
use In the SSDS include:
o Trunk and gateway blt, block, and frame traffic rates
o Trunk and gateway bit, block, and frame error rates
0 Node to node average and peak packeWme_sage transmlsslon tlmes
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o Retransmlsslon rates
o B1ocklng rates for switched circuit traffic
o Packet and message processing rates
Dynamlc reroutlng activities, partlcularly those related to gateway
failure, overflow, or burst pattern changes
o Collision rates for individual local area networks
o System loglns and sessions
o Power supply performance
o Intrusion and physical damage alarms
2.6.4 Software
Several types of servlces must be provlded for SSDS network monitoring. We
divide them into five classes. The allocation of functions to each set of
services is a significant set of options. We do not consider Security
Reporting in detail here, but it is likely to be integrated with other network
monitoring services.
Local Reporting Servlces--Support collection of data for local use (e.g.
Internal LAN traffic) or for summary reporting to the network control center
(e.g., session detail records).
Network Reporting Servlces--Support reporting of subnet, gateway, and trunk
status throughout the network In a consistent manner.
Security Reportlng Servlces--Support collection of data essential to
monitoring network security, e.g., attempts to gain access to protected
network resources.
Privileged Monltorlng Servlces--Support monltorlng of network performance by
network operations personnel. Typically these services include monitoring
activities which may affect network performance if utilized by a large class
of network users or those which report information which might compromise
network security.
User Monitoring Servlces--Support user monitoring of network performance
allowing users to determine current network status, determine data llnk
quality, and llnk alternatives when non-transparent services are used (i.e.
when users are allowed to determine which network resources are utilized).
Also services which allow users to register trouble reports.
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2.6.5 Nodellng and Slmulatlon Techniques
Tools for predlctlng network performance fall Into the following categories:
Analytlc queulng models which provlde numeric solutlons based on
probability distributions (e.g., Polsson, Erlang, etc.) and on estimates
of llne traffic rates.
General simulation tools such provide a framework for network performance
prediction, but which are not limited to this activity.
Telecommunications simulation tools which typically include factlltles for
analysls of network specific structures such as adaptlve routing,
propagation delay, protocol performance, and tariffs.
Some common (and well-supported) tools associated with analyttc and discrete
slmulatlon modellng of network performance are:
GPSS
SIMSCRIPT
SLAM
DSOS
SIMULA
Tools wlth specialized telecommunications modellng capabilities include
systems such as the Telco Optymizer's or the DMW Teletrafflc Optimizer. These
tools Include regularly updated tariff data bases, provisions for user-deflned
cost models, and simulation capabilities for the telecommunlcatlons-unlque
structures mentioned previously. However, since large volce-data-vldeo
networks are a relatively recent phenomena, most are geared toward the
analysis of traffic on voice network. Although manufacturers are gearing new
network analysis tools to the new network configurations, it seems unlikely
that a vendor-supplled tool fully suitable for SSDS modeling will be
available, and It is an optlon for NASA to consider the development of such a
tool.
A major set of options associated wlth system modeling involves the means for
introducing data into the model. Typically thls has been a manual operation,
and the automation of thls process for the SSDS Is seen as a means of reducing
the labor associated wlth network analysis, and increasing the responsiveness
(and usefulness) of the network model. The data collection and concentration
actlvltes are an appropriate consideration In the planning of the SSDS.
2.6.6 Performance Data Analysis
Analysis of network performance data serves the followlng purposes:
o To facllltate system plannlng and resource allocatlon
o To evaluate current system performance and user response
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o To determine system reliability and availability
o To predict fallure trends and target preventive maintenance
One option associated wlth performance analysls Is the type of software tool
to be used. Query systems associated with DBMS's can provide a partial
solutlon, providing essential summary reports. More general analysls can be
performed using a modern statlstlcal analysls system such as SAS or SPSS-X.
Such systems have standard Interfaces with DBMS's and provide high-level tools
for the generation of both production and ad hoc reports. Another option Is
to develop custom software for report production.
Types of analyses options which may be appropriate to the monitoring and
prediction of SSDS performance include:
o All the reports mentioned In 2.6.3 wlth short- and long-term trend analyses
o Hourly utilization rates for gateways and trunks
Analyses to locate dead clrcults such as short and long call rates, and
detailed circuit utlllzatlon reports
o Equipment failure models
o Trouble report summarles organized by locatlon, equipment type, and user
o Data quality summaries
o Peak response and node-to-node propagatlon times and variances
2.6.7 Performance Degradation Alert and Diagnosis System
The major types of options assoclated wlth network performance degradations
alerts are:
0 Detection--Methods of detection must preclude the posslblllty of
undetected gateway failure. Sufficient llnk redundancy must be provided
to allow diagnosis In the presence of gateway fallure.
Fllterlng--Typlcal large-scale networks are subject to many spurious
alarms which must be filtered so that serious problems are recognized
through the noise. Examples of spurious alarms are those associated wlth
equipment temporarily being taken offllne for maintenance or those
associated with routine network reconflguration.
Locallzatlon--Sufflclent information must be communicated that the problem
Is understood and localized to appropriate equipment (or software). In a
network involving many thousands of gateways, each wlth redundant
subsystems, thls may not be an easy task.
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Techniques for detecting performance degradation or gateway failure Include:
o Centrallzed polling--Gateways are regularly polled for status by a central
control and status system.
Centralized reportlng--Gateways regularly send status messages to a
central control and status system.
Centralized deadman tlmer--If a gateway has not been active for a period
of tlme then It Is polled by a central control and status system.
Paranold democracy--Gateways expect regular "I am well" messages or
handshakes from their nelghbors. Otherwise they reroute traffic.
Spurious status messages may be filtered by operator-settable warning
thresholds based on message type or frequency. Options include the degree of
operator control, the types of thresholds used, and the level of machine
Intelligence Involved (e.g., use of AI techniques).
Localization of failure or performance degradation presents another set of
options. Presentation of diagnostic information may involve a simple
alphanumeric description of the location and type of equipment involved or It
may be a sophisticated graphics display wlth menu options allowing the
operator to quickly recall a map of the equipment configuration with
Interconnectlons and affected subsystems clearly displayed. The second option
Is significantly more costly to develop, but saves time and manpower In
long-term operations.
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